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Abstract 
 
This thesis comprises three essays on Mergers and Acquisitions. In the first chapter I 
use an international sample of M&A deals to test the implications of the clientele theory of 
dividends in the context of post-acquisition dividend policy. I contribute to the literature by 
controlling for the effect of the target’s shareholder characteristics and the gap between target 
and bidder pre-acquisition dividend policies on post-M&A dividend policy. In line with the 
clientele theory of dividends, this chapter demonstrates that, in all stock payment deals, post-
acquisition dividends per share increase with the pre-acquisition percentage difference between 
target and acquirer DPS and with the size of the dividend clientele from the target company 
which becomes part of the bidder’s shareholder base. The second chapter tests how informed 
investors with local expertise can affect cross-border deal success using a comprehensive 
dataset of corporate acquirers’ share registers. We present evidence which confirms the 
hypothesis that acquirers in cross-border corporate transactions are more likely to be successful 
if the acquirer’s investors have a higher level of expertise in the target region, and that this 
effect is strongest when the maturity for corporate transactions of the target country is low. The 
third chapter contributes to the literature by investigating the wealth effects of horizontal 
acquisitions on the upstream and downstream participants in the product-market chain when 
the target company is in financial distress. This chapter posits that the financial health of the 
target is particularly relevant when considering the buyer power of the merging firms. 
Specifically, I hypothesise that industry-related acquisitions are more likely to increase the 
buyer power of the merging companies when the target is financially distressed due to the 
debtor-oriented insolvency rules in the US which allow bankrupt companies to renegotiate 
supplier contracts. The results of the study support this a priori expectation.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis comprises three essays on Mergers and Acquisitions. In the first chapter I 
use an international sample of M&A deals to test the implications of the clientele theory of 
dividends in the context of post-acquisition dividend policy. I contribute to the literature by 
controlling for the effect of the target’s shareholder characteristics on post-M&A dividend 
policy. The clientele theory posits that the acquirer will change its dividend policy after the 
deal in order to accommodate the preferences of the investors which it ‘inherits’ from the target. 
This effect is expected to be stronger when the target’s pre-acquisition dividend policy is 
significantly different from that of the acquirer, and the larger the proportion of institutional 
investors from the target company that remain on the share register of the bidder. These 
implications are most relevant in cases when the bidder pays for the target with its own shares 
and as a result acquires a large number of the target’s dividend clientele. This study 
demonstrates that, in all stock payment deals, post-acquisition dividends per share increase 
with the pre-acquisition percentage difference between target and acquirer DPS and with the 
size of the dividend clientele from the target company which becomes part of the bidder’s 
shareholder base. Thus, the acquirer is more likely to alter post-M&A dividend policy, the 
higher the bargaining power of the investors coming from the target company, and therefore 
the higher the likelihood that these investors will negatively impact the bidder’s share price 
should they be dissatisfied with the payout policy. The analysis also reveals that managers can 
use dividend payments as a signalling mechanism that reduces the information asymmetry that 
surrounds the acquisition process. 
The second chapter tests how informed investors with local expertise can affect cross-
border deal success using a comprehensive dataset of corporate acquirers’ share registers. We 
posit that deals in which long-term investors have a high level of expertise in the target firm’s 
region are more likely to perform better than if the deal is ‘naked’, i.e. when such regional 
 12 
 
expertise amongst the investors is low. We show that the strength of this effect depends upon 
an index of country-level M&A maturity which measures the relative divergence between 
acquirer and target countries. Specifically, we investigate whether acquirers investing in 
countries with low M&A maturity gain greater benefit from investors with regional expertise. 
We present evidence which confirms the hypothesis that acquirers in cross-border corporate 
transactions are more likely to be successful if the acquirer’s investors have a higher level of 
expertise in the target region, and that this effect is strongest when the maturity for corporate 
transactions of the target country is low. This provides a specific setting which is consistent 
with earlier theoretical work that argues in general that information flows should not just be 
from firms to capital markets but also in the opposite direction, and that this flow of information 
is particularly important whenever information is dispersed. 
The third chapter contributes to the literature by investigating the wealth effects of 
horizontal acquisitions on the upstream and downstream participants in the product-market 
chain when the target company is in financial distress. Specifically, this study examines the 
announcement-related share price revaluations experienced by the suppliers, competitors and 
customers to the acquisition industry in order to determine whether horizontal deals are driven 
by buyer power, monopolistic collusion or efficiency motives. This study posits that the 
financial health of the target is particularly relevant when considering the buyer power of the 
merging firms. In particular, I hypothesise that industry-related acquisitions are more likely to 
increase the buyer power of the merging companies when the target is financially distressed 
due to the debtor-oriented insolvency rules in the US which allow bankrupt companies to 
renegotiate supplier contracts. Consistent with the buyer power motive, the average 
announcement abnormal returns which accrue to the suppliers of the acquisition industry are 
significantly negative while the returns to the competitors of the merging firms are significantly 
positive. The magnitude of these stock market revaluations is higher when the target company 
 13 
 
is in financial distress. The regression analysis of announcement abnormal returns shows that 
the gains to the merging firms and their rivals are higher while the returns to suppliers are lower 
when the supplier industry is sufficiently concentrated and when the acquisition is large relative 
to its industry. The latter effects are stronger when the acquisition is of a financially distressed 
firm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Does Dividend Policy Change after M&A? 
1.1 Introduction 
On October 23, 2009 Suncor Energy (SE), a Canadian energy company, announced its 
intentions to merge with Petro-Canada (PC), another Canadian company which operates in the 
oil and gas industry. The method of payment for the deal was all stock and the transaction was 
valued at US $15.582 billion. Upon deal completion SE shareholders owned approximately 
60% and PC shareholders the remaining 40% of the new company. The dividend policies of 
the firms were considerably different before the closing of the deal, with PC and SE paying out 
dividends per share (DPS) of US $0.80 and US $0.20 respectively. One year after the takeover, 
SE increased its DPS by 100% to US $0.40. SE continued increasing the level of dividend 
payout over the subsequent years, with DPS reaching $0.80 in 2014.1 The story of Suncor 
Energy exemplifies how the dividend policy of companies may change following an all stock 
acquisition. More fundamentally, however, this story raises important questions with regard to 
the underlying reasons for the change in dividend policy, and whether this type of company 
behaviour is unique to Suncor Energy or whether it is typical for acquirers in all stock deals to 
find themselves in the same circumstances. 
The phrase ‘dividend policy’ signifies the idea that dividend streams do not evolve in a 
random fashion but rather that there must be some fundamental consistency through time. 
There is a plethora of theories which attempt to rationalise the pattern that dividend payments 
follow, both in the aggregate and per individual company, depending on the specific financial 
                                                          
1 This M&A example is obtained from SDC Platinum. 
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or other characteristics that the company displays. According to the irrelevance proposition of 
Modigliani and Miller (1961), the dividend policy that companies follow is not important since 
it cannot affect a firm’s value. In contrast, the clientele theory of dividends states that company 
dividend policy is shaped primarily by the tax and demographic characteristics of shareholders 
(see, for example, Allen, Bernardo and Welch, 2000; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Graham 
and Kumar, 2006; and Desai and Jin, 2011). This paper extends the literature on the clientele 
theory of dividends by showing that the acquirer propensity to adjust divided policy in order to 
satisfy investor preferences is affected by the bargaining power of these investors and therefore 
their ability to ‘punish’ the bidder in the cases when the payout policy is dissatisfactory. 
Specifically, the results indicate that post-M&A dividends increase, the higher the discrepancy 
between target and bidder dividend payments before the deal and the larger the size of the 
dividend clientele that is acquired from the target company by the bidder as a result of the 
takeover. Another strand of the literature, namely agency theory, suggests that institutional 
investors can exert a disciplining influence on company management by ensuring that the 
company does not omit or decrease dividend payments (see, for example, Allen et al., 2000). 
The results of this study, however, do not support the implications of the agency theory with 
regard to payout policy. Notwithstanding the attempts of previous studies to explain the 
dividend behaviour of companies, the literature is inconclusive with regard to the ability of the 
different dividend theories to explain the payout policies that companies adopt. 
Despite the fact that the analysis of dividend policy before and after takeovers could 
provide important insights into the factors which influence dividend payments, there are a very 
limited number of studies relevant to this issue. Jeon, Ligon and Soranakom (2010) investigate 
the relationship between the method of payment and the degree of difference between target 
and acquirer dividend policy. The authors show that stock acquisitions are more likely when 
the target and acquirer dividend policies are similar. However, Jeon et al. (2010) do not analyse 
CHAPTER 1: DOES DIVIDEND POLICY CHANGE AFTER M&A? 
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the post-acquisition policy of acquirers in order to determine whether acquirers are more likely 
to maintain their pre-acquisition dividend policy, or whether bidders are inclined to adjust their 
payout policy to that of the target when the policies are dissimilar. 
Bolleart, Dereeper and Turki (2013) extend the analysis of Jeon et al. (2010) by 
showing that acquirers are more likely to adjust their dividend policy to that of the target in all-
stock deals and when the target’s dividend yield is larger. The authors however do not consider 
the relative difference between the target and bidder dividend policies before the acquisition. 
Accounting for the relative discrepancy in payout polices is important as it indicates the degree 
of dissimilarity between the dividend clienteles of the two companies. In addition, Bolleart et 
al. (2013) do not consider the effect of the size of the dividend clientele from the target that is 
inherited by the bidder as a consequence of the M&A. This study extends the analysis of 
Bolleart et al. (2013), by accounting for: a) the relative difference between the target and bidder 
dividend polices, i.e. the ‘Dividend Gap’ between the two companies and b) the characteristics 
and proportion of the target’s shareholders which remain on the acquirer company’s share 
register, i.e. the ‘Inherited II’ (institutional investors). In all-stock acquisitions, it is more likely 
that the target’s shareholders and, therefore, its dividend clientele will become part of the 
acquiring company’s investor base, thereby suggesting that the dividend clientele of the 
acquirer will change as a result of the takeover. The clientele theory of dividends predicts that 
the acquirer will alter its dividend policy to accommodate the preferences of the target’s 
shareholders in the cases of all-stock deals and specifically when the size of the target’s 
dividend clientele, as acquired by the bidder, is large enough to cause a shift in the acquirer’s 
own dividend clientele. Bolleart et al. (2013) also do not account for the implications of other 
theories which aim to explain company payout policies, such as the agency, signalling and life 
cycle theories. 
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This study thus fills the void in the current literature on dividend policy by examining 
it in the context of corporate takeovers. To my knowledge there are no previous studies which 
test the relationship between the proportion and characteristics of target shareholders which 
remain on the acquiring company’s share register and the post-acquisition dividend policy as 
well as the relationship between the ‘Dividend Gap’ between the target and bidder and the post-
acquisition payout policy. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II 
reviews the literature on dividend policy and develops the study hypotheses; Section III 
provides a description of the sample, methodology and variables used to test each hypothesis; 
Section IV presents a discussion of the results and sensitivity analysis; and Section V 
concludes. 
1.2 Theories of Dividend Policy 
1.2.1 Dividend Clientele 
Since the main focus of this study is to test the clientele theory of dividends in the context 
of M&A, the main focus of the literature discussion is concerned with reviewing studies related 
to this theory. 
Modigliani and Miller (1961, hereafter MM), show that under a given set of assumptions, 
dividend payout policy is not relevant to company valuation and only investment decisions can 
affect shareholder wealth. Despite the fact that the irrelevance proposition has come under 
considerable criticism, its importance lies in the fact that it highlights the conditions under 
which dividend policy is relevant for company valuation. The assumptions underlying the 
dividend irrelevance principle are: 
1. Perfect capital markets - no transaction costs, costless pricing information, price-taking 
behaviour and no taxes; 
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2. Rational behaviour - investors are indifferent between dividends and capital gains, 
prefer more than less wealth and there are no agency conflicts; 
3. Perfect certainty - no information asymmetry between company outsiders and 
management, and investors know about all important income and cash flow in 
companies. 
Relaxing the assumptions underlying the dividend irrelevance principle has inspired the 
majority of theories that have been developed to explain the factors that drive the payout policy 
of companies. One of the assumptions underlying the irrelevance theory is the absence of taxes, 
however, in reality, both companies and investors incur taxes such as income and capital gains 
taxes. When the tax rate on ordinary income is higher than the tax rate on capital gains, rational 
shareholders should have a preference for receiving funds through share repurchases rather 
than dividends. The fact that companies pay dividends even when this form of payout policy 
is at a tax disadvantage relative to share repurchases is referred to as ‘the dividend puzzle’ 
(Black, 1976). In a theoretical study of dividend policy, Farrar and Selwyn (1967) show that 
when personal income taxes are higher than capital gains taxes, companies should distribute 
funds in the form of share repurchases rather than dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2000), 
however, show that dividends and share repurchase are substitute methods of returning cash to 
shareholders. 
The clientele theory of dividends has been developed by academics in an attempt to explain 
this dividend puzzle. According to the clientele explanation of dividend policy, younger and 
retail (as opposed to institutional) shareholders, investors with significant disparity between 
capital gains and personal income tax, as well as shareholders in low tax brackets, favour 
companies with a high dividend yield (Pettit, 1977). It should be noted, however, that the so-
called tax disadvantage associated with dividend payments is not relevant to all types of 
shareholders. For example, tax exempt investors, such as pension funds, should exhibit a 
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preference for companies with high dividend payout. In contrast, investors which belong to 
high income tax brackets should favour companies with low dividend payout or companies 
which do not pay out any dividends. Ogden, Jen and O’Connor (p. 479, 2003) claim that 
clientele effects are ‘a set of investors who are attracted to the stocks of firms that have the 
dividend policy they prefer, based on their tax or liquidity circumstances.’ The clientele theory 
of dividends suggest that management can increase the value of a company by following a 
payout policy that meets the preferences of those investors that are not currently met by other 
companies in the market. 
In a theoretical analysis of company dividend policies, Allen et al. (2000) contend that 
when retail investors are relatively more highly taxed, as compared to institutional investors, 
companies paying high dividends are likely to attract a higher proportion of institutional 
investors. Scholz (1992), Jain (2007) and Graham and Kumar (2006) document a negative 
relationship between the preference for dividends of retail investors and marginal and income 
tax levels. Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Scharbaum (1978), however, report a weak association 
between shareholders’ marginal tax rates and the dividend yields of their portfolios. 
Several more recent studies identify the presence of a different type of dividend clientele 
which is not based on different tax preferences but rather on other company and investor 
characteristics. For example, Becker, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2011) demonstrate that 
individual investors can display a preference for investing in local companies, while older 
investors are more likely to invest in companies which pay high dividends. The authors suggest 
that the combined effect of these two distinct preferences results in geographically varying 
demand for dividends. Lee (2011) finds that the time variation in the demand for dividends 
(measured by the dividend premium) is positively affected by shifts in the demographic 
characteristics of investors, such as increases in the proportion of older investors. 
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Some studies test the clientele theory of dividends by analysing the effect of company 
ownership structure on the relationship between dividends and taxes. According to Perez-
Gonzales (2003) and Holmen, Knopf and Peterson (2008), companies whose ownership 
structure is characterised by many large shareholders tend to modify their dividend policy in 
order to minimise the tax burden of their investors following changes in taxation legislation. 
As a result, the presence of differences in the preferences of majority shareholders may provide 
an explanation for the conflicting results of studies which analyse the relationship between 
dividends and taxes. Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) investigate change in institutional 
ownership following dividend omissions and find no evidence of significant shifts in ownership 
structure. Del Guercio (1996) analyses the effect of dividends on the portfolio selection choices 
of mutual funds and banks, and shows that dividends do not exert a significant influence on 
portfolio selection decisions. In contrast, Dhaliwal, Erickson and Trezevant (1999) present 
evidence that company institutional investor clientele adjusts according to its tax preferences, 
following dividend initiations, with a significant shift in ownership towards tax-deferred/tax-
exempt and corporate institutions. Similarly, Desai and Jin (2011) show empirically that the 
composition of the institutional ownership of companies is characterised significantly by the 
presence of a tax-based clientele. Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2007) also present evidence that 
institutions form different investment styles which are based on dividend yields. 
Another strand of the literature analyses the relationship between tax clientele and firm 
dividend policy by distinguishing between the tax preferences of institutional and individual 
investors. Specifically, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) examine the effect of the concentration 
of individual versus institutional investors on company payout policy. The authors do not find 
significant evidence of the presence of tax-based preferences among individual and 
institutional shareholders. Jain (1999) shows that institutional investors have a preference for 
low dividend yield stocks while retail investors prefer to invest in companies with higher 
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dividend yields. Strickland (1996) demonstrates that taxable institutional investors are more 
inclined to invest in low dividend yield companies, whereas tax-exempt investors do not show 
any clear preference for investing in either low or high dividend yield companies. In a survey 
analysis of company dividend policies, Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) provide 
evidence that institutional investors are not characterised by a distinct preference for dividends 
over share repurchases. 
A question which remains unanswered is whether companies adjust their dividend 
policies to attract a given type of investor. Studies which focus on this issue typically analyse 
the changes in company dividend policies which are associated with amendments to dividend 
legislation. For example, a number of papers analyse the effect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on 
dividend distributions. This tax reform equalised the tax rates on dividends and capital gains, 
which should have increased the incentive for companies to pay out higher levels of dividends. 
Bloster and Janjigian (1991), Papaioannou and Savarese (1994) and Casey, Anderson, and 
Dickens (1999) find little evidence that companies altered their payout polices in response to 
this regulatory change. In an examination of the effect of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003 on company payout policies, Chetty and Saez (2005) 
report that there was a higher number of dividend initiations following the introduction of the 
act. The authors contend that this result is expected given the fact that the JGTRRA decreased 
the tax rate on dividends from 38% to 15%.  Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely’s (2008) 
survey of managers indicates that tax reforms exert second order influence on payout decisions. 
Had the 2003 tax reform affected company payout policies, the expectation would have been 
that firms with a comparatively large proportion of retail shareholders would have initiated or 
increased dividends, however, both Chetty and Saez (2005) and Brav et al. (2008) show that 
companies appear to set dividend policy in line with the interests of their major shareholders. 
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The extant empirical and theoretical literature provides contradictory findings with regard 
to the presence of a dividend-induced clientele, or the effect of corporate dividend policy on 
the investment decisions of individuals and/or institutions – be it for tax, demographic and/or 
geographical considerations. In addition, the current body of research which analyses the 
relationship between company dividend policy and ownership structure is inconclusive with 
regards to the effect of a company’s ownership composition or changes in the ownership 
composition on its dividend policy. Furthermore, the ability of companies to adjust their 
dividend policy in order to attract or retain a given ownership structure has not been fully 
explored. 
Studies which analyse the ability and willingness of companies to amend their dividend 
policy typically focus on the effect of changes in dividend legislation on payout policy. M&A 
can induce a major shift in the ownership composition of companies and thereby provide an 
alternative setting to test the propensity of companies to adjust their dividend policy in 
accordance with the prevailing dividend preferences of their ownership structure. The type of 
corporate takeovers in which a major shift in the ownership structure of the acquirer is likely 
to occur are those where the acquirer pays for the target with its own shares. In this context, 
Jeon et al. (2010) test the implications of the clientele theory by analysing company choice of 
payment method in takeovers. The authors hypothesise that the probability of a stock 
acquisition is higher, the more similar the dividend policies of the bidder and the target, which 
is in line with the clientele theory of dividends. 
The results of Jeon et al. (2010) provide evidence in support of the clientele theory of 
dividends, however the authors do not analyse the dividend policy followed by acquirers after 
the completion of M&A deals. Since acquisitions can result in a significant shift in the 
ownership composition of the bidder, these corporate events provide a useful setting to test the 
clientele theory of dividends by examining post-M&A dividend policy. Specifically, it is 
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expected that the effect of the change in ownership structure, and therefore change in dividend 
clientele, will be strongest when the acquirer pays for the target with shares. This is due to the 
fact that in the latter M&A deal type, the target shareholders effectively become shareholders 
of the bidder company unless they decide to dispose of their holdings. If the target and acquirer 
dividend policies differ considerably, the dividend clienteles of the two companies are also 
likely to be very different. As a result, the completion of an all shares acquisition is likely not 
only to cause a major shift in the bidder’s share register, but also to lead to a change in its 
dividend clientele, a shift in the prevailing preferences for dividends in the acquirer’s 
ownership composition. If the target’s shareholders are not satisfied with the dividend policy 
of the acquirer, they can decide to dispose of their ownership in the bidder either before or after 
the completion of the deal. Such a sell-off of shares could have a severe negative impact on the 
share price of the acquirer. There is therefore a strong incentive for the acquirer company to 
adjust its dividend policy in order to accommodate the preferences of its changed dividend 
clientele. For example, if a large proportion of the target’s shareholders, which belong to a low 
income tax-bracket, remains on the acquirer’s share register and if the acquirer’s dividend 
payments before the completion of the deal are lower than the target’s, the acquirer will be 
inclined to increase its dividends to account for the tax circumstances of the target’s investors. 
The analysis of the change in acquirer dividend policy in the period surrounding the completion 
of all-shares takeovers, can help gain a deeper understanding of the importance of dividend 
clienteles in shaping payout policy. 
In this context, Bolleart et al. (2013), analyse the dividend policy of companies following 
the completion of M&A deals. The authors present evidence that bidders are more likely to 
amend their dividend policy in accordance with the dividend policy of the target in the case of 
all-stock deals. The Bolleart et al. (2013) study is based on a sample of US bidders and the 
authors control for the level of dividend payments of the target and acquirer before the 
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acquisition. The authors do not account for the relative similarity/dissimilarity between the 
target and bidder dividend policies before the M&A and for the proportion of target 
shareholders which remain on the acquirer share register post-M&A, however. Accounting for 
the ‘Dividend Gap’ and the ‘Inherited II’ is crucial since, by adjusting its dividend policy to 
the preferences of the newly inherited investors, the acquirer will also be harming its pre-
acquisition dividend clientele. The acquirer will only change its dividend policy when there is 
a significant presence of target shareholders on its share register after the takeover. This is due 
to the fact that the target’s shareholders may choose to dispose of their holdings before or 
immediately after the acquisition if they are not satisfied with the pre-acquisition dividend 
policy of the acquirer. In their analysis Bolleart et al. (2013) also do not control for the 
implications of other theories of dividends, such as the agency, life cycle, signalling and 
catering theories.2 
 It is also important to account for the characteristics of the investors which the bidder 
inherits from the target. It is expected that institutional investors (as opposed to retail investors) 
can exert a stronger influence on the behaviour of companies as their actions can have a direct 
impact on company valuation due to the fact that these investors tend to own larger blocks of 
shares (see, for example, Allen et al., 2000). Institutional investors can also directly influence 
the actions of management through their involvement in the corporate governance process. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Acquirers are expected to change their dividend policy in order to 
accommodate the dividend preferences (tax-based or other) of their newly inherited dividend 
clientele from the target’s ownership base. 
 
                                                          
2 Please refer to the following section of the literature review for an analysis of the implications 
of the other theories of dividends. 
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Hypothesis 2: This relationship is expected to hold in all stock deals, when the pre-
acquisition dividend policies of the target and acquirer differ considerably and when the 
proportion of institutional shareholders in the target which remain on the share register of the 
acquirer is higher. 
1.2.2 Other Theories of Dividends 
There are a number of other dividend theories, and therefore factors that need to be 
accounted for when analysing company dividend policy. The remainder of this section provides 
a brief overview of the literature pertinent to these theories. 
1.2.2.1 Signalling Theory 
Miller and Modigliani (p. 430, 1961) refer to the possibility that companies may utilise 
dividend payments as a signalling device in the following way: ‘…where a firm has adopted a 
policy of dividend stabilization with a long-established and generally appreciated ‘target 
payout ratio’, investors are likely to (and have good reason to) interpret a change in the dividend 
rate as a change in management’s views of future profit prospects for the firm. The dividend 
change, in other words, provides the occasion for the price change though not its cause, the 
price still being solely a reflection of future earnings and growth opportunities.’ 
According to Allen and Michaely (2003), a consequence of the signalling explanation of 
dividends is that there should be a positive relationship between future income and increases 
in dividends. There are a number of studies which examine the relationship between dividend 
changes and subsequent changes in earnings. Several studies provide empirical evidence which 
supplements the signalling theory of payout policy (see for example, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Skinner, 1992; Aharony and Dotan, 1994; Brook, Carlton, and Hendershott, 1998; Nissim 
and Ziv, 2001), however, there is a body of research which indicates that there is either no or a 
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very weak association between dividend changes and consequent changes in income (see for 
example, Watts, 1973; Gonedes, 1978; Penman, 1983; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 
1996; Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler, 1997; Fama and French, 2001; Grullon, Michaely, 
Benartzi, and Thaler, 2005). 
Since M&A deals are associated with a high degree of uncertainty, and management 
expectations about the future benefits of the acquisition may be more accurate than those of 
shareholders, post-acquisition dividend policy could be used as a signalling mechanism by 
management in an attempt to convey more precise information to the capital markets about the 
earnings or cash flow expected to be generated by the acquisition. The signalling theory of 
dividends suggests that companies will increase or initiate dividends in order to convey 
information about current and expected future cash flows and profitability to shareholders. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Acquirers will increase and/or initiate dividends only if they expect the post-
acquisition earnings and/or cash flows generated through the acquisition to continue or 
increase. 
1.2.2.2 Life Cycle Theory 
The life cycle theory of dividends suggests that a company begins to distribute funds to 
shareholders when its profitability and growth are diminishing, which is diametrically opposed 
to the implications of the signalling theory, according to which companies pay dividends when 
they expect improvements in profitability and growth (Bulan and Subramanian, 2009). Fama 
and French (2002) note that dividend payers tend to be profitable and large companies, with 
levels of retained earnings which are adequate for the purposes of investments. In contrast, 
companies that have never distributed funds to shareholders tend to be less profitable and 
smaller in size. The empirical analysis of Fama and French (2002) points to the fact that 
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dividend payers possess the features of mature companies, whereas non-payers have the 
features of young firms. In addition, the observed decline in the propensity to pay dividends 
between 1987 and 1999 can partly be attributed to the dramatic increase in IPOs over the same 
period, which presents further evidence in favour of the life cycle theory of dividends. 
According to the life cycle theory of dividends, the more mature, cash rich and low growth 
opportunity companies are more likely to initiate or increase dividends. An acquisition could 
lead to a major change in any or all of the maturity characteristics of the acquirer. Specifically, 
the acquiring company’s growth opportunities profile could change as a result of the M&A 
deal due to the fact that it inherits the growth opportunities of its target. The life cycle theory 
of dividends indicates that when the acquirer shifts to a higher growth opportunities profile, 
the firm will be less likely to increase or initiate dividends or may even be inclined to reduce 
or omit dividend payments after the takeover in order to devote all of its available resources to 
seizing these opportunities. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Acquirers whose growth opportunities increase as a consequence of the 
acquisition are expected to be less likely to increase or initiate dividends. In addition, these 
acquirers may even be more likely to reduce or omit dividend payments after the takeover. 
1.2.2.3 Agency Theory 
Agency costs arise due to the conflict of interest between management, shareholders and 
bondholders. The agency costs incurred by shareholders could result from management’s 
inclination to accumulate free cash flow3 for their personal benefit, rather than pay it out in the 
form of dividends or share repurchases. The distribution of free cash flow to shareholders 
                                                          
3 The cash flow which remains after all positive net present value (NPV) projects have been 
undertaken. 
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reduces the cash available to management and diminishes its ability to waste this capital, thus 
alleviating the agency problem (see for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Jensen, 
1986). Lang and Litzenberger (1989) test the proposition that the market reaction to dividend 
changes should be more pronounced for firms which are more likely to misuse free cash flow 
(overinvest), i.e. firms with a ratio of market value to replacement cost of capital (Tobin’s Q 
ratio) smaller than 1. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, the share price increase 
(decrease) associated with a dividend increase (decrease) should be higher for companies 
which are more likely to overinvest. The authors find evidence in accordance with this 
hypothesis. In addition, Lie (2000) confirms the findings of Lang and Litzenberger (1989). 
According to Allen et al. (2000) informed institutional investors possess the power to 
discipline management by either disposing of their ownership or being directly engaged in the 
corporate governance process. The authors also argue that companies that pay dividends and 
have a large proportion of institutional owners are more likely to be punished by their 
shareholders if they reduce or omit dividends. In the context of M&A, 
the model developed by Allen et al. (2000) suggests that when a substantial proportion of 
target institutional investors remain on the acquirer’s share register, the acquirer will be less 
likely to decrease or omit dividend payments. 
When testing Allen et al.’s (2000) model it is important to account for the corporate 
governance characteristics of the target and acquirer’s countries of domicile. If the target is 
domiciled in a country with stronger corporate governance regulations its institutional 
shareholders will be better accustomed to higher quality corporate governance. 
It is expected that the disciplining influence of investors will be stronger in the latter cases. 
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Hypothesis 5: Acquirers in all stock deals whose ownership composition shifts towards a 
higher proportion of institutional shareholders are less likely to decrease or omit dividends 
post-M&A. This relationship will be stronger when the target’s country of domicile has 
stronger corporate governance regulation. 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
This study uses a sample of completed M&A deals where the bidder acquires majority 
ownership of the target, that is deals where the initial percentage of equity owned is below 50% 
and the final percentage of equity owned is more than 50%, in line with the methodologies 
followed by Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006). This ensures 
that only deals which are strategically important from the acquiring company’s perspective are 
considered. Acquirer and target ownership data is obtained from the Thomson One Banker 
database. Since Thomson One Banker covers company ownership information since 1998 the 
study sample consists of deals completed in the period 1998 - 2011. The final sample consists 
of 2,821 M&A transactions and excludes both acquirer and target companies which operate in 
the financial services and utilities sectors, as these companies tend to be highly regulated and 
therefore less able to freely manage their dividend policy. Table 1.1 provides a breakdown of 
the data restrictions used to obtain the final sample for this study. 
The change in bidder dividend policy is measured as a percentage change in DPS over 
periods starting one year before and ending one, two or three years after the completion of the 
M&A deal. The longer time period accounts for the fact that dividend policy change may 
materialise gradually, over a number of years after the acquisition (see for example, Lintner, 
1959). Table 1.2, Panel A, presents a list of the variables used to test the hypotheses developed 
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in this study, as well as the control variables. Table 1.2, Panel B shows the expected relationship 
between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables. 
To capture the change in the dividend clientele of the bidder this study measures the 
percentage change in the holdings of those acquirer company investors that were also invested 
in the target company before the M&A. The holdings of the investors inherited from the target 
are measured as a proportion of all shares outstanding in the acquirer company. Following 
Allen et al. (2000) this study focuses on the change in holdings of institutional investors (as 
opposed to individual investors) due to the fact that these investors have the ability to influence 
the behaviour of companies. The degree of similarity (dissimilarity) between the bidder and 
target dividend policies before the M&A deal is measured by the ‘Dividend Gap’ variable, 
which is equal to the percentage difference between the target and acquirer’s DPS one year 
before the acquisition completion.4 
For the purposes of including all possible combinations of target and acquirer pre-
acquisition dividend policies, the ‘Dividend Gap’ is calculated as follows: 
1) When the target and acquirer pay zero DPS before the acquisition, the percentage 
difference variable is 0 
                                                          
4 It is also possible to use the ratio of target to acquirer DPS as a measure of the disparity 
between target and acquirer dividend policies, however, this variable would limit the sample 
to only cases where both the target and acquirer pay dividends before the acquisition. When 
the acquirer does not pay dividends and the target pays dividends, for example, the ratio of 
target to acquirer dividends per share will be undefined, thereby further restricting the study 
sample. It is also possible to use the target and acquirer DPS corresponding to the year of the 
completion of the acquisition, however, there is limited availability of target DPS information 
for that period as the year of the completion of the M&A is also the year when the target 
company ceases to exist as a separate entity.  In addition, previous studies show that for some 
acquisitions (primarily hostile takeovers) the target is more likely to substantially increase its 
dividend policy in the year of the acquisition as a defence mechanism in order to dissuade the 
acquirer from completing the deal (see, for example, Page, Jahera and Pugh, 1996; and 
Ryngaert and Scholten, 2010). As a result, the dividend policy of the target is more likely to be 
distorted in the year of the acquisition and therefore not reflect the characteristics of the target’s 
dividend clientele. 
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2) When the target pays dividends before the acquisition and the acquirer does not pay 
dividends before the acquisition the percentage difference is 1 
3) In all other cases the percentage difference is calculated as: 
% difference in target and acquirer DPS =
Traget DPS
Acquirer DPS
-1 
The change in the dividend clientele of the acquirer is captured by interacting the 
change in the institutional ownership variable with a dummy variable which is equal to one 
when the ‘Dividend Gap’ is positive. This variable should capture the influence of a shift in 
dividend clientele on the acquirer’s dividend policy, especially when the target and acquirer 
payout policies differ considerably. In order to control for the effect of other/non-institutional 
investors this study also includes an interaction variable between the dummy for positive 
‘Dividend Gap’ and the percentage change in the proportion of retail/individual investors (out 
of all shares outstanding) in the bidder that were also invested in the target company. 
To account for the implications of the signalling theory of dividends, this study adopts 
a number of measures of the change in expected future earnings or cash flows of the acquirer 
company as a consequence of the acquisition. First, this study uses the change in 
expected/forecasted EPS, which is measured over a period starting one year before and ending 
one year after the acquisition completion. In addition, this study also measures the present value 
of future cash flow that is expected to be generated from the takeover, also referred to as the 
synergy gains associated with the deal. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) pioneered a 
methodology for measuring expected synergistic gains from tender offers. The authors measure 
the synergy gains as the abnormal return to a value weighted portfolio of the bidder and target 
companies estimated over an event widow starting five days prior to, and ending five days post 
deal announcement. Abnormal returns are estimated on the basis of the market model. The 
target and acquirer weights are based on the market value of each company as of six days prior 
to deal announcement. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) measure expected synergies 
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in a similar manner; however, the authors use a smaller event window starting from one day 
before the acquisition announcement and ending one day after it. The variables used in order 
to weight the abnormal returns are the market values of the target and acquirer as of twenty 
days before the announcement of the M&A. This study adopts both methods of measuring 
expected future cash flows or synergies associated with the takeover. 
To control for the implications of the life cycle theory of dividends, this study measures 
the change in acquirer growth opportunities in the period surrounding the completion of the 
M&A deal. Specifically, growth opportunities are measured with the market to book ratio of 
the acquirer, and the change in growth opportunities is captured by the change in the market to 
book ratio over a period starting one year before and ending one year after the deal completion. 
To account for the predictions of the agency theory of dividends, this study measures 
the change in the proportion of institutional investors in the acquirer company that were also 
present in the target company’s share register. To capture the difference in target and acquirer 
country corporate governance quality this study uses the difference in the target and acquirer 
countries’ anti-self-dealing indices. To test whether the disciplining effect of investors is 
stronger when the target’s institutional investors are accustomed to higher corporate 
governance standards, this study uses an interaction variable between the change in the 
proportion of institutional investors from the target company which remain on the acquirer’s 
share register and a dummy variable which is equal to one when the target country’s corporate 
governance quality is higher than that of the bidder’s country. 
When examining acquirer dividend policy it is important to include the standard control 
variables which are used by previous studies which analyse dividend policy (see for example, 
Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012; Kale, Kini and Payne, 2012; Lie and Li, 2006; Fama and French, 
2001; and Baker and Wurgler, 2005). Specifically, each model which analyses the change in 
acquirer dividend policy controls for the acquirer company’s growth opportunities, measured 
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as the market to book ratio; the acquirer’s liquidity, measured as the ratio of operating cash 
flow to sales; and the acquirer’s degree of maturity, measured as the age of the bidder. In 
addition, the analysis also controls for the acquirer’s profitability, measured as the return on 
assets (ROA); its size, measured as the company’s total assets; and its leverage, measured as 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Finally, the regressions also account for the acquirer’s 
risk profile, captured by the standard deviation of the company’s operating cash flow calculated 
over a three-year period before the deal, the acquirer country’s quality of corporate governance, 
measured by the anti-self-dealing index, the acquirer country’s economic growth, measured as 
the annual growth in GDP, and the dividend premium, calculated following the methodology 
of Baker and Wurgler (2005).5 To ensure the statistical validity of the results, the study 
estimates the linear regression models with robust standard errors. To control for country, time 
or industry effects, the regressions are estimated with the inclusion of country, industry and 
year dummies. 
1.4 Empirical Analysis 
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.3 presents the sample breakdown per different time periods as well as target 
and acquirer country. The table distinguishes between four M&A cycles during the study time 
period: Cycle 1, which covers the period between 1998 and 2001; Cycle 2, which covers the 
period between 2002 and 2004; Cycle 3, which covers the period between 2005 and 2007; and 
Cycle 4, which covers the period between 2008 and 2011. The table demonstrates that the 
number of M&A deals is relatively evenly distributed between Cycles 1, 3, and 4, with Cycle 
                                                          
5 Acquirer company and country financials are measured as of one year before the completion 
of the M&A deal. 
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2 having the lowest number of sample deals. In terms of the acquirer and target country 
breakdown, we can see that the study sample is representative of the actual universe of M&A 
deals, with the United States dominating both the target and acquirer sides of the M&A market. 
Table 1.3 also shows that most target and acquirer companies in the sample are domiciled in 
markets which are economically developed, such as North America, Western Europe and 
South-East Asia. 
Table 1.4 presents the key target and acquirer financial characteristics as of one year 
before the completion of the M&A deal for three different acquirer sub-samples, determined 
on the basis of the dividend policy that the company follows after the takeover. Specifically, 
Table 1.4 distinguishes between: a) acquirers that either decrease or omit dividend payments, 
b) acquirers that maintain their pre-acquisition dividend policy (i.e. companies that did not pay 
any dividends before and after the M&A deal or companies that preserve the pre-acquisition 
DPS level), and c) acquirers that either increase or initiate dividends. Dividend policy change 
is measured over a period starting one year before and ending one year after the completion of 
the M&A deal. 
Table 1.4, Panel A considers deals where the method of payment is shares only, Panel 
B considers deals where the method of payment is cash only and Panel C considers deals where 
the method of payment is a combination of cash and stock. The table shows that the percentage 
difference between the target and bidder DPS, the ‘Dividend Gap’, is significantly higher for 
acquirers that either maintain their pre-acquisition dividend policy or increase/initiate DPS 
following the completion of the deal - irrespective of the deal’s method of payment. In addition, 
Table 1.4 (All Panels) demonstrates that the holdings of institutional investors from the target 
company that remain on the share register of the acquirer, i.e. the ‘Inherited II’, are also 
significantly higher before and after the deal for acquirers that either increase or initiate 
dividends compared to acquirers that maintain their pre-acquisition dividend policy. These 
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results are confirmed when the presence of target institutional investors on the acquirer’s share 
register is measured not only by the size of their holdings but also by the actual number of 
institutions. In order to determine whether there is a significant shift in the acquirer’s investor 
composition following the takeover, it is necessary to consider the presence of shareholders 
from the target post-M&A relative to the presence of shareholders from the target pre-M&A; 
i.e. it is necessary to consider the change in the holdings or number of ‘Inherited II’. Table 1.4 
(All Panels) reveals that the change in the number of ‘Inherited II’ is statistically significant 
only for the deals where the method of payment is all stock. Specifically, the number of 
‘Inherited II’ increases significantly for the group of acquirers that increase/initiate dividends 
relative to the acquirers that maintain their pre-acquisition DPS level. In addition, Table 1.4, 
Panel B demonstrates that the change in holdings of ‘Inherited II’ is significantly smaller for 
the group of acquirers that increase/initiate dividend payments when the method of payment is 
all cash, suggesting that in the latter cases it is not a shift in the dividend clientele that prompts 
the acquirer to increase/initiate dividends and that there must be other factors at play. These 
results support the idea that the implications of the clientele theory of dividends are most 
relevant to the deals for which the acquirer pays with its own shares.  
Table 1.4 also shows that the expected M&A gains (measured by the change in forecast 
EPS) are significantly higher for acquirers that either maintain the level of (All Panels), or 
increase/initiate, dividend payments (Panels A and B). This result is in line with the predictions 
of the signalling theory of dividends which suggests that bidders will signal their expectation 
of better post-M&A financial performance by either increasing or maintaining the same 
dividend policy. In terms of acquirer pre-acquisition characteristics, Table 1.4 (All Panels) 
demonstrates that acquirers that increase or initiate dividends post-M&A are larger (measured 
by assets and market value), more profitable (measured by ROA and ROE), less risky 
(measured by the standard deviation of operating cash flows over a 3-year window) and older 
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(measured by age) companies. These results are in line with the predictions of the life cycle 
theory of dividends which posits that companies are likely to initiate or increase dividends 
when they enter the mature phase of their life cycle, since their cash flows and earnings become 
more stable. 
 When comparing the targets of the acquirers that initiate/increase DPS post-M&A to 
the targets of the acquirers that maintain their pre-acquisition dividend policy, Table 1.4 (All 
Panels) reveals that the targets which belong to the former group are significantly more 
profitable (ROE and ROA), more liquid (operating cash flow to sales), less risky (standard 
deviation of operating cash flow over a 3-year window), and older (age). This result is not 
surprising, as the acquisition of more profitable, liquid, less risky and older companies is likely 
to shift the acquirer towards a more mature stage of its life cycle, thereby boosting the incentive 
to increase/initiate dividends. 
1.4.2 Analysis of the Change in Acquirer Dividend Policy Post-M&A 
Table 1.5 shows the results of a multivariate regression analysis of the change in 
acquirer dividend policy over three different time windows, starting one year before and 
ending: a) one year (Model 1), or b) two years (Model 2), or c) three years (Model 3) after the 
completion of the M&A deal. The dependent variable in all models included in Table 1.5 is the 
percentage change in acquirer DPS. The analysis presented in Table 1.5 provides evidence in 
favour of the clientele theory of dividends. The positive and statistically significant coefficient 
corresponding to the ‘Dividend Gap’ variable shows that the acquirer is more likely to increase 
DPS in the first, second or third year after the completion of the takeover, when the level of 
target company pre-acquisition DPS is higher relative to that of the acquirer. This finding 
supports the clientele theory of dividends by showing that the acquirer is more likely to change 
post-M&A dividend policy when the degree of difference between the pre-acquisition dividend 
policies of the target and bidder is higher. The coefficient corresponding to the interaction 
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variable which captures the influence of the target company’s dividend clientele, 
‘Tar_Clientele’, is not statistically significantly in any of the models presented in Table 1.5. 
However, this finding does not provide evidence against the clientele theory of dividends as 
the change in the holdings of ‘Inherited II’ is likely to be significant only in the case of all stock 
deals. As a result, and as stated in Hypothesis 1, it is expected that the size of the target clientele 
will induce change in post-M&A dividend policy only when the bidder pays for the target 
company with its own shares. The positive and statistically significant coefficient 
corresponding to the interaction variable between the size of the target’s dividend clientele and 
the all stock method of payment dummy, ‘Tar_Clientele x All_Shares’, presents evidence in 
favour of Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Table 1.5, All Models). The acquirer is more likely to alter its 
dividend policy in order to accommodate the preferences of target institutional shareholders, 
the higher the bargaining power that these investors possess (as indicated by the change in their 
holdings in the acquirer company after the M&A). This is because the actions of institutional 
investors can have a more severe effect on the acquirer company, when the holdings of these 
investors account for a higher proportion of the acquirer’s investor base. If a considerable 
proportion of institutional investors were dissatisfied with the dividend policy of the acquirer 
and decided to dispose of their holdings in the company, these adjustments in ownership could 
have a strongly negative effect on the acquirer company’s share price. These results also show 
that the clientele effect on the acquirer dividend policy persists over the second and third year 
after the completion of the M&A deal (Table 1.5, Models 2 and 3). 
The results presented in Table 1.5 (All Models) provide evidence in favour of Hypothesis 
3, the signalling theory of dividends. This finding is confirmed by the fact that the coefficients 
corresponding to the variable ‘M&A_Exp. gains’, which accounts for signalling incentives and 
is measured by the change in forward-looking EPS, are positive and statistically significant 
Table 1.5 (All Models). Thus, the bidders are likely to signal the expected gains from the M&A 
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by increasing their DPS post-M&A. This finding is not surprising since corporate acquisitions 
can be viewed as a major form of investment project which the acquirer undertakes in order to 
increase future cash flows/profitability. The literature on the factors which increase the 
propensity to perform an acquisition is vast, and identifies a variety of motives for M&A which 
can lead to better financial performance, such as achieving economies of scale and/or scope 
(Brealey, Myers, and Allen, 2006), or operating synergies (see for example, Copeland, Weston, 
and Shastri, 2005), financial synergies (see for example, Sudarsanam, 2003; and Copeland et 
al., 2005) increasing market discipline (see for example, Agrawal and Walkling, 1994), growth 
in market share and revenue (see for example, Gaughan, 2005), improvement of financial 
performance through turnaround strategy (see for example, Harzing, 2002), improvement of 
managerial efficiency (see for example, Martin and McConnell, 1991; and Copeland et al., 
2005), and diversification (see for example, Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002). Irrespective 
of the specific reason underlying the acquisition, the idea that takeovers can be viewed as major 
investment projects implies that M&A should increase the expected profitability or future cash 
flows that are being generated (assuming that management acts in the best interest of 
shareholders and consequently undertakes only positive NPV projects). 
In addition, given the complexity of the M&A process, which is primarily associated with 
the ability of the acquirer to successfully integrate the target company into its business and the 
need to devote substantial company funds in order to buy the target company, it can be expected 
that the success of acquisitions is characterised with a high degree of uncertainty. As a result, 
the acquirer may be willing to provide a costly signal to company shareholders with regard to 
the degree of expected future synergies and/or earnings that will be generated as a result of the 
acquisition. In addition, it is likely that the acquirer company management is in the best position 
to evaluate and accurately forecast the expected future cash flows and synergies that will be 
generated from the acquisition, given the degree to which these acquisition benefits are 
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contingent upon a successful post-M&A integration. The positive and significant relationship 
between change in forecast EPS and post-M&A dividend payments demonstrates that 
managers are likely to change their dividend policy post-M&A in order to reduce the degree of 
information asymmetry and uncertainty that arises as a result of the takeover.6 
The results presented in Table 1.5 (All Models) do not provide any evidence in support 
of Hypotheses 4 and 5; there is no evidence in favour of the agency and life cycle theories of 
dividends. The signs and significance of the control variables are relatively as expected in the 
analysis of the acquirer dividend policy in the first, second and third years after M&A. 
Specifically, ROA is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of dividend increase 
or initiation, which is in line with Fama and French (2002). Acquirer size (measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets or market value) is positively and significantly associated with 
the percentage change in post-M&A DPS in line with the life cycle theory of dividends, as 
larger companies are expected to be more mature (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2006). 
Acquirer leverage is negatively and significantly associated with the change in post-M&A DPS 
in the first year (Model 1) and second year (Model 2) after the completion of the M&A deal, 
pointing to low free cash flow problems and debt covenants faced by more leveraged firms. 
Similarly, the relative size of target and bidder (measured by the ratio of deal value to acquirer 
market value) is negatively and significantly related to the percentage change in dividends 
which could be due to lower free cash flow levels following the acquisition of large targets. 
The dividend premium has an insignificant coefficient which is in line with the findings of Ejie 
and Megginson (2008), Denis and Osobov (2008), and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009).
                                                          
6 Please refer to the ‘Sensitivity Analysis’ section of this study for a full description of the 
additional variables used to proxy management expectations.  
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1.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
To ensure that the results presented in this study are not driven by country, time and/or 
industry effects, all regressions are re-estimated with the inclusion of country, industry and 
year dummies. The regression results remain unaffected by the inclusion of these dummies. 
It is possible that the financial characteristics of the target company could also exert an 
impact on the post-M&A dividend policy followed by the bidder. This is due to the fact that 
target characteristics can influence the success of the M&A and therefore the post-acquisition 
financial performance of the bidder. Furthermore, the acquisition of a more leveraged and/or 
larger target can lead to lower free cash flow levels post-M&A. The target’s financial profile 
can also shift the acquirer’s financial profile towards a more or less mature life cycle stage. 
Table 1.6 presents a re-estimation of the original models (presented in Table 1.5) where the 
regression models also account for the financial characteristics of the target. The main results 
of the analysis remain unaffected by the inclusion of these additional control variables. 
It is also possible that the level of target DPS one year before the completion of the 
takeover is unusually high, as higher dividend payouts can be used as a defence mechanism 
aimed at preventing the acquisition (see for example, Page, Jahera and Pugh, 1996; and 
Ryngaert and Scholten, 2010). Tables 1.7 and 1.8 present a re-estimation of the original 
regression models where the target DPS is measured as of two years before the completion of 
the deal and the acquirer DPS is measured as of either two years before the M&A (Table 1.7) 
or one year before the M&A (Table 1.8). The sign and significance of the main variables of 
interest to this study, namely the ‘Dividend Gap’ and ‘Tar_Clientele x All_Shares’, remain 
unaffected. 
It is also possible that the presence of serial acquirers could drive the results associated 
with the change in acquirer dividend policy, due to the fact that the presence of more than one 
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acquisition completed by the same company in the sample could lead to ‘duplicate’ changes in 
DPS observations. This is particularly relevant when the serial acquirer performs the 
subsequent acquisition within a 3-year time window before or after the current acquisition. In 
the latter cases the results could be ‘contaminated’ by the continued effects of previous 
acquisitions, a given change in dividend policy could be affected not by the most recent 
acquisition (as is originally assumed and accounted for in the regression models) but by 
preceding acquisitions performed by the same acquirer. The effects of serial M&A on the 
bidder’s dividend policy could also continue to materialise over a period longer than one, two 
or three years. In order to account for the effect of multiple acquisitions by the same company, 
the regression models are re-estimated on the basis of a model that either includes variables 
which account for the presence of serial acquirers in the sample (Table 1.9) or excludes serial 
acquirers altogether (Table 1.10). The results of the new regressions show that the findings of 
the study are not driven or biased by the presence of serial acquirers. 
To ensure that the results are robust to the measure of the presence of institutional 
investors from the target company that remain on the acquirer’s share register, the regression 
analysis is re-estimated with the use of alternative proxies for target clientele, such as 
measuring target ownership in the acquirer as: a) the difference in the natural logarithm of the 
number of ‘Inherited II’ (Table 1.11); b) the percentage change in the natural logarithm of the 
number of ‘Inherited II’ (Table 1.12); c) the difference in the natural logarithm of the sum of 
the holdings of ‘Inherited II’ (Table 1.13). The results of the new regressions show that the 
findings of the study are not driven or biased by the specific measure used to capture the change 
in dividend clientele. 
To test the robustness of the results to the exclusion of individual/retail investors from 
the analysis, the original models are re-estimated with the inclusion of variables that measure 
the change in the ownership of retail/individual investors from the target company that remain 
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on the share register of the acquirer (Table 1.14). The sign and significance of the main 
variables of interest to this study, ‘Dividend Gap’ and ‘Tar_Clientele x All_Shares’, remain 
unaffected by the inclusion of these additional control variables. 
It is possible that the findings of the study are driven by the specific variables used to 
measure the financial characteristics of the acquirer and target companies. To ensure that this 
is not the case, the original models are re-estimated with the use of different variables which 
proxy for the same type of company financial characteristic. For example, size is also measured 
by the market value of equity (as opposed to total assets) or expected cash flows, or synergies 
associated with the acquisition are measured by the combined bidder and target abnormal 
returns associated with the announcement of the takeover (as opposed to change in forecast 
EPS); profitability is measured by ROE (as opposed to ROA); risk is measured by the five year 
standard deviation in operating cash flows (as opposed to the three year standard deviation in 
operating cash flows); leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to the market value 
of common equity (as opposed to the ratio of long-term debt to total assets); and liquidity is 
measured as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (as opposed to the ratio of operating 
cash flow to sales). The results of the new regressions are presented in Table 1.15. The main 
findings of the study remain unaffected by the use of different measures of the acquirer and 
target pre-acquisition financial characteristics. 
The regressions are also re-estimated with the use of the ratio of target to acquirer DPS 
as well as the ratio of target to acquirer dividend yield as the measure of the ‘Dividend Gap’ 
variable. The latter variable makes it possible to use a more granular measure of the degree of 
discrepancy between the target and bidder dividend policies before the acquisition. In addition, 
the results are tested with the use of a Tobit regression specification and on the basis of the 
subsample of US acquisitions.7 The findings of the study remain unchanged. 
                                                          
7 The results of these additional sensitivity tests are available from the author upon request. 
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1.5 Conclusion 
This study examines acquirer dividend policy after the completion of M&A. Takeovers 
present a useful and interesting corporate event which can exert a major impact on the dividend 
policy of the acquiring company. According to the clientele theory of dividends, the acquirer 
is expected to adjust its dividend policy to accommodate the preferences of target shareholders, 
particularly when the bidder pays for the target with its own shares and thus inherits the target’s 
investors. This study adds to the existing literature which examines the clientele theory of 
dividends by testing it in the context of M&A and by showing that the propensity of the acquirer 
to adjust its dividend policy to that of the target company depends on the degree of dissimilarity 
between the target and bidder dividend policies before the acquisition. The results also 
demonstrate that the propensity to change dividend payments post-M&A is contingent upon 
the change in the holdings of institutional investors from the target company that remain on the 
acquirer’s share register. Overall, the findings of this study show that acquirers can successfully 
adapt their payout policy to meet the dividend demand of their changing investor clientele. By 
changing their payout policy bidder companies can avoid the possibility of negative share price 
movements due to investor sell-offs in the period surrounding the M&A deal and thereby 
circumvent any disruptions to the acquisition process. 
Acquisitions can be viewed as major investment projects, with companies devoting 
substantial funds in order to buy target firms. Managers can use dividend policy as a signalling 
device to inform shareholders of the expected benefits to be reaped from the M&A deal. Since 
takeovers are complex transactions and the probability of performing a successful acquisition 
is empirically very low, it can be expected that the outcome of acquisitions is characterised 
with a high degree of uncertainty. The results of this study demonstrate that acquirers can 
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increase dividend payments after the takeover when they anticipate that company earnings will 
be augmented after the M&A deal and thus successfully convey this valuable information to 
the market. Managers can thus use dividend payments to reduce the information asymmetry 
between company insiders (the management team) and company outsiders (market 
participants) that is associated with the M&A deal.  
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Table 1.1 Sample Restrictions 
 
 Cycle 1  
(1998 - 
2001) 
Cycle 2 
(2002 - 
2004) 
Cycle 3  
(2005 - 
2007) 
Cycle 4  
(2008 - 
2011) 
Total 
1. All completed M&A Deals from 
SDC Platinum 
4,173 1,719 2,173 2,173 10,238 
2. Deals in 1 with acquirer Sedol or 
Datastream code 
3,969 1,666 2,108 2,121 9,864 
3. Deals in 2 excluding financial 
services companies 
2,795 1,149 1,527 1,620 7,091 
4. Deals in 3 with acquirer and target 
ownership information 
1,487 682 971 1,042 4,182 
5. Deals in 4 with acquirer financial 
data available 
756 539 760 766 2,821 
 
Notes: This table presents the restrictions used when constructing the final sample of the study. As indicated, the 
final number of deals is 2,821. These deals are completed between 1998 and 2011. 
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Table 1.2 Variable Definitions and Expected Signs of Explanatory Variables 
Panel A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Dependent variable: change in acquirer DPS after the completion of the M&A deal 
Pct_Ch_DPS 
Dependent variable used for the analysis of change in acquirer dividend policy. 
This variable is measured over three time windows: staring one year before the 
completion of the M&A and ending a) one year, b) two years, and c) three years 
after the completion of the takeover. This variable is equal to a) -1 when the 
acquirer distributed dividends one year before the acquisition but omitted DPS 
payments after, b) 0 when the acquirer did not distribute dividends either before or 
after the acquisition or when the acquirer distributed equal levels of dividends 
before and after the acquisition c) the percentage difference between DPS before 
and after the completion of the takeover, d) 1 when the acquirer did not distribute 
dividends before the acquisition but initiated dividend payments after. 
Explanatory variables used for the purposes of testing the clientele theory of dividends 
Dividend Gap 
This variable is equals to a) 1 when the target distributed dividends one year before 
the acquisition and the acquirer did not, b) 0 when the target and acquirer did not 
distribute dividends one year before the acquisition or the target and acquirer 
distributed equal levels of dividends one year before the acquisition c) the 
percentage difference between target and acquirer dividends per share calculated 
one year before the completion of the acquisition. This variable is then transformed 
into a dummy which equals one when the target paid higher DPS relative to the 
acquirer and zero otherwise.  
Tar_Clientele (Inherited 
II x Dividend Gap) 
This variable is equal to the product between the ‘Dividend Gap’ and the change 
in the proportion of the holdings of institutional investors (out of all sahres 
outstanding) in the bidder company that were also invested in the target company 
before the acquisition. This variable is measured over a time period starting one 
year before and ending one year after the completion of the takeover. 
Tar_Clientele x 
All_Shares 
Interaction variable between ‘Tar_Clientele’ and a dummy variable which is equal 
to 1 when the method of payment is all stock and 0 otherwise. 
Explanatory variables used to control for the effects of the agency theory of dividends 
Inherited II 
This variable is equal to the change in the percentage of holdings in the bidder 
company of institutional investors that were also invested in the target company 
before the M&A. This variable is measured over a time period starting one year 
before and ending one year after the completion of the takeover. 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 
Difference between the target and acquirer countries’ anti-self-dealing indices 
developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
Inherited II x 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 
This variable is equal to the product between the ‘Diff_antiself Tar-Acq’ variable and 
the ‘Inherited II’ variable 
Inherited II x 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x 
All_Shares 
Interaction variable between ‘Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq’ and a dummy 
variable which is equal to 1 when the method of payment is all stock and 0 
otherwise 
Explanatory variables used to control for the effects of the signalling theory of dividends 
M&A_Exp. gains 
Change in acquirer 12-month forward looking EPS (from t-1 to t+1). According to 
the Datastream definition, the 12-month forward EPS is defined as follows: 
F1FD12 = ((M x F1) + ((12 -M) x F2)) / 12 
where: M = Number of month ends to end of current fiscal year. F1 = Consensus 
EPS forecast for current fiscal year. F2 = Consensus EPS forecast for next fiscal 
year. 
Explanatory variables used to control for the effects of the life cycle theory of dividends 
∆ Growth oppt. 
Percentage difference in the acquirer’s market to book ratio calculated over a 
period starting one year before and ending one year after the acquisition completion 
Control Variables 
MtoBAcq Y-1/ MtoBTar Y-1 
Ratio of acquirer/target market value of equity to book value of equity calculated 
one year before the acquisition completion 
SizeAcq Y-1/ SizeTar Y-1 
Ratio of acquirer/target market value of equity, or total assets or net sales as of one 
year before the completion of the acquisition. The natural logarithm of these values 
is used for the purposes of the regression analysis. 
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Table 1.2 (Continued) 
 
Variable Name Definition 
ROAAcq Y-1 / ROATar Y-1 
Ratio of acquirer/target (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest 
Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / (Last Year's Total Assets) 
LeverageAcq Y-1 / 
LeverageTar Y-1 
Ratio of acquirer/target long-term debt divided by the market value of equity, or 
acquirer long-term debt divided by book value of equity, or acquirer long-term debt 
divided by total assets all calculated one year before the acquisition completion 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 / 
LiquidityTar Y-1 
Ratio of acquirer/target operating cash flow dividend by net sales, or ratio of 
acquirer/target current assets divided by current liabilities  
RiskAcq Y-1 / RiskTar Y-1 
Standard deviation of acquirer/target operating cash flows to sales ratio measured 
over a period of five or three years before the acquisition completion 
AgeAcq / AgeTar 
Number of years that the acquirer/target financial data (net sales) is covered by 
Datastream 
Dividend Premium 
Variable calculated as per the methodology developed by Baker and Wurgler 
(2005) which measures the difference in the market value weighted average of the 
market to book ratio of dividend payers and dividend non-payers. The constituents 
companies of the MSCI World index are used for the purposes of calculating this 
ratio  
GDP GrowthAcq / GDP 
GrowthTar 
Annual GDP growth of target or acquirer country of domicile 
CB_Deal 
Dummy variable equal to 1 when the acquirer and target countries of domicile are 
different 
Ind_relat. 
Dummy variables which equals 1 when the four digits of the target and acquirer 
primary standard industry classification (SIC) codes are equal and zero otherwise 
Rel_Size 
Ratio of target to acquirer total assets, or ratio of target to acquirer market value of 
equity or ratio of deal value to acquirer market value 
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Table 1.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Expected Relationship between Explanatory Variables Used to Test the Hypotheses of the Study and Percentage Change in Post-acquisition DPS 
 
Variable name Clientele theory Agency theory Life cycle theory Signalling theory 
Dividend Gap Positive No relationship No relationship No relationship 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x 
Dividend Gap) 
Positive 
No relationship No relationship No relationship 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares Positive 
No relationship No relationship No relationship 
Inherited II No relationship Positive No relationship No relationship 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself 
Tar-Acq 
No relationship Positive No relationship No relationship 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself 
Tar-Acq x All_Shares 
No relationship Positive No relationship No relationship 
M&A_Exp. gains No relationship No relationship No relationship Positive 
∆ Growth oppt.  No relationship No relationship Negative No relationship 
CHAPTER 1: DOES DIVIDEND POLICY CHANGE AFTER M&A? 
 
49 
 
Table 1.3 Deal Breakdown per Acquirer and Target Country and Time Period 
 
Notes: This table presents the sample distribution per target and acquire country of domicile. The deal distribution 
per each cycle is presented from the acquirer country's perspective. 
Country Acquirer Target 
Cycle 1  
(1998 - 
2001) 
Cycle 2  
(2002 - 
2004) 
Cycle 3  
(2005 - 
2007) 
Cycle 4  
(2008 - 
2011) 
United States 1,560 1,496 685 287 321 267 
Japan 398 374 26 100 135 137 
Canada 229 303 3 43 70 113 
Australia 134 159 7 23 50 54 
United Kingdom 103 139 6 22 47 28 
France 51 22 7 6 18 20 
Germany 43 22 2 11 13 17 
India 31 28 2 2 12 15 
South Korea 31 33 1 1 5 24 
Netherlands 26 21 4 0 11 11 
Sweden 24 24 0 3 16 5 
Switzerland 23 15 2 6 6 9 
Finland 14 7 2 0 6 6 
Hong Kong 14 11 1 4 4 5 
Italy 13 7 2 5 1 5 
South Africa 13 14 0 4 4 5 
Brazil 11 10 0 1 5 5 
Israel 11 12 0 2 2 7 
Singapore 11 17 1 3 6 1 
Spain 11 5 1 4 3 3 
Malaysia 8 11 1 3 3 1 
Denmark 7 6 0 3 3 1 
China 6 7 0 0 0 6 
Greece 6 7 0 1 3 2 
Norway 6 21 1 0 3 2 
Thailand 6 8 1 2 1 2 
Poland 5 9 0 0 2 3 
Belgium 4 5 0 1 1 2 
Mexico 4 4 0 0 2 2 
Philippines 3 2 0 1 1 1 
Ireland 2 1 1 0 0 1 
New Zealand 2 4 0 0 2 0 
Russia 2 1 0 0 1 1 
Austria 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Chile 1 4 0 0 1 0 
Colombia 1 2 0 0 1 0 
Indonesia 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Luxembourg 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Peru 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Portugal 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Turkey 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Uruguay 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Taiwan 0 5 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Ghana 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 2,821 2,821 756 539 760 766 
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Table 1.4 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel A: All Share Deals 
 
∆ DPSAcq Y-1 to Y+1 
Decrease 
(1) 
No 
Change 
(2) 
Increase 
(3) 
(2) – (1) (2) – (3) (1) – (3) 
Average 
-0.51 
Average 
0.00 
Average 
0.64 
t-stat t-stat t-stat 
 
Dividend Gap -0.40 0.02 -0.02 4.387*** 0.484 -1.847** 
Holding of Inherited IIY-1  18,775,905  4,889,098  22,950,524  -3.298*** -4.233*** -0.374 
Holding of Inherited IIY+1 26,436,090  9,172,570  30,536,457  -2.732*** -3.887*** -0.293 
∆ Holding of Inherited IIY-1 to 
Y+1 
0.60 0.62 0.48 0.0622 0.605 0.290 
Number of Inherited IIY-1  4.93 3.92 9.01 -0.4666 -2.720*** -1.205 
Number of Inherited IIY+1 5.76 4.67 10.44 -0.4649 -2.931*** -1.342* 
∆ Number of Inherited IIY-1 to 
Y+1 (diff) 
0.06 0.08 0.10 0.4473 -1.112 -1.014 
∆ Number of Inherited IIY-1 to 
Y+1 (pct.) 
0.10 0.12 0.17 0.4546 -1.399* -1.207 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.0003 -0.0010 0.0091 -0.1690 -1.957** -1.175 
Rel_Size  0.31 0.46 0.35 2.540*** 2.602*** -0.708 
Deal Value 598  641  1,393  0.2259 -4.083*** -2.108** 
M&A_Exp. gains  -0.15 0.47 0.46 3.362*** 0.066 -4.593*** 
∆ Growth oppt.  0.06 0.28 0.13 1.777** 1.848** -0.850 
SizeAcq Y-1 Total Assets 5,792  2,261  7,776  -4.577*** -7.258*** -1.124 
SizeAcq Y-1 Market Value 2,896  6,360  12,924  1.489* -3.394*** -3.117*** 
ROEAcq Y-1 0.05 -0.09 0.12 -3.465*** -8.329*** -3.521*** 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.04 -0.05 0.07 -4.075*** -8.452*** -3.000*** 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 0.14 -0.46 0.14 -3.802*** -6.211*** -0.139 
LeverageAcq Y-1 (Assets) 0.41 0.19 0.27 -1.427* -1.756**   0.285 
MtoBAcq Y-1 2.08 3.17 2.95 2.872*** 0.863 -2.428*** 
RiskAcq Y-1 (3-year) 0.04 0.69 0.04 4.056*** 6.598*** 0.019 
AgeAcq 15.90 10.74 16.99 -7.635*** 
-
12.701*** 
-1.207 
GDP GrowthAcq 0.04 0.04 0.04 3.150*** 3.845*** -0.284 
SizeTar Y-1 Total Assets 2,169  3,191  2,737  1.554* 1.021 -0.931 
SizeTar Y-1 Market Value 1,880  3,170  2,415  2.140** 1.863** -0.956 
ROETar Y-1 -0.13 -0.12 0.02 0.073 -5.060*** -4.165*** 
ROATar Y-1 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 -1.611* -5.444*** -2.764*** 
LiquidityTar Y-1 -0.20 -0.33 0.00 -0.798 -3.362*** -2.063** 
LeverageTar Y-1 (Assets) 0.41 0.13 0.36 -2.149** -4.984*** -1.168 
MtoBTar Y-1 5.23 7.46 5.31 1.994** 2.907*** -0.068 
RiskTar Y-1 (3-year) 0.36 0.72 0.18 1.379* 3.405*** 1.306* 
AgeTar 12.93 11.29 13.00 -1.593* -2.458*** -0.064 
GDP GrowthTar 0.04 0.04 0.04 3.120*** 3.465*** -0.434 
Dividend premium -0.42 -0.45 -0.42 -1.128 -1.305* 0.125 
Number of observations 103 615 273    
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Table 1.4 (Continued), Panel B: All Cash Deals 
∆ DPSAcq Y-1 to Y+1 
Decrease 
(1) 
No Change 
(2) 
Increase 
(3) 
(2) – (1) (2) – (3) (1) – (3) 
Average 
-0.49 
Average 
0.00 
Average 
0.58 
t-stat t-stat t-stat 
 
Dividend Gap -0.53 0.10 -0.22 4.736*** 3.378*** -1.561* 
Holding of Inherited  
IIY-1  
39,892,297  27,887,221  45,985,626  -0.828 -2.204** -0.392 
Holding of Inherited 
IIY+1 
46,750,125  28,736,509  45,993,193  -1.210 -2.102** 0.048 
∆ Holding of Inherited 
IIY-1 to Y+1 
0.47 0.25 0.04 -0.798 1.487* 1.665** 
Number of Inherited II 
Y-1  
11.59 11.90 18.67 0.073 -2.620*** -1.439* 
Number of Inherited II 
Y+1 
11.71 11.64 19.02 -0.017 -2.919*** -1.502* 
∆ Number of Inherited 
IIY-1 to Y+1 (diff) 
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.496 0.285 -0.328 
∆ Number of Inherited 
IIY-1 to Y+1 (pct.) 
0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.152 -0.108 0.087 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -4.898*** -6.303*** 0.726 
Rel_Size  0.17 0.23 0.14 1.270 4.310*** 1.042 
Deal Value 742 605 911 -0.748 -2.882*** -0.766 
M&A_Exp. gains  -0.03 0.44 0.41 3.564*** 0.557 -4.816*** 
∆ Growth oppt.  0.13 0.13 0.10 0.010 0.671 0.393 
SizeAcq Y-1 Total Assets 14,971  5,930  20,469  -4.997*** -9.999*** -1.728** 
SizeAcq Y-1 Market Value 9,328  9,950  28,860  0.235 -8.036*** -3.975*** 
ROEAcq Y-1 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.416 -5.745*** -4.934*** 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.253 -4.788*** -4.318*** 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 0.12 0.11 0.14 -0.126 -1.880** -1.772** 
LeverageAcq Y-1 (Assets) 0.18 0.15 0.16 -1.462* -0.695 1.481* 
MtoBAcq Y-1 2.26 3.28 3.05 2.796*** 1.234 -2.824*** 
RiskAcq Y-1 (3-year) 0.03 0.09 0.03 1.291* 3.325*** 0.249 
AgeAcq 20.94 15.71 21.99 -5.960*** -13.146*** -1.185 
GDP GrowthAcq 0.04 0.04 0.03 2.592*** 6.189*** 0.876 
SizeTar Y-1 Total Assets 996 897 837 -0.282 0.360 0.592 
SizeTar Y-1 Market Value 944 889 907 -0.170 -0.111 0.130 
ROETar Y-1 -0.03 -0.10 0.01 -1.409* -4.433*** -0.997 
ROATar Y-1 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -2.634*** -5.783*** -0.232 
LiquidityTar Y-1 0.05 -0.17 -0.02 -1.690* -2.292** 0.815 
LeverageTar Y-1 (Assets) 0.16 0.09 0.12 -4.046*** -3.543*** 2.029 
MtoBTar Y-1 2.94 3.49 2.98 0.776 1.461* -0.076 
RiskTar Y-1 (3-year) 0.26 0.40 0.21 0.656 1.968** 0.352 
AgeTar 12.22 10.18 11.53 -2.371*** -2.928*** 0.809 
GDP GrowthTar 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.102 4.581*** 2.411*** 
Dividend premium -0.40 -0.42 -0.43 -0.472 0.464 0.701 
Number of observations 94 488 603    
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Table 1.4 (Continued), Panel C: Cash and Shares Deals 
 
∆ DPSAcq Y-1 to Y+1 
Decrease 
(1) 
No 
Change (2) 
Increase 
(3) 
(2) – (1) (2) – (3) (1) – (3) 
Average 
-0.19 
Average 
0.00 
Average 
0.47 
t-stat t-stat t-stat 
 
Dividend Gap -0.71 0.06 0.15 5.664*** 0.066 -2.371*** 
Holding of Inherited IIY-1  51,315,087  11,368,663  53,385,949  -2.443*** -3.729*** 0.155 
Holding of Inherited IIY+1 55,505,794  14,989,364  67,591,575  -2.561*** -4.098***   -0.071 
∆ Holding of Inherited IIY-1 to 
Y+1 
0.19 0.44 0.40 -0.218 0.445 0.421 
Number of Inherited IIY-1  36.05 11.87 27.71 -2.357*** -2.708*** 0.676 
Number of Inherited IIY+1 38.44 13.08 29.50 -2.357*** -2.844*** 0.578 
∆ Number of Inherited IIY-1 to 
Y+1 (diff) 
0.05 0.07 0.07 -0.538 -0.154 0.448 
∆ Number of Inherited IIY-1 to 
Y+1 (pct) 
0.10 0.09 0.10 -1.022 -0.694 0.579 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.01 0.00 0.04 -1.028 -3.461*** -0.787 
Rel_Size  0.56 0.56 0.50 0.728 1.150 -0.068 
Deal Value 3,688  1,480  3,289  -1.957** -5.311*** -0.930 
M&A_Exp. gains  -0.10 0.47 0.61 2.702*** -0.710 -4.804 
∆ Growth oppt.  -0.04 0.25 0.18 0.488 1.094 0.066 
SizeAcq Y-1 Total Assets 16,250  3,303  14,108  -6.708*** -7.771*** 0.742 
SizeAcq Y-1 Market Value 20,616  5,533  16,155  -4.598*** -6.168*** 0.465 
ROEAcq Y-1 0.17 0.00 0.17 -2.252** -7.818*** -3.061*** 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.09 0.01 0.08 -2.303** -6.914***   -2.234** 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 0.23 0.02 0.16 -2.165** -2.514*** 4.103*** 
LeverageAcq Y-1 (Assets) 0.22 0.18 0.18 -0.633 0.199 0.990 
MtoBAcq Y-1 2.67 2.82 2.53 0.814 0.494 -0.778 
RiskAcq Y-1 (3-year) 0.03 0.31 0.03 1.786** 4.086*** 2.094** 
AgeAcq 18.03 13.30 17.85 -2.979*** -6.802***   -0.725 
GDP GrowthAcq 0.04 0.04 0.04 3.012*** 0.896 -2.304 
SizeTar Y-1 Total Assets 2,683  1,412  2,515  -1.287* -2.399*** -0.026 
SizeTar Y-1 Market Value 2,625  1,455  2,260  -1.225 -2.157** 0.043 
ROETar Y-1 0.06 -0.13 0.09 -2.194** -6.271*** -1.125 
ROATar Y-1 0.06 -0.07 0.03 -3.107*** -5.272*** 1.007 
LiquidityTar Y-1 0.17 -0.26 0.04 -1.830** -2.546*** 1.017 
LeverageTar Y-1 (Assets) 0.20 0.11 0.17 -1.693** -3.729*** 0.177 
MtoBTar Y-1 2.73 3.83 3.03 0.381 2.526*** 1.062 
RiskTar Y-1 (3-year) 0.08 0.45 0.13 1.161 2.137** -0.397 
AgeTar 12.31 9.80 11.88 -0.798 -1.910** -0.221 
GDP GrowthTar 0.04 0.04 0.04 2.075** 0.917 -1.416* 
Dividend premium -0.41 -0.43 -0.44 1.093 1.178 -0.377 
Number of observations 46 378 221    
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
 
Notes: The table presents some descriptive statistics of the study sample. The sample is divided into three sub-
samples depending on whether there is a decrease, no change, or an increase in the DPS measured over a period 
starting one year before and ending one year after the M&A. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C provide the descriptive 
statistics for the deals with all stock, all cash, and cash and stock methods of payment respectively. (2) - (1) is a 
t-test of the difference in averages between the group of acquirers that maintain their pre-acquisition dividend 
policy and those that decrease the DPS post-M&A; (2) - (3) is a t-test of the difference in averages between the 
group of acquirers that maintain their pre-acquisition dividend policy and those that increase the DPS post-M&A; 
(1) - (3) is a t-test of the difference in averages between the group of acquirers that decrease DPS post-M&A and 
those that increase the DPS post-M&A. ‘Holding of Inherited IIY-1’ is the holdings of institutional investors (II) in 
the acquirer company that were also invested in the target company prior to the acquisition, measured one year 
before the M&A, ‘Holding of Inherited IIY+1’ is the holdings of II in the acquirer company that were also invested 
in the target company prior to the acquisition measured one year after the M&A, ‘∆ Holding of Inherited IIY-1 to 
Y+1’ is the percentage change in the holdings of II in the acquirer company that were also invested in the target 
company prior to the acquisition over a period starting one year before and ending one year after the M&A, 
‘Number of Inherited IIY-1’ is the number of II in the acquirer company that were also invested in the target 
company prior to the acquisition, measured one year before the M&A, ‘Number of Inherited IIY+1’ is the number 
of II in the acquirer company that were also invested in the target company prior to the acquisition, measured one 
year after the M&A, ‘∆ Number of Inherited IIY-1 to Y+1 (diff)’ is the difference in the natural logarithm of the number 
of II in the acquirer company that were also invested in the target company prior to the acquisition over a period 
starting one year before and ending one year after the M&A, ‘∆ Number of Inherited IIY-1 to Y+1 (pct.)’ is the 
percentage change in the natural logarithm of the number of II in the acquirer company that were also invested in 
the target company prior to the acquisition over a period starting one year before and ending one year after the 
M&A, ‘Deal Value’ is the value of the M&A deal measured in millions of US $. For all other variable definitions 
please refer to Table 2. Variables with ‘Tar’ subscript are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables 
with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.5 Analysis of Change in Acquirer DPS 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
(Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
(Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
(Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory  
Dividend Gap 0.193*** 0.232*** 0.291*** 
 5.750 5.610 5.870 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) -0.828 -0.553 -1.636 
 -1.270 -0.660 -1.630 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 10.180* 17.411** 20.404** 
 1.930 2.290 2.120 
Agency Theory  
Inherited II -0.104 0.009 0.358 
 -0.680 0.050 1.350 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.188*** 0.141 0.131 
 2.560 1.420 0.970 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq -4.407 -3.692 -10.238** 
 -1.460 -0.950 -2.030 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares 0.410 0.295 -0.385 
 1.050 0.500 -0.600 
Signalling theory   
M&A_Exp. gains  0.034*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 
 5.010 5.320 5.310 
Life Cycle Theory  
∆ Growth oppt.  0.000 0.010 0.017 
 -0.050 1.170 1.500 
Control Variables  
All_Shares  -0.045** -0.054** -0.062* 
 -2.180 -1.970 -1.850 
Dividend Premium -0.005 -0.014 -0.183*** 
 -0.120 -0.290 -2.990 
AgeAcq -0.015 0.037 0.090*** 
 -0.700 1.390 2.770 
GDP GrowthAcq -1.385* 0.012 1.507 
 -1.840 0.010 1.220 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.013** 0.019** 0.019** 
 2.110 2.410 1.980 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.335*** 0.376*** 0.408*** 
 5.990 5.530 5.080 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 
 -1.560 -1.530 -1.200 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 0.190 0.200 -0.200 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.117** -0.143* -0.145 
 -2.040 -1.900 -1.510 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 
 -1.470 -1.270 -0.590 
CB_Deal 0.029 0.064* 0.086** 
 1.160 1.930 2.000 
Ind_relat. -0.009 -0.016 -0.022 
 -0.470 -0.670 -0.740 
Rel_Size -0.032* -0.049** -0.064** 
 -1.810 -2.130 -2.150 
Constant 0.169** 0.001 -0.199* 
 2.500 0.010 -1.810 
Number of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 
Adjusted R2 0.0682 0.0707 0.0757 
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Table 1.5 (Continued) 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, 
‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the deal and ending a) one year (Model 1), b) two years 
(Model 2), and c) three years (Model 3) after the completion of the M&A. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed 
definitions of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are 
not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression 
residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance 
following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each variable. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.6: Sensitivity Analysis: Controlling for Target Characteristics 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
(Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
(Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
(Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory  
Dividend Gap 0.184*** 0.234*** 0.293*** 
 5.060 5.120 5.400 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) -1.100 -0.670 -1.313 
 -1.550 -0.750 -1.280 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 12.319** 19.206** 21.952** 
 2.220 2.370 2.140 
Agency Theory  
Inherited II  -0.120 -0.032 0.196 
 -0.770 -0.150 0.770 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.277*** 0.242** 0.288* 
 3.160 2.050 1.950 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq -4.358 -3.821 -10.806* 
 -1.210 -0.850 -1.810 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares 1.411 1.844 -0.403 
 1.600 1.320 -0.120 
Signalling theory   
M&A_Exp. gains  0.035*** 0.051*** 0.070*** 
 4.330 4.480 4.590 
Life Cycle Theory  
∆ Growth oppt.  0.001 0.013 0.022 
 0.100 1.180 1.550 
Control Variables  
All_Shares  -0.060** -0.059* -0.071* 
 -2.500 -1.870 -1.920 
Dividend Premium -0.039 -0.034 -0.234*** 
 -0.910 -0.610 -3.470 
AgeAcq -0.012 0.034 0.107*** 
 -0.470 1.070 2.870 
GDP GrowthAcq 0.866 1.485 2.359 
 0.440 0.630 0.870 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.018** 0.030*** 0.021 
 2.170 2.840 1.630 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.295*** 0.307*** 0.336*** 
 4.390 3.720 3.530 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.010 -0.020 -0.024 
 -1.130 -1.570 -1.510 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.210 0.120 0.160 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.123* -0.109 -0.125 
 -1.700 -1.130 -1.040 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 
 -0.970 -1.170 -0.120 
CB_Deal 0.002 0.020 0.040 
 0.090 0.540 0.880 
Ind_relat. -0.009 -0.032 -0.051 
 -0.420 -1.140 -1.490 
Rel_Size -0.023 -0.038 -0.069* 
 -0.950 -1.280 -1.710 
SizeTar Y-1 -0.016* -0.027** -0.016 
 -1.750 -2.210 -1.040 
ROATar Y-1 0.169*** 0.212*** 0.207*** 
 3.730 3.530 2.970 
LiquidityTar Y-1 0.003 0.003 0.005 
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Table 1.6 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
(Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
(Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
(Y-1 to Y+3) 
 0.700 0.390 0.530 
MtoBTar Y-1 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 0.280 0.360 -0.300 
LeverageTar Y-1 -0.061 -0.093 -0.039 
 -0.940 -1.050 -0.350 
AgeTar  -0.007 0.005 0.001 
 -0.260 0.140 0.020 
GDP GrowthTar  -2.891 -2.240 -1.494 
 -1.480 -0.960 -0.550 
Constant 0.257*** 0.101 -0.144 
 2.850 0.830 -0.980 
Number of Obs. 2,217 2, 217 2,217 
Adjusted R2 0.0769 0.0770 0.0848 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, 
‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the deal and ending a) one year (Model 1), b) two years 
(Model 2), and c) three years (Model 3) after the completion of the M&A. These regressions control for the 
financial characteristics of the target company before the acquisition completion. Variables with ‘Tar’ subscript 
are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. 
Please refer to Table 2 for detailed definitions of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the 
possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our 
independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models 
have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each 
variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.7 Sensitivity Analysis: Measuring Target and Acquirer DPS Two Years Prior to Deal Completion 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory     
Dividend Gap 0.165*** 0.209*** 0.277*** 0.151*** 0.205*** 0.285*** 
 5.350 5.380 5.680 4.470 4.700 5.290 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) -0.132 -0.067 -0.114 -0.157 -0.121 -0.194 
 -1.210 -0.520 -0.730 -1.420 -0.910 -1.260 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 0.266* 0.346* 0.508** 0.299** 0.415** 0.608*** 
 1.900 1.940 2.420 2.090 2.220 2.810 
Agency Theory     
Inherited II 0.107** 0.125* 0.215*** 0.108* 0.159** 0.252*** 
 2.150 1.920 2.640 1.950 2.170 2.800 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.037 0.050 0.078 0.117** 0.134* 0.215** 
 0.760 0.800 1.000 2.090 1.920 2.520 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.056 -0.022 -0.255 0.046 0.049 -0.244 
 0.360 -0.100 -1.050 0.260 0.200 -0.890 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares -0.035 -0.030 -0.085 -0.035 0.084 -0.255 
 -0.590 -0.380 -1.010 -0.130 0.230 -0.560 
Signalling theory      
M&A_Exp. gains  0.034*** 0.049*** 0.065*** 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.067*** 
 4.990 5.230 5.200 4.200 4.300 4.400 
Life Cycle Theory     
∆ Growth oppt.  0.000 0.011 0.019* 0.002 0.014 0.023 
 0.070 1.310 1.750 0.200 1.280 1.640 
Control Variables     
All_Shares  -0.047** -0.052* -0.062* -0.061** -0.057* -0.073** 
 -2.300 -1.940 -1.870 -2.540 -1.820 -1.970 
Dividend Premium -0.011 -0.022 -0.193*** -0.046 -0.040 -0.242*** 
 -0.300 -0.440 -3.180 -1.070 -0.740 -3.640 
AgeAcq -0.015 0.037 0.091*** -0.012 0.034 0.109*** 
 -0.710 1.370 2.810 -0.460 1.060 2.880 
GDP GrowthAcq -1.435* -0.020 1.532 0.781 1.643 2.771 
 -1.880 -0.020 1.240 0.400 0.720 1.100 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.015** 0.020*** 0.020** 0.021** 0.034*** 0.024* 
 2.420 2.610 2.060 2.420 3.110 1.850 
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Table 1.7 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.331*** 0.374*** 0.407*** 0.277*** 0.289*** 0.321*** 
 6.010 5.580 5.100 4.210 3.570 3.410 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.011* -0.014* -0.015 -0.012 -0.022* -0.026 
 -1.870 -1.690 -1.360 -1.390 -1.690 -1.510 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.040 0.100 -0.220 0.040 0.000 0.060 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.108* -0.132* -0.121 -0.107 -0.090 -0.098 
 -1.910 -1.770 -1.270 -1.490 -0.940 -0.820 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.007** -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.004 
 -1.990 -1.630 -0.810 -1.560 -1.560 -0.330 
CB_Deal 0.015 0.045 0.054 -0.046 -0.039 -0.049 
 0.460 1.050 0.960 -1.320 -0.890 -0.880 
Ind_relat. -0.015 -0.022 -0.031 -0.013 -0.035 -0.056* 
 -0.800 -0.910 -1.040 -0.590 -1.260 -1.650 
Rel_Size -0.033* -0.048** -0.066** -0.023 -0.036 -0.068* 
 -1.810 -2.050 -2.190 -0.940 -1.160 -1.660 
SizeTar Y-1    -0.016* -0.028** -0.018 
    -1.710 -2.250 -1.160 
ROATar Y-1    0.183*** 0.226*** 0.213*** 
    4.020 3.770 3.050 
LiquidityTar Y-1    0.004 0.004 0.006 
    0.870 0.490 0.640 
MtoBTar Y-1    0.001 0.002 -0.001 
    0.430 0.490 -0.190 
LeverageTar Y-1    -0.066 -0.096 -0.042 
    -1.010 -1.080 -0.370 
AgeTar     -0.010 0.002 -0.006 
    -0.350 0.050 -0.140 
GDP GrowthTar     -2.766 -2.335 -1.817 
    -1.440 -1.030 -0.730 
Constant 0.158** -0.011 -0.215* 0.246*** 0.086 -0.155 
 2.330 -0.130 -1.960 2.700 0.690 -1.050 
Number of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,217 2,217 2,217 
Adjusted R2 0.0607 0.0660 0.0741 0.0679 0.0722 0.0862 
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Table 1.7 (Continued) 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, ‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the 
deal and ending a) one year (Model 1 and 4), b) two years (Model 2 and 5), and c) three years (Model 3 and 6) after the completion of the M&A. Models 4 to 6 account for 
target financial characteristics in addition to the acquirer financial characteristics. Variables with ‘Tar’ subscript are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables 
with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed definitions of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility 
that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or 
identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each variable. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.8 Sensitivity Analysis: Measuring Target DPS Two Years Prior to and Acquirer DPS One Year Prior to Deal Completion 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory     
Dividend Gap 0.197 0.245*** 0.328*** 0.203*** 0.264*** 0.348*** 
 5.880 5.930 6.540 5.630 5.790 6.270 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) -0.177 -0.158 -0.272 -0.232* -0.252* -0.362** 
 -1.430 -1.130 -1.580 -1.840 -1.730 -2.160 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 0.297* 0.480** 0.672*** 0.334** 0.563*** 0.757*** 
 1.890 2.560 2.960 2.100 2.880 3.280 
Agency Theory     
Inherited II 0.111** 0.130** 0.225*** 0.118** 0.171** 0.269*** 
 2.240 2.010 2.790 2.150 2.350 3.000 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.036 0.047 0.074 0.116** 0.132* 0.212** 
 0.730 0.760 0.950 2.050 1.880 2.470 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.058 -0.010 -0.231 0.054 0.071 -0.213 
 0.370 -0.050 -0.960 0.310 0.300 -0.780 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares -0.036 -0.033 -0.092 -0.036 0.071 -0.273 
 -0.600 -0.430 -1.090 -0.130 0.200 -0.590 
Signalling theory      
M&A_Exp. gains  0.033*** 0.048*** 0.064*** 0.034*** 0.048*** 0.066*** 
 4.930 5.180 5.160 4.130 4.230 4.340 
Life Cycle Theory     
∆ Growth oppt.  0.001 0.011 0.019* 0.001 0.014 0.022 
 0.090 1.360 1.780 0.170 1.280 1.640 
Control Variables     
All_Shares  -0.046** -0.052* -0.061* -0.060** -0.057* -0.072** 
 -2.250 -1.920 -1.830 -2.540 -1.850 -1.960 
Dividend Premium -0.014 -0.025 -0.198*** -0.045 -0.041 -0.243*** 
 -0.360 -0.510 -3.250 -1.070 -0.740 -3.640 
AgeAcq -0.016 0.035 0.088*** -0.012 0.033 0.107** 
 -0.770 1.300 2.730 -0.470 1.020 2.850 
GDP GrowthAcq -1.527** -0.157 1.348 0.754 1.606 2.695 
 -2.020 -0.150 1.100 0.380 0.700 1.070 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.015** 0.021*** 0.020** 0.022*** 0.035*** 0.026** 
 2.460 2.660 2.130 2.590 3.290 2.000 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.334*** 0.377*** 0.411*** 0.280*** 0.291*** 0.326*** 
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Table 1.8 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
 6.070 5.640 5.170 4.270 3.620 3.470 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.011* -0.014* -0.015 -0.012 -0.022* -0.027 
 -1.860 -1.720 -1.400 -1.350 -1.700 -1.530 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 0.170 0.190 -0.120 0.160 0.090 0.160 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.112** -0.137* -0.127 -0.113 -0.099 -0.106 
 -1.970 -1.830 -1.330 -1.570 -1.030 -0.890 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.007* -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 
 -1.920 -1.610 -0.820 -1.530 -1.570 -0.370 
CB_Deal 0.017 0.046 0.057 -0.044 -0.039 -0.048 
 0.520 1.090 1.020 -1.270 -0.870 -0.860 
Ind_relat. -0.015 -0.023 -0.032 -0.013 -0.035 -0.057* 
 -0.820 -0.940 -1.060 -0.600 -1.280 -1.680 
Rel_Size -0.035* -0.050** -0.070** -0.025 -0.038 -0.071* 
 -1.930 -2.150 -2.310 -1.020 -1.230 -1.720 
SizeTar Y-1    -0.018* -0.030** -0.019 
    -1.850 -2.380 -1.250 
ROATar Y-1    0.183*** 0.228*** 0.217*** 
    4.020 3.780 3.090 
LiquidityTar Y-1    0.004 0.004 0.006 
    0.830 0.470 0.620 
MtoBTar Y-1    0.001 0.002 0.000 
    0.520 0.600 -0.080 
LeverageTar Y-1    -0.063 -0.093 -0.040 
    -0.970 -1.050 -0.360 
AgeTar     -0.017 -0.007 -0.016 
    -0.630 -0.200 -0.370 
GDP GrowthTar     -2.895 -2.526 -2.035 
    -1.500 -1.110 -0.820 
Constant 0.160** -0.006 -0.209* 0.262*** 0.109 -0.127 
 2.360 -0.070 -1.900 2.910 0.890 -0.870 
Number of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,217 2,217 2,217 
Adjusted R2 0.0655 0.0708 0.0793 0.0761 0.0806 0.0934 
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Table 1.8 (Continued) 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, ‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the 
deal and ending a) one year (Model 1 and 4), b) two years (Model 2 and 5), and c) three years (Model 3 and 6) after the completion of the M&A. Models 4 to 6 account for 
target financial characteristics in addition to the acquirer financial characteristics. Variables with ‘Tar’ subscript are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables 
with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed definitions of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility 
that the coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of the independent variables and regression residual are not independent or 
identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each variable. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.9 Sensitivity Analysis: Controlling for Serial Acquirers 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory     
Dividend Gap 0.193*** 0.231*** 0.290*** 0.184*** 0.234*** 0.293*** 
 5.730 5.580 5.850 5.070 5.100 5.370 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) -0.402 -0.378 -1.281 -0.660 -0.586 -0.812 
 -0.570 -0.390 -1.100 -0.940 -0.580 -0.720 
Tar_Clientele x Serial -1.498 -0.670 -1.272 -1.642 -0.422 -1.822 
 -1.050 -0.380 -0.630 -1.060 -0.220 -0.820 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 12.584* 20.690** 23.463* 15.554** 24.030** 25.635* 
 1.830 2.090 1.820 2.100 2.230 1.830 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares x Serial -6.820 -9.608 -8.835 -7.963 -13.076 -9.252 
 -0.770 -0.710 -0.510 -0.840 -0.910 -0.500 
Agency Theory     
Inherited II  -0.109 0.010 0.355 -0.125 -0.027 0.188 
 -0.710 0.050 1.330 -0.800 -0.130 0.730 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.189*** 0.142 0.132 0.280*** 0.243** 0.288* 
 2.570 1.430 0.970 3.180 2.050 1.940 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq -4.133 -3.610 -10.028** -3.946 -3.790 -10.409* 
 -1.380 -0.920 -1.970 -1.100 -0.830 -1.730 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares 0.373 0.268 -0.422 1.246 1.698 -0.627 
 1.000 0.460 -0.650 1.540 1.200 -0.170 
Signalling theory      
M&A_Exp. gains  0.033*** 0.049*** 0.065*** 0.034*** 0.051*** 0.069*** 
 4.940 5.260 5.250 4.200 4.410 4.520 
Life Cycle Theory     
∆ Growth oppt.  0.000 0.010 0.017 0.001 0.013 0.022 
 -0.040 1.170 1.510 0.120 1.190 1.550 
Control Variables     
All_Shares  -0.045** -0.054** -0.061* -0.059** -0.059* -0.070* 
 -2.150 -1.960 -1.830 -2.460 -1.870 -1.900 
Serial -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 0.004 -0.005 -0.013 
 -0.250 -0.160 -0.190 0.150 -0.150 -0.320 
Dividend Premium -0.004 -0.014 -0.183*** -0.038 -0.034 -0.234*** 
 -0.110 -0.290 -2.990 -0.890 -0.610 -3.470 
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Table 1.9 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
AgeAcq -0.015 0.037 0.090*** -0.011 0.035 0.109*** 
 -0.690 1.400 2.780 -0.430 1.100 2.910 
GDP GrowthAcq -1.386* 0.000 1.502 0.905 1.496 2.384 
 -1.840 0.000 1.210 0.460 0.640 0.880 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.013** 0.019** 0.019* 0.018** 0.031*** 0.022 
 2.020 2.290 1.890 1.980 2.680 1.630 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.334*** 0.375*** 0.407*** 0.293*** 0.307*** 0.333*** 
 5.950 5.490 5.030 4.370 3.710 3.500 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.008 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.020 -0.024 
 -1.520 -1.510 -1.180 -1.110 -1.560 -1.460 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.280 0.240 -0.140 0.270 0.160 0.220 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.115** -0.141* -0.143 -0.118 -0.104 -0.119 
 -1.990 -1.860 -1.470 -1.620 -1.070 -0.980 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.001 
 -1.380 -1.220 -0.550 -0.900 -1.120 -0.050 
CB_Deal 0.028 0.063* 0.085** 0.001 0.019 0.039 
 1.130 1.910 1.980 0.040 0.520 0.850 
Ind_relat. -0.008 -0.015 -0.021 -0.008 -0.031 -0.049 
 -0.430 -0.640 -0.710 -0.370 -1.110 -1.450 
Rel_Size -0.033* -0.049** -0.065** -0.023 -0.038 -0.068* 
 -1.830 -2.130 -2.150 -0.950 -1.250 -1.690 
SizeTar Y-1    -0.016* -0.027** -0.017 
    -1.730 -2.210 -1.060 
ROATar Y-1    0.170*** 0.210*** 0.206*** 
    3.750 3.490 2.940 
LiquidityTar Y-1    0.003 0.003 0.005 
    0.710 0.390 0.530 
MtoBTar Y-1    0.001 0.001 -0.001 
    0.300 0.380 -0.260 
LeverageTar Y-1    -0.064 -0.096 -0.043 
    -0.970 -1.080 -0.390 
AgeTar     -0.009 0.004 -0.001 
    -0.330 0.110 -0.030 
GDP GrowthTar     -2.960 -2.281 -1.531 
    -1.510 -0.970 -0.570 
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Table 1.9 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Constant 0.165** -0.002 -0.203* 0.258*** 0.099 -0.148 
 2.420 -0.020 -1.810 2.820 0.800 -0.990 
Number of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,217 2,217 2,217 
Adjusted R2 0.0697 0.0713 0.0763 0.079 0.0779 0.0859 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, ‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting one year before the deal 
and ending a) one year (Model 1 and 4), b) two years (Model 2 and 5), and c) three years (Model 3 and 6) the completion of the M&A. Models 4 to 6 account for target financial 
characteristics in addition to the acquirer financial characteristics. Variables with ‘Tar’ subscript are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables with ‘Acq’ 
subscript but for the target company. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed definitions of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility that the 
coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of the independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically 
distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each variable. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.10 Sensitivity Analysis: Excluding Serial Acquirers 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory     
Dividend Gap 0.179*** 0.202*** 0.186*** 0.154*** 0.172*** 0.156*** 
 5.970 6.180 5.520 4.880 4.930 4.380 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) -0.371 -0.051 -0.313 -0.348 -0.059 -0.190 
 -0.730 -0.090 -0.530 -0.650 -0.100 -0.310 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 8.313** 7.734* 7.633* 10.039** 8.776* 8.544* 
 1.970 1.690 1.720 2.280 1.800 1.780 
Agency Theory     
Inherited II  -0.077 -0.005 0.084 1.590 -0.018 0.029 
 -0.690 -0.040 0.580 -1.200 -0.120 0.170 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.106 0.024 -0.024 0.158* 0.056 0.091 
 1.420 0.270 -0.230 1.780 0.510 0.710 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq -1.134 2.973 -3.200 -0.944 2.696 -5.015 
 -0.410 0.960 -0.980 -0.320 0.840 -1.450 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares 0.040 -0.071 0.047 1.110 2.091*** 2.286** 
 0.160 -0.150 0.090 1.590 3.620 2.430 
Signalling theory      
M&A_Exp. gains  0.020*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.024** 0.025*** 
 3.360 2.830 2.780 3.160 2.530 2.660 
Life Cycle Theory     
∆ Growth oppt.  -0.009* -0.006 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 0.002 
 -1.670 -1.060 0.070 -1.020 -0.410 0.240 
Control Variables     
All_Shares  -0.026 -0.023 -0.016 -0.044** -0.026 -0.031 
 -1.420 -1.080 -0.710 -2.000 -0.990 -1.110 
Dividend Premium -0.056 -0.065* -0.149*** -0.067* -0.060 -0.171*** 
 -1.620 -1.670 -3.540 -1.730 -1.360 -3.680 
AgeAcq -0.016 0.016 0.039* -0.030 -0.005 0.026 
 -0.900 0.800 1.850 -1.300 -0.200 1.000 
GDP GrowthAcq -0.747 0.318 0.535 -1.008 1.598 3.742** 
 -1.180 0.430 0.700 -0.700 0.920 2.350 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.023** 0.033*** 0.024** 
 4.080 3.950 4.510 2.380 2.890 2.050 
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Table 1.10 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.198*** 0.239*** 0.300*** 0.147** 0.182** 0.247*** 
 4.250 4.210 4.910 2.460 2.480 3.170 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.005 -0.010 -0.009 -0.004 -0.015 -0.013 
 -1.160 -1.370 -0.770 -0.520 -1.170 -0.640 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 0.560 0.720 0.180 0.030 0.360 0.080 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.142*** -0.192*** -0.222*** -0.177** -0.219*** -0.279*** 
 -2.700 -3.300 -3.540 -2.540 -2.800 -3.430 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.008** -0.010** -0.003 -0.011* -0.015** 0.000 
 -2.170 -2.380 -0.360 -1.730 -2.330 0.020 
CB_Deal -0.016 -0.010 0.006 -0.032 -0.025 -0.009 
 -0.670 -0.370 0.180 -1.090 -0.720 -0.230 
Ind_relat. -0.031* -0.030 -0.025 -0.035* -0.038 -0.040 
 -1.850 -1.520 -1.180 -1.770 -1.630 -1.600 
Rel_Size -0.027** -0.046*** -0.044** -0.032 -0.051** -0.066*** 
 -1.980 -2.950 -2.390 -1.540 -2.210 -2.710 
SizeTar Y-1    0.000 -0.004 0.011 
    -0.030 -0.360 0.870 
ROATar Y-1    0.138*** 0.150*** 0.157*** 
    3.130 2.970 3.020 
LiquidityTar Y-1    0.001 0.004 0.006 
    0.250 0.970 1.330 
MtoBTar Y-1    0.002 0.001 -0.001 
    0.840 0.350 -0.260 
LeverageTar Y-1    -0.074 -0.098 -0.028 
    -1.220 -1.430 -0.380 
AgeTar     0.002 0.011 0.012 
    0.090 0.420 0.430 
GDP GrowthTar     -0.036 -1.474 -3.411** 
    -0.020 -0.840 -2.110 
Constant 0.087 -0.013 -0.114 0.175** 0.056 -0.057 
 1.460 -0.190 -1.580 2.100 0.590 -0.570 
Number of Obs. 1,292 1,292 1,292 1,002 1,002 1,002 
Adjusted R2 0.1459 0.1509 0.1549 0.1507 0.1503 0.1664 
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Table 1.10 (Continued) 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, ‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the 
deal and ending a) one year after (Model 1 and 4), b) two years after (Model 2 and 5), and c) three years after (Model 3 and 6) the completion of the M&A. The difference 
between Models 1 to 3 and Models 4 to 6 is that the last three models account for target financial characteristics in addition to the acquirer financial characteristics. The deal 
sample used for estimating the models in this table exclude acquirers that have performed more than one acquisitions within the sample period. Variables with ‘Tar’ subscript 
are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed definitions of the explanatory 
variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of our independent 
variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and White (1980, 
1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.11 Sensitivity Analysis: Measuring Change in Inherited II as the Difference in the Natural Logarithm of the Number of Inherited II 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory     
Dividend Gap 0.188*** 0.236*** 0.165*** 0.177*** 0.238*** 0.293*** 
 5.540 5.610 6.670 4.880 5.150 5.290 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) 0.052 0.048 0.042 0.038 0.050 0.007 
 0.350 0.250 0.400 0.230 0.230 0.030 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 0.857** 1.078* 0.845*** 1.105** 1.233* 1.704** 
 2.010 1.740 2.660 2.350 1.790 1.990 
Agency Theory     
Inherited II  -0.214 -0.012 0.139 -0.274** -0.065 0.024 
 -1.560 -0.070 1.310 -1.980 -0.350 0.110 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.156** 0.120 0.099 0.231*** 0.192 0.230 
 2.060 1.170 1.430 2.580 1.600 1.520 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.007 -0.031 -0.104 0.041 0.092 -0.117 
 0.040 -0.140 -0.950 0.220 0.360 -0.400 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares 0.018 0.000 -0.045 0.000 0.089 -0.281 
 0.280 0.000 -1.150 0.000 0.250 -0.600 
Signalling theory      
M&A_Exp. gains  0.034*** 0.050*** 0.020*** 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.071*** 
 5.060 5.360 3.690 4.380 4.510 4.640 
Life Cycle Theory     
∆ Growth oppt.  0.001 0.011 0.007 0.002 0.014 0.023 
 0.100 1.230 1.120 0.250 1.250 1.640 
Control Variables     
All_Shares  -0.044** -0.048* -0.012 -0.058** -0.051 -0.064* 
 -2.130 -1.790 -0.710 -2.400 -1.630 -1.740 
Dividend Premium -0.007 -0.016 -0.099*** -0.045 -0.038 -0.241*** 
 -0.180 -0.320 -3.380 -1.050 -0.700 -3.610 
AgeAcq -0.012 0.040 0.047*** -0.008 0.039 0.114*** 
 -0.570 1.500 2.940 -0.320 1.200 3.030 
GDP GrowthAcq -1.446* -0.086 -0.210 0.629 1.226 1.889 
 -1.920 -0.080 -0.370 0.330 0.540 0.740 
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Table 1.11 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.012** 0.018** 0.027*** 0.017** 0.030*** 0.017 
 1.980 2.320 5.810 2.000 2.760 1.340 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.339*** 0.383*** 0.329*** 0.300*** 0.313*** 0.357*** 
 6.010 5.580 7.040 4.410 3.750 3.700 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.010 -0.020 -0.024 
 -1.620 -1.540 -1.100 -1.150 -1.570 -1.510 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.270 0.270 -1.430 0.310 0.230 0.260 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.108* -0.135* -0.074 -0.111 -0.100 -0.108 
 -1.890 -1.800 -1.510 -1.530 -1.030 -0.890 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.002 
 -1.430 -1.270 -0.610 -0.900 -1.230 -0.130 
CB_Deal 0.026 0.063* 0.033 -0.002 0.013 0.038 
 1.000 1.870 1.640 -0.060 0.360 0.830 
Ind_relat. -0.011 -0.018 -0.021 -0.013 -0.034 -0.057* 
 -0.590 -0.730 -1.360 -0.590 -1.220 -1.660 
Rel_Size -0.033* -0.050** -0.042*** -0.025 -0.039 -0.071* 
 -1.880 -2.180 -2.980 -1.020 -1.310 -1.760 
SizeTar Y-1    -0.017* -0.028** -0.016 
    -1.790 -2.270 -1.020 
ROATar Y-1    0.169*** 0.213*** 0.204*** 
    3.690 3.510 2.910 
LiquidityTar Y-1    0.003 0.003 0.005 
    0.690 0.390 0.540 
MtoBTar Y-1    0.001 0.001 -0.001 
    0.240 0.320 -0.350 
LeverageTar Y-1    -0.055 -0.085 -0.032 
    -0.850 -0.960 -0.280 
AgeTar     -0.004 0.007 0.004 
    -0.160 0.200 0.100 
GDP GrowthTar     -2.727 -2.093 -1.176 
    -1.440 -0.930 -0.460 
Constant 0.167** -0.002 -0.069 0.250*** 0.091 -0.149 
 2.470 -0.030 -1.290 2.760 0.740 -1.010 
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Table 1.11 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Number of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,217 2,217 2,217 
Adjusted R2 0.0677 0.0693 0.1250 0.0766 0.0753 0.0821 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, ‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the 
deal and ending a) one year after (Model 1 and 4), b) two years after (Model 2 and 5), and c) three years after (Model 3 and 6) the completion of the M&A. The difference 
between Models 1 to 3 and Models 4 to 6 is that the last three models account for target financial characteristics in addition to the acquirer financial characteristics. Variables 
with ‘Tar’ subscript are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed definitions 
of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of 
our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and 
White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.12 Sensitivity Analysis: Measuring Change in Inherited II as the Percentage Change in the Natural Logarithm of the Number of Inherited II 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory     
Dividend Gap 0.187*** 0.144*** 0.164*** 0.176*** 0.134*** 0.293*** 
 5.460 6.020 6.590 4.810 5.270 5.230 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) 0.046 0.045 0.039 0.032 0.030 0.012 
 0.410 0.580 0.490 0.270 0.360 0.070 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 0.700* 0.703** 0.679** 0.913** 0.814*** 1.381** 
 1.950 2.500 2.460 2.300 2.680 1.970 
Agency Theory     
Inherited II -0.214 0.032 0.135 -0.274** 0.045 0.026 
 -1.580 0.320 1.290 -1.990 0.410 0.120 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.154** 0.115* 0.098 0.228** 0.123* 0.229 
 2.040 1.880 1.420 2.550 1.660 1.510 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.007 -0.051 -0.070 0.038 0.009 -0.081 
 0.060 -0.640 -0.880 0.310 0.100 -0.410 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares 0.044 0.076 -0.006 0.004 0.147 -0.115 
 0.290 0.700 -0.050 0.020 1.140 -0.380 
Signalling theory      
M&A_Exp. gains  0.034*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.036*** 0.022*** 0.071*** 
 5.060 4.040 3.690 4.370 3.500 4.650 
Life Cycle Theory     
∆ Growth oppt.  0.001 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.023 
 0.090 0.440 
1.110 
 
0.250 0.560 1.630 
Control Variables     
All_Shares  -0.044** -0.025* -0.012 -0.058** -0.028 -0.064* 
 -2.120 -1.640 -0.710 -2.400 -1.600 -1.730 
Dividend Premium -0.007 -0.037 -0.099*** -0.045 -0.049 -0.241*** 
 -0.180 -1.320 -3.380 -1.050 -1.560 -3.610 
AgeAcq -0.012 0.016 0.047*** -0.008 0.004 0.114*** 
 -0.570 1.020 2.950 -0.320 0.190 3.030 
GDP GrowthAcq -1.447* -0.577 -0.213 0.626 0.527 1.880 
 -1.920 -1.040 -0.370 0.320 0.450 0.730 
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Table 1.12 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.012** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.017** 0.028*** 0.017 
 2.000 5.710 5.800 2.010 4.560 1.350 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.338*** 0.296*** 0.330*** 0.299*** 0.259*** 0.357*** 
 6.000 6.750 7.060 4.410 4.640 3.690 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.016 -0.024 
 -1.620 -1.560 -1.110 -1.150 -1.570 -1.510 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.001 -0.003* -0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.001 
 0.280 -1.660 -1.420 0.320 -1.620 0.270 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.109* -0.073* -0.073 -0.111 -0.074 -0.108 
 -1.890 -1.680 -1.500 -1.540 -1.320 -0.900 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.005 -0.007** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008* -0.002 
 -1.430 -2.080 -0.600 -0.910 -1.690 -0.130 
CB_Deal 0.025 0.032* 0.033 -0.003 0.013 0.037 
 0.980 1.700 1.610 -0.100 0.570 0.820 
Ind_relat. -0.011 -0.018 -0.021 -0.013 -0.026 -0.057* 
 -0.590 -1.280 -1.370 -0.590 -1.620 -1.660 
Rel_Size -0.033* -0.034*** -0.042*** -0.025 -0.044*** -0.071* 
 -1.870 -2.610 -2.980 -1.020 -2.610 -1.760 
SizeTar Y-1    -0.017* -0.012* -0.016 
    -1.790 -1.690 -1.020 
ROATar Y-1    0.170*** 0.149*** 0.204*** 
    3.700 3.920 2.910 
LiquidityTar Y-1    0.003 0.004 0.005 
    0.680 1.020 0.540 
MtoBTar Y-1    0.001 0.002 -0.001 
    0.240 0.910 -0.350 
LeverageTar Y-1    -0.055 0.000 -0.032 
    -0.840 0.010 -0.280 
AgeTar     -0.004 0.000 0.004 
    -0.160 0.000 0.090 
GDP GrowthTar     -2.719 -1.674 -1.171 
    -1.440 -1.450 -0.460 
Constant 0.167** 0.031 -0.069 0.249*** 0.142** -0.149 
 2.460 0.610 -1.290 2.750 2.080 -1.010 
Number of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,217 2,217 2,217 
Adjusted R2 0.0678 0.1139 0.1247 0.0766 0.1133 0.0819 
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Table 1.12 (Continued) 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, ‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the 
deal and ending a) one year after (Model 1 and 4), b) two years after (Model 2 and 5), and c) three years after (Model 3 and 6) the completion of the M&A. The difference 
between Models 1 to 3 and Models 4 to 6 is that the last three models account for target financial characteristics in addition to the acquirer financial characteristics. Variables 
with ‘Tar’ subscript are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed definitions 
of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of 
our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and 
White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.13 Sensitivity Analysis: Measuring Change in Inherited II as the Difference in the Natural Logarithm of the Sum of the Holdings of Inherited II 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory     
Dividend Gap 0.193*** 0.242*** 0.169*** 0.184*** 0.243*** 0.160*** 
 5.670 5.730 6.780 4.960 5.170 6.020 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) -0.008 -0.026 0.007 -0.011 -0.025 -0.001 
 -0.460 -1.070 0.470 -0.550 -0.910 -0.040 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 0.310** 0.504** 0.203** 0.367** 0.548** 0.251** 
 2.270 2.490 2.040 2.500 2.500 2.340 
Agency Theory     
Inherited II -0.200 0.005 0.137 -0.262* -0.053 0.152 
 -1.410 0.030 1.260 -1.780 -0.270 1.250 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.177** 0.144 0.110 0.254*** 0.227** 0.157* 
 2.400 1.460 1.630 2.910 1.980 1.940 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq -0.033 -0.045 -0.064* -0.024 -0.024 -0.074** 
 -0.590 -0.690 -1.790 -0.400 -0.360 -2.030 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares -0.006 -0.009 -0.002 -0.010 -0.007 0.009 
 -0.460 -0.640 -0.290 -0.600 -0.320 0.650 
Signalling theory      
M&A_Exp. gains  0.034*** 0.050*** 0.020*** 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.022*** 
 5.050 5.340 3.660 4.360 4.510 3.430 
Life Cycle Theory     
∆ Growth oppt.  0.000 0.010 0.007 0.002 0.014 0.009 
 0.070 1.200 1.110 0.220 1.220 1.220 
Control Variables     
All_Shares  -0.045** -0.053* -0.010 -0.059** -0.057* -0.014 
 -2.170 -1.950 -0.620 -2.470 -1.830 -0.720 
Dividend Premium -0.007 -0.017 -0.099*** -0.043 -0.037 -0.123*** 
 -0.200 -0.350 -3.380 -1.010 -0.670 -3.720 
AgeAcq -0.013 0.039 0.047*** -0.009 0.038 0.039** 
 -0.620 1.440 2.910 -0.360 1.160 2.030 
GDP GrowthAcq -1.413* -0.039 -0.201 0.785 1.477 1.351 
 -1.880 -0.040 -0.350 0.400 0.650 1.120 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.012* 0.017** 0.027*** 0.017** 0.029*** 0.026*** 
 1.950 2.250 5.820 1.980 2.700 3.860 
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Table 1.13 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.340 0.383*** 0.329*** 0.303*** 0.319*** 0.307*** 
 6.050 5.610 7.070 4.490 3.820 5.190 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 -0.021* -0.020 
 -1.620 -1.590 -1.090 -1.230 -1.680 -1.490 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 0.160 0.150 -1.530 0.160 0.060 -1.210 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.111* -0.139* -0.076 -0.111 -0.098 -0.089 
 -1.940 -1.850 -1.550 -1.530 -1.020 -1.460 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 0.001 
 -1.430 -1.280 -0.580 -0.900 -1.210 0.090 
CB_Deal 0.032 0.070** 0.036* 0.006 0.026 0.036 
 1.260 2.100 1.790 0.210 0.690 1.460 
Ind_relat. -0.010 -0.016 -0.020 -0.011 -0.032 -0.031* 
 -0.540 -0.680 -1.340 -0.520 -1.150 -1.760 
Rel_Size -0.034* -0.051** -0.043*** -0.026 -0.040 -0.062*** 
 -1.930 -2.240 -3.010 -1.040 -1.350 -3.320 
SizeTar Y-1    -0.017* -0.028** -0.004 
    -1.770 -2.260 -0.560 
ROATar Y-1    0.167*** 0.209*** 0.146*** 
    3.640 3.480 3.560 
LiquidityTar Y-1    0.003 0.003 0.005 
    0.710 0.410 0.950 
MtoBTar Y-1    0.001 0.001 0.000 
    0.270 0.370 -0.050 
LeverageTar Y-1    -0.060 -0.090 0.024 
    -0.920 -1.010 0.450 
AgeTar     -0.007 0.004 0.002* 
    -0.250 0.120 0.090 
GDP GrowthTar     -2.862 -2.323 -1.956 
    -1.500 -1.020 -1.640 
Constant 0.171** 0.006 -0.068 0.261*** 0.107 0.007* 
 2.530 0.070 -1.270 2.870 0.880 0.100 
Number of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,217 2,217 2,217 
Adjusted R2 0.0680 0.0711 0.1247 0.0764 0.0768 0.1286 
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Table 1.13 (Continued) 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, ‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the 
deal and ending a) one year after (Model 1 and 4), b) two years after (Model 2 and 5), and c) three years after (Model 3 and 6) the completion of the M&A. The difference 
between Models 1 to 3 and Models 4 to 6 is that the last three models account for target financial characteristics in addition to the acquirer financial characteristics. Variables 
with ‘Tar’ subscript are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed definitions 
of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of 
our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and 
White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.14 Sensitivity Analysis: Controlling for the Change in Inherited Retail/Individual Investors 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory     
Dividend Gap 0.196*** 0.238*** 0.299*** 0.186*** 0.240*** 0.302*** 
 5.690 5.690 5.950 5.010 5.200 5.490 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) -0.739 -0.297 -1.270 -1.019 -0.401 -0.920 
 -1.070 -0.330 -1.190 -1.430 -0.420 -0.840 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 9.699* 16.090** 18.510* 11.834** 17.800** 19.905* 
 1.780 2.080 1.880 2.070 2.160 1.900 
Tar_Clientele_Inherited Retail -1.881 -5.103* -7.149* -1.850 -5.188* -7.285* 
 -0.720 -1.820 -1.690 -0.680 -1.850 -1.760 
Tar_Clientele_Inherited Retail x All_Shares 1.848 5.041* 7.115* 1.828 5.105* 7.226* 
 0.710 1.800 1.690 0.670 1.820 1.750 
Agency Theory     
Inherited II  -0.107 0.010 0.363 -0.127 -0.038 0.195 
 -0.700 0.050 1.360 -0.820 -0.180 0.760 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.187** 0.140 0.129 0.274*** 0.236** 0.282* 
 2.550 1.410 0.950 3.110 2.000 1.900 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq -4.088 -3.373 -10.078* -4.077 -3.603 -10.789* 
 -1.330 -0.850 -1.950 -1.120 -0.790 -1.770 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares 0.430 0.326 -0.355 1.577* 2.074 -0.204 
 1.050 0.530 -0.560 1.680 1.560 -0.060 
Inherited RetailTar x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.519 3.481 5.162 1.011 4.030 5.453 
 0.200 1.260 1.230 0.370 1.440 1.320 
Inherited RetailTar x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x 
All_Shares 
-2.605 -6.128** -7.279* -3.045 -6.467** -7.098* 
 -1.000 -2.160 -1.720 -1.120 -2.290 -1.710 
Inherited RetailTar 0.045 0.073 0.043 0.059 0.126 0.100 
 0.920 1.090 0.570 1.060 1.460 1.030 
Signalling theory      
M&A_Exp. gains  0.034*** 0.049*** 0.066*** 0.035*** 0.051*** 0.070*** 
 4.990 5.310 5.300 4.310 4.480 4.590 
Life Cycle Theory     
∆ Growth oppt.  -0.001 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.011 0.020 
 -0.170 0.980 1.360 0.010 1.030 1.420 
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Table 1.14 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Control Variables       
All_Shares  -0.045** -0.055** -0.063* -0.061** -0.060* -0.073** 
 -2.180 -2.000 -1.870 -2.500 -1.910 -1.960 
Dividend Premium -0.006 -0.016 -0.184*** -0.039 -0.035 -0.235*** 
 -0.150 -0.320 -3.020 -0.920 -0.630 -3.480 
AgeAcq -0.015 0.036 0.088*** -0.013 0.032 0.103*** 
 -0.720 1.330 2.710 -0.520 0.980 2.770 
GDP GrowthAcq -1.345* 0.070 1.562 0.834 1.429 2.249 
 -1.780 0.070 1.260 0.420 0.600 0.820 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.013** 0.018** 0.018* 0.018** 0.031*** 0.021 
 2.080 2.370 1.940 2.170 2.840 1.640 
ROAAcq Y-1 0.338*** 0.380*** 0.409*** 0.295*** 0.309*** 0.334*** 
 5.980 5.520 5.000 4.330 3.670 3.420 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 -0.009 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.023* -0.027 
 -1.610 -1.570 -1.190 -1.250 -1.730 -1.580 
MtoBAcq Y-1 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 0.160 0.180 -0.200 0.190 0.100 0.160 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.121** -0.151** -0.156 -0.130* -0.123 -0.142 
 -2.100 -2.010 -1.620 -1.780 -1.260 -1.180 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 
 -1.440 -1.210 -0.580 -0.940 -1.070 -0.080 
CB_Deal 0.030 0.065** 0.087** 0.003 0.021 0.040 
 1.200 1.960 2.020 0.120 0.560 0.890 
Ind_relat. -0.009 -0.016 -0.022 -0.009 -0.031 -0.051 
 -0.470 -0.660 -0.740 -0.420 -1.140 -1.500 
Rel_Size -0.032* -0.047** -0.062** -0.023 -0.036 -0.065 
 -1.780 -2.070 -2.060 -0.940 -1.220 -1.620 
SizeTar Y-1    -0.017* -0.028** -0.017 
    -1.780 -2.280 -1.110 
ROATar Y-1    0.172*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 
    3.780 3.600 3.060 
LiquidityTar Y-1    0.003 0.003 0.005 
    0.660 0.340 0.500 
MtoBTar Y-1    0.001 0.001 -0.001 
    0.280 0.390 -0.250 
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Table 1.14 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
LeverageTar Y-1    -0.059 -0.088 -0.033 
       
    -0.910 -1.000 -0.300 
AgeTar     -0.006 0.007 0.003 
    -0.220 0.200 0.070 
GDP GrowthTar     -2.808 -2.114 -1.322 
    -1.420 -0.890 -0.480 
Constant 0.170** 0.004 -0.194* 0.258*** 0.105 -0.138 
 2.510 0.050 -1.750 2.850 0.860 -0.940 
Number of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,217 2,217 2,217 
Adjusted R2 0.0691 0.0731 0.0784 0.0779 0.0800 0.0883 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, ‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the 
deal and ending a) one year after (Model 1 and 4), b) two years after (Model 2 and 5), and c) three years after (Model 3 and 6) the completion of the M&A. The difference 
between Models 1 to 3 and Models 4 to 6 is that the last three models account for target financial characteristics in addition to the acquirer financial characteristics. 
‘Tar_Clientele_Inherited Retail’ is defined as the percentage change in the natural logarithm of the holdings of retail investors in the acquirer company that were also invested 
in the target company prior to the acquisition over a period starting one year before and ending one year after the M&A completion interacted with a dummy variable which is 
equal to one when the target DPS before the deal is higher than that of the acquire and zero otherwise, ‘Tar_Clientele_Inherited Retail x All_Shares’ is defined as the 
‘Tar_Clientele_Inherited Retail’ variable interacted with a dummy variable which is equal to one when the deal method of payment is all stock and zero otherwise, ‘Inherited 
RetailTar x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq’ is defined as the percentage change in the natural logarithm of the holdings of retail investors in the acquirer company that were also invested in 
the target company prior to the acquisition over a period starting one year before and ending one year after the M&A completion interacted with ‘Diff_antiself Tar-Acq’, ‘Inherited 
RetailTar x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares’ is defined as the ‘Inherited RetailTar x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq’ interacted with a dummy variable which is equal to one when the deal 
method of payment is all stock and zero otherwise, ‘Inherited RetailTar’ is defined as the percentage change in the natural logarithm of the holdings of retail investors in the 
acquirer company that were also invested in the target company prior to the acquisition over a period starting one year before and ending one year after the M&A completion. 
Variables with ‘Tar’ subscript are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed 
definitions of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the 
distributions of our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following 
Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.15 Sensitivity Analysis: Using Alternative Measures for Target and Acquirer Financial Characteristics 
 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Clientele Theory     
Dividend Gap 0.186*** 0.227*** 0.292*** 0.193*** 0.241*** 0.296*** 
 5.470 5.410 5.830 5.280 5.220 5.420 
Tar_Clientele (Inherited II x Dividend Gap) -1.010 -0.673 -1.688 -1.159 -0.663 -1.328 
 -1.500 -0.760 -1.600 -1.620 -0.690 -1.210 
Tar_Clientele x All_Shares 11.126** 18.139** 21.782** 13.185** 19.637** 21.863** 
 2.070 2.320 2.200 2.340 2.380 2.160 
Agency Theory     
Inherited II -0.126 -0.010 0.328 -0.064 0.037 0.292 
 -0.830 -0.050 1.230 -0.440 0.180 1.160 
Diff_antiself Tar-Acq 0.202*** 0.160 0.151 0.282*** 0.262** 0.294** 
 2.760 1.610 1.110 3.230 2.240 1.980 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq -4.251 -3.558 -10.174** -5.612 -5.397 -12.483** 
 -1.420 -0.920 -2.020 -1.520 -1.170 -2.050 
Inherited II x Diff_antiself Tar-Acq x All_Shares 0.388 0.286 -0.409 1.576 2.089 -0.257 
 1.050 0.500 -0.640 1.600 1.510 -0.080 
Signalling theory      
M&A_Exp. gains  0.031*** 0.046*** 0.066*** 0.039*** 0.056*** 0.076*** 
 4.460 4.900 5.250 4.780 4.860 4.900 
Life Cycle Theory     
∆ Growth oppt.  -0.003 0.009 0.015 -0.010 0.003 0.013 
 -0.350 0.930 1.260 -1.150 0.310 0.920 
Control Variables     
All_Shares  -0.038* -0.049* -0.074** -0.055** -0.060* -0.075* 
 -1.830 -1.800 -2.170 -2.210 -1.840 -1.950 
Dividend Premium 0.006 -0.003 -0.178*** -0.034 -0.033 -0.251*** 
 0.160 -0.060 -2.880 -0.800 -0.590 -3.700 
AgeAcq -0.014 0.045* 0.116*** -0.002 0.048 0.126*** 
 -0.740 1.780 3.700 -0.060 1.540 3.380 
GDP GrowthAcq -1.506** -0.128 1.466 1.012 1.714 2.263 
 -1.980 -0.120 1.170 0.500 0.720 0.830 
SizeAcq Y-1 0.009*** 0.012* 0.013 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.021 
 1.790 1.770 1.630 3.030 2.890 1.540 
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Table 1.15 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
ROEAcq Y-1 0.179*** 0.166*** 0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 6.110 4.560 0.620 0.070 -0.350 -0.220 
LiquidityAcq Y-1 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 0.430 0.260 2.050 1.640 1.350 1.620 
MtoBAcq Y-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
 -0.290 -0.180 -0.290 -0.940 -0.690 -0.260 
LeverageAcq Y-1 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.017 -0.005 0.005 
 -0.310 -0.150 -0.090 -0.770 -0.150 0.140 
RiskAcq Y-1 -0.002 -0.004* -0.001** -0.007** -0.010*** -0.009** 
 -0.870 -1.850 -2.350 -2.440 -2.760 -2.030 
CB_Deal 0.029 0.066** 0.089** 0.019 0.040 0.060 
 1.150 1.980 2.070 0.650 1.060 1.290 
Ind_relat. -0.016 -0.024 -0.032 -0.016 -0.040 -0.061* 
 -0.850 -0.990 -1.050 -0.710 -1.430 -1.750 
Rel_Size -0.035* -0.054** -0.076** -0.020 -0.040 -0.054 
 -1.910 -2.300 -2.460 -0.780 -1.270 -1.250 
SizeTar Y-1    -0.019** -0.025** -0.024* 
    -2.180 -2.180 -1.680 
ROETar Y-1    -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
    -0.310 -0.940 -1.090 
LiquidityTar Y-1    0.000 0.000 0.000 
    -0.160 0.090 0.430 
MtoBTar Y-1    0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 
    2.770 2.990 2.510 
LeverageTar Y-1    -0.011** -0.010 -0.004 
    -2.010 -1.430 -0.330 
AgeTar     -0.004 0.010 0.018 
    -0.170 0.300 0.440 
RiskTar    0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 
    -2.710 -2.140 -2.310 
GDP GrowthTar     -3.364* -2.842 -1.921 
    -1.680 -1.200 -0.710 
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Table 1.15 (Continued) 
Dependant variable: Pct_Ch_DPS 
Model 1 
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 2 
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 3 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Model 4  
 (Y-1 to Y+1) 
Model 5  
 (Y-1 to Y+2) 
Model 6 
 (Y-1 to Y+3) 
Constant 0.192*** 0.025 -0.218** 0.198** 0.038 -0.201 
 2.760 0.270 -1.970 2.190 0.310 -1.370 
Number of Obs. 2,821 2,821 2,821 2,217 2,217 2,217 
Adjusted R2 0.0681 0.0668 0.0674 0.0684 0.0684 0.0774 
 
Notes: The table presents the regression analysis of the determinants of the percentage change in acquirer DPS, ‘Pct_Ch_DPS’, over periods starting from one year before the 
deal and ending a) one year after (Model 1 and 4), b) two years after (Model 2 and 5), and c) three years after (Model 3 and 6) the completion of the M&A. The difference 
between Models 1 to 3 and Models 4 to 6 is that the last three models account for target financial characteristics in addition to the acquirer financial characteristics. Variables 
with ‘Tar’ subscript are measured in the same way as the corresponding variables with ‘Acq’ subscript but for the target company. Please refer to Table 2 for detailed definitions 
of the explanatory variables used in the models. To correct for the possibility that our coefficients are not estimated on the basis of a random sample or that the distributions of 
our independent variables and regression residual are not independent or identically distributed (i.i.d.), all models have robust estimate of variance following Huber (1967) and 
White (1980, 1982). T-stats are reported below each independent variable. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
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CHAPTER 2 
Naked M&A Transactions: How the Lack of Local 
Expertise in Cross-border Deals Can Negatively Affect 
Acquirer Performance – and How Informed Institutional 
Investors Can Mitigate This Effect 
2.1 Introduction 
Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2009), hereafter FMM, consider cross-border M&A deals and 
find (Subsection 4.3) that the extent to which a deal is value-increasing depends on whether 
there is foreign institutional ownership of the companies. Specifically, they find (p. 640) that 
“foreign institutional ownership in both target and acquirer firms is associated with higher 
combined returns in cross-border deals. This is consistent with the “facilitation hypothesis” 
that foreign institutions promote deals that offer greater value creation (synergy).” They argue 
that this is because foreign institutional investors may reduce transaction costs and 
informational asymmetries between potential acquirers and targets. However, they do not 
propose in detail how these advantages arise. 
Building upon the theory of Financial Geography and the work of Dye and Sridhar (2003), 
we argue that the reason that the holdings of foreign institutional investors is positively 
associated with the performance of acquirer returns is because a subset of the investors may 
hold key expertise in the target region. That is, in an economic setting in which information is 
hard to gather and diverse in nature, it may be reasonably argued that those investors with 
regional expertise hold information which the management of the acquirer finds hard to collect. 
Thus, they may have a role to play in reducing cross-border M&A deal informational 
 The full text of this article has been 
removed for copyright reasons 
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CHAPTER 3 
Distressed Horizontal M&A: What’s the Wealth Effect on 
Supply Chain Participants? 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the most frequently stated reasons for horizontal acquisitions is that they 
improve productive efficiency and thereby achieve superior post- mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) financial performance. The need to enhance productive efficiency is usually brought 
about by unexpected and/or major economic changes (see e.g., Jensen 1993; Comment and 
Schwert, 1995; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; and Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2001). Removal of redundant facilities and/or the attainment of greater 
economies of scale could lead to the improvement of productive efficiency. In contrast to this 
idea about the sources of gains in horizontal takeovers is the view usually expressed by antitrust 
authorities which suggests that industry-related acquisitions can generate benefits for the 
merging firms by harming their customers and suppliers. In effect, the merging firms are 
expropriating customer and supplier wealth by engaging in collusive activities with their rival 
firms. Companies in horizontal takeovers can collude with their rivals, and as a result 
expropriate gains from customers and suppliers through two different channels, which are not 
mutually exclusive: a) the colluding firms can restrict the output levels in the takeover industry 
leading to the purchase of lower input quantities from suppliers and higher prices for 
customers; b) the colluding firms can negotiate lower input prices from their suppliers owing 
to their increased bargaining power (due to the lower number of larger industry players after 
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the horizontal acquisition), with the effect on customer wealth being either positive or 
negative.20 
The product-market dynamics between merging firms, customers, rivals and suppliers, 
in the case of industry-related takeovers, are expected to be different when one of the 
companies is in financial distress. The company’s potential bankruptcy could profoundly 
influence the actions and performance of all the participants in its supply chain. The decisions 
of supply chain participants can also change the distressed company’s risk of bankruptcy. This 
is particularly the case for companies domiciled in the United States, where firm bankruptcy is 
principally governed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Compared with other countries, 
the US insolvency rules are significantly more debtor-oriented. The US legal environment 
allows the managers of the bankrupt company to retain control and to carry on operating the 
company during reorganisation (Franks, Nyborg, and Torous 1996; and Ravid and Sundgren, 
1998). These specific rules affect how supply chain contracts are established between different 
parties both when a firm is in financial distress and if the firm becomes bankrupt (Yang, Birge, 
and Parker, 2014).  
To my knowledge there is one theoretical model in the extant literature, developed by 
Yang et al. (2014), which examines both the effect of the risk of bankruptcy (i.e. when the 
company is in financial distress) and the effect of bankruptcy itself on company rivals and 
suppliers. Yang et al. (2014)’s model demonstrates that reorganisation, as a possible strategy, 
can considerably impact the pre-bankruptcy courses of action of the different participants in 
the supply chain and can generate value for the financially distressed firm as compared to a 
situation without the possibility of bankruptcy reorganization. If the supplier has the ability to 
                                                          
20 The effect on customers could be positive if the lower input costs are passed along to 
customers in the form of lower output prices. Alternatively, the effect could be negative if the 
suppliers also decide to collude and reduce the level of input that is produced by the industry 
(Shahrur, 2005). 
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change the price of its inputs, it has a strong incentive to grant concessions to the financially 
distressed buyer before the period in which bankruptcy takes place Yang et al. (2014). This 
incentive originates from the fear that the supplier may lose one of its sales channels in the 
event of the firm going bankrupt.  
Reorganisation is not the only course of action available to companies in financial 
troubles. Jensen (1991) argues that M&A are an effective means for resolving financial distress, 
and they can take place either inside or outside of bankruptcy. The effect on suppliers, and 
consequently the effect on customers and rivals, of the financially distressed firm is less clear, 
however, when the company is acquired out of distress by a competitor. On the one hand, the 
financially distressed firm is expected to have higher bargaining/buyer power relative to its 
financially sound peers due to the fact that one of the possible exit routes from financial distress 
is filing for Chapter 11. The company’s suppliers are aware of the fact that when in Chapter 11 
a bankrupt company is very likely to re-negotiate its supplier contracts. In anticipation of this 
possibility, suppliers are likely to react by providing the financially distressed companies with 
certain concessions such as more favourable contract terms and/or lower input prices. This 
effect can be strengthened by the fact that the industry concentration of the financially 
distressed firm could also increase as a result of the horizontal takeover, thus further 
augmenting the buyer power of the merged company.  
On the other hand, through the acquisition, the financially distressed firm becomes part 
of a new company which could be financially more stable. As a result, suppliers of the takeover 
industry can benefit from the fact that the newly formed company is more likely to afford the 
same input prices. The latter effect can be stronger when the supplier industry's structure is 
monopolistic or oligopolistic, i.e. when the suppliers possess higher bargaining power. 
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The literature on acquirer post-M&A performance following acquisitions of distressed 
targets is scarce. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) study two matching sub-groups of 
acquisitions, those that were acquired in Chapter 11 and those that were acquired outside 
Chapter 11. They find evidence of value creation for the first group (using cash flow 
performance and event studies) but not for the second group. Clark and Ofek (1994) also find 
evidence of poor post-merger performance in acquisitions of distressed targets. In terms of 
short-term performance, even though Clark and Ofek (1994) argue that announcements of 
abnormal returns for both acquirers and distressed targets are similar to those for the general 
population of acquirers and targets, Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) find positive abnormal 
returns for both acquirers and bankrupt targets. 
To my knowledge there are no previous studies which investigate the wealth 
implications for the merging firms in horizontal takeovers as well as their customers, 
competitors, and suppliers when the target is financially distressed. The literature that examines 
the financial effect of industry-related takeovers on the different participants in the product-
market relationship is also limited. There are two studies which analyse the wealth implications 
of horizontal mergers for customers, suppliers, and rivals as well as the merging firms - Fee 
and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005). Both studies provide evidence that horizontal 
acquisitions tend to be motivated by efficiency considerations. However, the authors also show 
that horizontal mergers can enhance the buyer power of the newly combined firm when the 
supplier industry is concentrated. This study presents a useful and interesting extension of the 
analyses of Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005) by examining the wealth effects on the 
merging firms, customers, rivals and suppliers of industry-related takeovers when the target is 
financially distressed. 
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3.2 Related Literature 
3.2.1 Buyer Power, Collusion and Productive Efficiency Hypotheses 
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the different hypotheses tested in this study and the 
implications of each hypothesis for the merging firms as well as their customers, suppliers and 
rivals. Horizontal takeovers can lead to combined purchasing activities as there is a newly 
formed company as opposed to two companies purchasing from the same suppliers. The idea 
that such combined purchasing activities can result in lower input prices is referred to as the 
buyer power hypothesis (Fee and Thomas, 2004; and Shahrur, 2005). The buyer purchasing 
power effect can result from increased bargaining power on the side of the merging firms or 
increased competition among the supplier firms, or a combination of the two. The idea that 
industry-related acquisitions can stimulate anticompetitive behaviour among buyer firms is 
referred to as monopsonistic collusion (Galbraith, 1952). If horizontal mergers lead to 
monopsonistic collusion among firms in the takeover industry, company rivals would gain at 
the expense of suppliers, owing to improved coordination between rival firms (higher 
bargaining power) that enables them to negotiate lower prices with the suppliers to the takeover 
industry. Alternatively, when two buyer companies merge, they could induce higher 
competition among industry suppliers that consequently leads to reduced input prices, if the 
supplier industry is not perfectly competitive and the suppliers were therefore colluding before 
the merger (Fee and Thomas, 2004). 
The implication of the buyer power hypothesis for customer companies is unclear. On 
the one hand, the participants in the monopsonistic industry are unlikely to translate lower input 
costs into lower customer prices. When the takeover industry is perfectly competitive, the 
monopsonist will sell the product at the market price but the output level will decrease owing 
to lower input purchases. If the takeover industry is less than perfectly competitive, the 
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monopsonist will be able to sell the limited output at higher prices, thus hurting customers 
(Blair and Harrison, 1993). On the other hand, there is some anecdotal evidence that buyer 
power can exert a positive influence on customer companies. As suggested by Frank and 
Solomon (2002), “Programmers like Walt Disney and Viacom, which supply cable companies 
with channels, are using their increasing power to charge cable companies higher fees for 
programs. Cable companies need equal reach, and influence as “gatekeepers” to the public, to 
resist the cost increases.” The wealth implications for the merging firms, suppliers, rivals and 
customers of the buyer power hypothesis are summarised in Table 3.1. 
Another motive for horizontal acquisitions is the augmentation of productive efficiency 
by achieving greater economies of scale or reducing overlapping production facilities, for 
example. There is a plethora of studies that provide evidence for the idea that industry-related 
M&A, as opposed to diversifying takeovers, can boost operating synergies (see, for example, 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992; Maquieira, Megginson and Nail, 1998; Maksimovic and 
Phillips, 2001). The idea that such benefits can be reaped from horizontal takeovers is referred 
to as the ‘productive efficiency hypothesis’ (Fee and Thomas, 2005; Shahrur, 2005). According 
to the productive efficiency hypothesis, acquirers are expected to experience improved 
financial performance post-M&A in the form of higher cash flow margins or positive 
announcement abnormal returns. An improvement in the productive efficiency of the merging 
firms can also have financial performance implications for the supplier, customer, and rival 
firms of the bidder. The effect of better productive efficiency on rival companies can be either 
positive or negative. Rivals could experience a positive market reaction upon the 
announcement of a horizontal M&A if the capital markets deduce that companies in the given 
industry are undervalued or that rivals can achieve higher productive efficiency through future 
acquisitions of their own (see Song and Walkling, 2000). The announcement effect on rival 
companies could also be negative, however, when the acquiring company is likely to obtain a 
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competitive advantage that cannot be mimicked by rivals. The effect on customer firms can 
either be negative, when the acquisition results in elimination of overlapping facilities (i.e. a 
scale-decreasing acquisition), thus leading to lower output levels and higher customer prices, 
or positive when the productive efficiency gains are scale-increasing and result in higher levels 
of output and lower customer prices. 
The implication of the productive efficiency hypothesis for suppliers is twofold. On the 
one hand, it could result in higher demand for the merging companies’ products, when the 
customer prices are decreased, and therefore boost demand for the product’s inputs. 
Alternatively, the improved efficiency could also mean that more can be produced with a lower 
amount of the same inputs and thus result in less demand for the factors of production provided 
by the supplier firms. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the implications of the productive 
efficiency hypothesis for each of the participants in the product-market relationship. The 
empirical literature, which examines whether productive efficiency is a vital source of gains 
for takeovers, focuses on analysing the share price announcement reaction for the bidder and 
target companies as well as acquirer post-M&A operating performance. Most studies report 
positive announcement returns for bidders in horizontal mergers (see, for example, Bruner, 
2002). 
Since horizontal M&A increases the concentration of companies in the takeover 
industry, it can also increase the likelihood of collusion between rival firms in order to limit 
output levels to monopoly and charge higher prices to customers (Stigler, 1964). This outcome 
of horizontal acquisitions is referred to as the monopolistic collusion hypothesis (see Fee and 
Thomas, 2004; and Shahrur, 2005). The monopolistic collusion hypothesis predicts that 
acquiring firms and their rivals will gain from horizontal merger, while customer companies 
will be harmed. Similarly, the effect on suppliers of the takeover industry will be negative due 
to the fact that the lower output levels result in higher consumer prices and lower demand for 
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the input of the suppliers (Eckbo, 1983). Table 3.1 provides a summary of the effects of 
monopolistic collusion on the merging firms, as well as the suppliers, consumers and 
competitors to the acquisition industry. 
The literature which tests the implications of the hypotheses described above is 
empirically limited, with only two previous studies examining the effect of horizontal takeovers 
on the financial performance of the merging firms as well as their customers, suppliers and 
rivals (see Fee and Thomas, 2004 and Shahrur, 2005). This study extends the analysis of Fee 
and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005) by testing the predictions of these hypotheses in the 
context of distressed horizontal takeovers - when the target company is financially distressed. 
According to Jensen (1991), takeovers can be an effective mechanism for emerging from 
financial distress. Acquisitions of distressed targets are one of three routes to reorganising firms 
in financial distress, the other two being corporate restructuring in the strict sense (asset, 
operational, financial, and managerial) and liquidation (piecewise sale). 
This study focuses on distressed M&A in the United States since the country’s 
insolvency code is heavily debtor-oriented. Once declared bankrupt, a firm is entitled to 
undertake various legal steps such as automatic stay (which shields the company from creditor 
actions related to debt repayments), and exclusivity (which provides the exclusive right of a 
debtor to put forward a plan of reorganisation within a period of 120 days).21 There are 
numerous real world examples of companies that have managed to successfully reorganise their 
businesses and re-emerge from bankruptcy as the leaders in their respective industries. For 
example, after a speedy reorganisation process in 2009, the new General Motors not only 
returned to the position of the largest global car producer but also realised a record $7.6 billion 
                                                          
21 This 120 day period can be extended multiple times by the court. 
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net income in 2011.22 In addition, Zhang (2010) demonstrates empirically that bankrupt 
companies typically re-emerge as stronger rivals following successful reorganization. 
When bankrupt, a company is also entitled to re-negotiate its contracts with suppliers. 
Given this situation, the supplier company can either end up with a lower number of input 
buyers (if the bankrupt company is unable to propose a reorganisation plan) or at least partially 
mitigate the problem by agreeing to provide the input at lower prices. The theoretical model 
developed by Yang et al. (2014) suggests that rational suppliers are likely to choose the latter 
option. The authors show that after filing for bankruptcy, a successful reorganisation can reduce 
the company’s operating costs. This outcome can also enhance the overall efficiency of the 
supply chain to which the bankrupt company belongs Yang et al. (2014). In addition, company 
rivals can gain from lower input prices after a successful reorganisation. The suppliers of the 
bankrupt company’s industry can also sustain some advantage compared to the case of facing 
a more concentrated buyer industry in the event that the bankrupt firm is liquidated. Kouvelis 
and Zhao (2012) and Yang and Birge (2009) demonstrate that the efficiency of the supply chain 
can be enhanced if the financially distressed company obtains financing from its supplier. A 
number of studies have focused specifically on the supplier’s behaviour when the buyer faces 
bankruptcy risk. Perotti and Spier (1993) argue that companies can use their indebtedness to 
increase their bargaining power against labour unions. Wilner (2000) shows that trade creditors 
have an incentive to provide more concessions if the debtor is financially distressed.  
Industry-related acquisitions of distressed targets are particularly relevant when testing 
the buyer power hypothesis. This is because in anticipation of the costs of reorganization and 
the effects of bankruptcy the company's suppliers and rivals can alter their operational decisions 
Yang et al. (2014). If the buyer power hypothesis holds, the effect of acquisitions of distressed 
                                                          
22 Forbes Jan. 19, 2012, “GM Is No. 1 In The World Again In Auto Sales”; ABC, Feb. 17, 
2012, “GM Posts Record $7.6-Billion Profit” 
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targets on suppliers should be more negative compared to the effect of acquisitions of healthy 
targets. This is because the debtor-oriented insolvency code in the US increases the bargaining 
power of financially distressed buyers – in anticipation of the possibility that the company will 
file for Chapter 11 and renegotiate its contracts the company’s suppliers are likely to provide 
these buyers with pre-emptive concessions such as offering lower input prices (i.e. rational 
supplier would like to avoid the case in which the company files for Chapter 11). By decreasing 
the distressed company’s wholesale price, the supplier lowers the likelihood of bankruptcy and 
minimizes the total ‘bail-out costs’ that it could face in the case of bankruptcy Yang et al. 
(2014). This effect of buyer financial distress on the supplier’s pricing decisions is referred to 
as the bail-out effect Yang et al. (2014). 
The prediction of the buyer power hypothesis for the wealth effect on rival companies 
when the target is financially distressed is positive. This effect can be more pronounced relative 
to the cases when the target is financially healthy owing to the higher bargaining power that a 
financially distressed target may possess. The enhanced buyer power can be either 
advantageous or detrimental for the wealth of customer companies, depending on whether the 
merging firms decide to pass along the lower cost of the factors of production to these 
customers. Table 3.1 summarises the implications of buyer power when the target is financially 
distressed. 
Importantly, the acquisition of the distressed target could also result in a more 
financially stable combined entity with lower liquidity and cash flow constraints. As a result, 
the combined firm may be less well positioned to obtain concessions from its suppliers thereby 
benefitting these suppliers. I refer to this idea as the financial stabilization hypothesis (Table 
3.1). This hypothesis does not have any specific implications for the wealth effect on customers 
and competitors and the wealth effect on these product-market participants will depend on the 
validity of the other hypotheses described in this study, which are not mutually exclusive to the 
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financial stabilization hypothesis. Table 3.1 presents the predictions of the financial 
stabilisation hypothesis for the different participants in the product-market relationship. 
3.2.2 Distressed Acquisitions 
The literature on distressed acquisitions is scarce, and has concentrated on: a) the 
comparison between acquisitions in bankruptcy and acquisitions outside bankruptcy of healthy 
companies (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998); b) the study of acquisitions of distressed 
companies (Clark and Ofek, 1994); or c) on the comparison between acquisitions and 
bankruptcies as exit strategies (Bergström, Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 2005). This paper 
thus fills the void in the literature by exclusively investigating acquisitions of distressed targets, 
including those involved in bankruptcy proceedings. To my knowledge, there are no other 
studies that investigate horizontal acquisitions of distressed and bankrupt companies over the 
time period of the four major crises since 1985, and in the context of the buyer power, 
efficiency and collusion hypotheses. 
Bergström et al. (2005) compare the determinants of acquisitions to those of 
bankruptcies. As expected, they find evidence of more merger activity in prosperous periods 
than in recessions. Interestingly, in stressed economic times, there seems to be an industry 
factor, as firms in industries with high bankruptcy rates are less likely to initiate bankruptcy 
proceedings (see Faccio and Sengupta, 2006). The literature on short-term post M&A acquirer 
and target performance is also scarce, with only two studies comparing the abnormal returns 
that accrue to bankrupt acquisitions (i.e. the target in bankruptcy proceedings) and non-
bankrupt acquisitions (i.e. the target is healthy) on the basis of samples of US acquisitions. 
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) argue that acquisitions of bankrupt firms are more complex 
than those of non-bankrupt firms, and involve more bargaining as they require negotiation with 
each class of creditors, both over the sale price and subsequent distribution of proceeds, so 
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there should be fewer “bad acquirers” of bankrupt firms. However, Clark and Ofek (1994) find 
that in general, abnormal returns (AR) for both acquirers and distressed targets are similar to 
those for the general population of acquirers and targets. In contrast, Hotchkiss and Mooradian 
(1998) find positive abnormal returns for both the acquirers and the bankrupt targets in 
distressed acquisitions (hence evidence of value creation for both firms) but only for the healthy 
target in non-bankrupt acquisitions. The authors explain these results by the presence of less 
‘bad bidders’ (i.e. bidders with empire-building managers) in their sample of bankrupt 
acquisitions. 
When analysing the post-M&A wealth effects of target and acquirer financial 
characteristics, Clark and Ofek (1994) find increasingly poor post-merger performance for 
deals involving distressed targets, the larger the subsequent combined leverage. Martynova, 
Oosting, and Renneboog (2006) report better post-performance when targets are relatively 
large compared to acquirers. However, Clark and Ofek (1994) argue that post-merger 
performance is better when distressed targets are relatively smaller than the acquirers, thus 
emphasising the complexity of managing a large combined firm. The study reports poor post-
merger performance following acquisitions of financially distressed targets for larger premium 
deals. In addition, Clark and Ofek (1994) show a positive relationship between acquirer 
announcement abnormal returns and subsequent combined performance when the target is 
distressed. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) demonstrate that the combined cash flows of the 
merged company increase by more when the target is bankrupt compared to those of a non-
bankrupt target. The sources of gains include reductions in operating expenses and 
employment. 
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3.3 Data and Methodology 
The M&A deal sample is obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum 
database. The sample covers acquisitions announced between the period 1985 and 2012. In the 
spirit of Faccio et al. (2006) and Rossi and Volpin (2004), this paper defines a merger or an 
acquisition as the purchase of majority interest (i.e., only deals where the acquirer owned less 
than 50% of shares in the target pre-acquisition and more than 50% of shares in the target post-
acquisition are included). The sample excludes Leveraged Buyouts, Spinoffs, 
Recapitalisations, Self-Tenders, Exchange Offers, Repurchases, and Privatisations. The sample 
also excludes financial institutions (banks, savings banks, unit trusts, mutual funds, and pension 
funds) in light of their special regulatory environment and accounting issues, and in line with, 
for example, Martynova and Renneboog (2006). 
As this study focuses on distressed targets, it is important to find a robust definition for 
‘distressed’ firms. Despite the vast number of measures of distress, there is some consensus 
over the use of the Interest Cover Ratio (ICR) expressed as Earnings before Interest and Tax 
(EBIT) divided by the Net Interest Expense23 and measured at year-end prior to the acquisition. 
This measure has been favoured by academics and practitioners alike because it captures firms 
suffering from financial distress as it incorporates the company’s financial expenses (see, for 
example, Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994 and Zingales and Rajan, 1995). The final 
study sample consists of deals for which the ICR of the target company is available. A target 
company is considered to be in financial distress when its ICR is less than one. The sample of 
US acquisitions consists of 1,211 deals. Following Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005), 
this study uses the acquirer and target companies’ primary Standard Industry Classification 
                                                          
23 This study also uses the ratio of Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and 
Amortization (EBITDA) divided by Net Interest Expense as a measure of financial distress in 
order to test the sensitivity of the results to the specific measure of financial distress. 
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(SIC) code to measure industry-relatedness between the target and bidder firms. An acquisition 
is defined as horizontal when the first three digits of the target and acquirer primary SIC codes 
are identical. The final study sample of completed horizontal takeovers of distressed targets 
includes 270 deals. To be included in the final sample bidder companies had to be US 
domiciled, exchange-listed companies with an available SEDOL identification number from 
SDC Platinum. Table 3.2 describes the restrictions that were imposed in order to identify the 
final M&A sample of the study. 
This study uses the benchmark input-output (IO) accounts for the US economy which 
are published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the US Department of Commerce every 
five years. Specifically, this study relies on the so-called Use table of the benchmark IO 
accounts. The Use table provides estimates of the amount of supplier industry output, measured 
in US dollars, which serve as input in the production of output for the customer industry. The 
customers of a given industry are defined as companies that belong to industries that purchase 
the output of the acquisition industry. Each acquisition-customer pair of industries is 
characterised by two variables: Acquisition Percentage Sold and Customer Input Coefficient. 
Table 3.3 presents the definitions of all the variables used in this study. Following Shahrur 
(2005), the former variable is defined as the percentage of the output of the acquisition industry 
that is purchased by the customer industry, and the latter variable is defined as the total output 
of the acquisition industry that is purchased by the customer industry divided by the total output 
of the customer industry. The Acquisition Percentage Sold captures the significance of the 
customer industry as a buyer of the output of the acquisition industry and the Customer Input 
Coefficient captures the significance of the acquisition industry’s output for the production of 
the consumer industry’s products. 
Since each acquisition industry has a large number of customer industries that purchase 
its output, I focus on two key industries from the portfolio of all consumer industries with 
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exchange-listed firms. The industry with the largest Acquisition Percentage Sold is defined as 
the Main Customer industry. This is the industry that uses the highest proportion of the 
acquisition industry’s output. The industry with the largest Customer Input Coefficient is 
defined as the Dependent Customer. The Dependent Customer is the industry whose output 
depends on the acquisition industry’s produce more than any other consumer industry.24 
Suppliers are defined as the companies which belong to the industries that supply the 
input necessary for the production of the acquisition industry’s output. Each supplier-
acquisition industry pair is characterised by two variables. Supplier Percentage Sold is defined 
as the proportion of the total output of the supplier industry that is purchased by the acquisition 
industry. This variable captures the significance of the acquisition industry as a consumer of 
the output of the supplier’s industry. The Acquisition Input Coefficient is the value of the 
supplier industry’s produce that is purchased by the acquisition industry divided by the total 
output of the acquisition industry. This variable captures the significance of the output of the 
supplier industry for the production of the acquisition industry’s output. 
I identify two important supplier industries to the acquisition industry from the portfolio 
of supplier industries with exchange-listed companies. The industry with the largest 
Acquisition Input Coefficient is defined as the Main Supplier. This is the industry that provides 
the primary input to the acquisition industry. The industry with the largest Supplier Percentage 
Sold is defined as the Dependent Supplier. The proportion of output that the latter industry sells 
to the acquisition industry is larger than that of any other supplier industry. 
Following Shahrur (2005), I only include supplier industries with Supplier Percentage 
Sold that is greater than or equal to 1%. The final sample of the study thus consists of 174 Main 
                                                          
24 Please note that I only report the results pertaining to the Main Customers of the acquisition 
industry since the results pertaining to the Dependent Customers are qualitatively similar.  
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Supplier and 176 Dependent Supplier industries (Table 3.4). Similarly, a 1% cut-off is used for 
the Customer Input Coefficient which results in 129 Main Customer industries (Table 3.4). 
Table 4 provides some additional industry level descriptive statistics related to the Customer 
and Acquisition Input Coefficient, as well as the Supplier and Acquisition Percentage Sold. 
SDC Platinum uses SIC codes for the purposes of industry classification, while the Use 
table is based on the IO six-digit coding framework. This study uses the table constructed by 
Fan and Lang (2000) to match the IO codes with the SIC codes. The authors created this table 
with the help of the conversion tables available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. To 
identify the Suppliers and Customers of each acquisition industry, I use the 1982 Use table for 
acquisitions announced between 1984 to 1987, the 1987 Use table for acquisitions announced 
between 1987 to 1991, the 1992 Use table for acquisitions announced between 1992 to 1996, 
the 1997 Use table for acquisitions announced between 1997 to 2001, the 2002 Use table for 
acquisitions announced between 2002 to 2006, and the 2007 Use table for acquisitions 
announced between 2007 to 2012. 
This study uses event study methodology to measure the wealth effect associated with 
the announcements of horizontal acquisitions on the merging companies as well as their 
suppliers, customers and competitors. Following Weston, Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004), and 
in the spirit of Brown and Warner (1985), the paper presents results for the model’s market-
and-risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between 
the actual returns and the expected returns, with the benchmark given by the CRSP value-
weighted index. Daily returns are computed as the percentage price (or index) changes on two 
consecutive trading days. I use a 240-day estimation period prior to the beginning of the event 
period. Results are provided for a number of different event windows surrounding the 
acquisition announcement, such as (-1, 0), (-2, 2), (-10, 10), (-40, 40), and (10, 20). In line with 
Bradley et al. (1988), this study measures the combined target and acquirer wealth effect as the 
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cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) which accrues to the value-weighted portfolio of 
the target and acquirer. The market capitalisation of the target and acquirer companies as of ten 
days prior to the announcement of the M&A serve as the weights for the portfolio. Following 
Eckbo (1983), Song and Walkling (200) and Shahrur (2005) this study uses equally-weighted 
portfolios to measure the CAARs which accrue to the suppliers, customers and competitors of 
the acquisition industry. The latter methodology controls for the possibility that the CAARs 
are contemporaneously cross-correlated. The statistical significance of the abnormal returns is 
tested using the methodology in Mikkelson and Partch (1988) and Shahrur (2005). 
It should be noted that it is possible to perform sensitivity analysis of the results 
obtained on the basis of examining CAARs by analysing the evolution of a selection of 
accounting ratios which capture company financial performance over longer time windows 
such as (-1, 3 or -1, 5 years). Examples of ratios that would be suitable for this purpose are 
profitability ratios (e.g., Return on Equity and Return on Assets) and operating performance 
ratios (e.g., EBITDA/Total Assets and EBIT/Total Assets).  
I use a regression analysis framework to investigate the determinants of the short-term 
announcement returns to the merging firms, as well as their customers, rivals and suppliers. 
The regression analysis makes it possible to distinguish between the different hypotheses that 
can explain the post-M&A performance of the different participants in the product-market 
relationship. According to Eckbo (1983 and 1992), it is necessary to control for the change in 
industry concentration that results from the horizontal acquisitions. If the monopolistic 
collusion hypothesis is valid, there will be a positive association between industry 
concentration and the short-term gains to acquirers and their competitors. However, if the buyer 
power hypothesis holds, there will be a positive relationship between acquirer returns and the 
size of the combined firm (relative to the individual entities before the takeover) when the 
supplier industry is monopolistic or oligopolistic (i.e. when the supplier industry is more 
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concentrated). The returns to the suppliers in the latter case will deteriorate when the newly 
combined firm is large compared to its own industry. The specific regression equations 
estimated in this study are presented below. 
1. Combined Returns to Acquirer and Target 
Equation 1 
CARAcq+Tar=β1Sup.Con.+β2Sup.Con. x Rel. Size+β3Sup.Con. x Change in Herf. Index +  
β
4
 Herf. Index+β
5
Change in Herf. Index+β
6
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index+β
7
Controls 
 
Equation 2 
CARAcq+Tar=β1Sup.Con.+β2Sup.Con. x Distr. Target+β3Sup.Con. x Rel. Size+β4Sup.Con. x  
Rel. Size x Distr. Target+β
5
Sup.Con. x Change in Herf. Index+β
6
Sup.Con. x Change in Herf. Index  
x Distr. Target+β
7
Herf. Index+β
8
Change in Herf. Index +β
9
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index 
+β
10
Controls  
 
2. Main/Dependent Supplier and Competitor Returns 
Equation 3 
CARMain/Dep. Sup=β1Sup.Con. +β2Sup.Con. x Change in Herf. Index+β3Herf. Index  
+β
4
Change in Herf. Index + β
5
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index+ β
6
Controls  
 
Equation 4 
CARMain/Dep. Sup=β1Sup.Con. +β2Sup.Con. x Distr. Target+β3Sup.Con. x Change in Herf. Index 
+β
4
Sup.Con. x Change in Herf. Index x Distr. Target+β
5
Herf. Index+β
6
Change in Herf. Index 
+ β
7
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index+ β
8
Controls  
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3. Customer Returns 
Equation 5 
CARCustomer=β1Herf. Index+β2Change in Herf. Index +β3Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index 
+ β
4
Controls  
 
Following Lang and Stulz (1992), Song and Walkling (2000) and Shahrur (2005), this 
study measures industry concentration with the sales-based Herfindahl Index. Sales 
information is obtained from Compustat and the market share of each company is measured as 
of one year before the announcement of the M&A deal. The Herfindahl Index is measured as: 
∑ Salesi
2n
i=1                                                                                                                     (1) 
Following Shahrur (2005), when calculating the customer industry concentration, 
∑ Salesi
2n
i=1  is measured as the proportion of the acquisition industry’s output bought by 
company i where n is the total number of companies in the industry. Thus, Salesi
2
 is captured 
by the product of the Customer Input Coefficient of the industry and the sales of Company i. 
In line with Ravenscraft (1983) and Shahrur (2005), Supplier Concentration is measured as the 
Herfindahl Index corresponding to each supplier industry where 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 is the net sales of each 
supplier company measured as of one year before the announcement of the M&A deal. This 
study accounts for the degree of import competition by including the variable ‘Foreign 
Competition’ in the regression analysis. ‘Foreign Competition’ is measured as the acquisition 
industry’s imports as a proportion of the industry’s total supply (see, for example, Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 1996; and Shahrur, 2005). The analysis of the combined abnormal returns to the 
target and bidder accounts for the following standard control variables, which are found in the 
extant literature on short-term M&A performance: a) ‘Stock Financing’ accounts for the 
presence of stock in the financing of the deal and is constructed as a dummy variable (see, for 
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example, Travlos, 1987); b) ‘Rel. Size’ accounts for the relative size of the target and acquirer 
companies and is measured as the ratio of target to acquirer market value as of four weeks 
before the announcement of the M&A (see for example, Servaes, 1991; and Mulherin and 
Boone, 2000); c) ‘Hostile Deal’ accounts for the attitude of the deal and is constructed as a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if the deal is classified as hostile by the SDC Platinum 
database and zero otherwise (see, for example, Schwert, 2000).25 All dependent variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, i.e. the lower- and uppermost percentiles are set to be 
equal to the values corresponding to the 1st and 99th percentiles respectively. To adjust the 
regression estimates for the presence of heteroskedasticity and following Shahrur (2005), this 
study uses Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation procedure where the weights are 
calculated as the ratio of one over the standard deviation of the residuals. In line with Shahrur 
(2005), I repeat the analysis using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) regression specifications. This study reports the results based on the WLS 
estimation procedure for the analysis of the returns to suppliers, customers and rivals and the 
WLS and MLE results for the analysis of the combined target and acquirer returns. The results 
obtained with the use of the other estimation procedures are qualitatively similar. 
                                                          
25 It should be noted that in contrast to Shahrur (2005), this study does not include a control 
variable for the combined target and acquirer CAARs in the regression analysis of the returns 
to the suppliers, customers and competitors. This is due to the fact that the sample size drops 
dramatically when I impose the additional restriction that the target company is exchange-listed 
(from 1, 211 to 421, please see Table 3.2). I have also performed the analysis of supplier, 
customer and competitor returns with the inclusion of the combined target and bidder CAAR 
and the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the larger sample. 
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3.4 Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 Sample Descriptives and Univariate Analysis 
The baseline sample used for the analysis in this study consists of 1, 211 M&A deals 
where the acquirer is exchange-listed. The average (median) market value of acquirer 
companies is $6,651 ($650) million. This sample of deals is used for the analysis of the 
cumulative abnormal returns that accrue to the suppliers, competitors and customers to the 
takeover industry. The subsample of deals used for the analysis of the Combined Abnormal 
Returns that accrue to the target and acquirer companies as a result of the M&A deal consists 
of 421 deals. The average (median) market value of acquirer companies in this subset of deals 
is $10,855 ($1,669) million. The average (median) market value of the target companies that 
belong to this subsample of deals is $1,045 ($156) million. 
Table 3.5 presents the distribution of M&A deals by 2-digit SIC code industry and year. 
The table demonstrates that the distribution of M&A deals per industry is very similar to that 
reported in Shahrur (2005), as well as Andrade et al. (2001), with the following industries 
representing the highest proportion of the target and bidder companies in the sample: a) 
business services (28.57%); b) instruments (10.32%); c) industrial machinery (6.85%); d) oil 
and gas extraction (6.69%); and e) electronical machinery (5.53%). In addition, the final sample 
of 1,211 deals consists of 166 four-digit SIC codes which covers approximately 37% of the 
entire universe of four-digit SIC codes of exchange-listed companies. Table 3.5 also shows the 
magnitude of acquisition activity for each of the sample industries, which is measured as the 
number of acquirers from each industry divided by the total number of firms that belonged to 
that industry over the sample period.26 The average, median, minimum and maximum values 
                                                          
26 It should be noted that the acquisition activity variable includes all acquisitions, i.e. both 
horizontal and diversifying acquisitions. 
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of the acquisition activity variable are 1.06%, 0.73%, 0.07%, and 6.11% respectively, 
suggesting that the industries included in the sample differ considerably in terms of the 
magnitude of acquisition activity that they have experienced throughout the sample period. 
The first step of the analysis of this study involves the examination of the cumulative 
abnormal returns that accrue to each of the participants in the product-market chain as a result 
of the M&A announcement. The analysis of the combined wealth effect from the M&A on the 
target and bidder shows that companies earn a significant 0.4% and 0.1% CAAR for the (-1, 0) 
and (-2, 2) event windows respectively. These findings are in line with the existing evidence 
of the combined market reaction associated with the announcements of M&A deals (see, for 
example, Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Andrade et al., 2001, and Shahrur, 2005). The results also 
reveal that approximately 50% of the acquisitions are value destroying (measured over an event 
window of (-10, 10)), suggesting that these deals are perceived negatively by the shareholders 
of the target and bidder firms. 
Table 3.6 reports the abnormal returns that accrue to the suppliers, competitors and 
customers to the acquisition industry. Panel A demonstrates that competitor companies 
experience a positive and statistically significant CAAR of 0.72% for the (-2, 2) window and 
2.02% for the (-40, 40) window. This positive market reaction is in line with the findings of 
Eckbo (1983), Song and Walkling (2000) and Shahrur (2005). The average CAARs that accrue 
to the suppliers and customers are negative for most event windows, albeit statistically 
insignificant. These findings differ from the results reported in Shahrur (2005) where suppliers 
experience significantly negative, and customers significantly positive CAARs. 
Table 3.6, Panel B shows the CAARs to suppliers, competitors and customers for the 
subsample of distressed targets, where distress is measured with the EBIT to Net Interest 
Expense ratio. The CAAR earned by competitors is positive and statistically significant, and 
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amounts to 0.81% for the (-2, 2) window and 3.85% for the (-40, 40) window. The market 
reaction experienced by the main and dependent suppliers to the acquisition industry is 
significantly negative, and amounts to 2.11% and 3.04% respectively for the (-10, 10) window. 
In addition, the CAARs earned by the corporate customers are not statistically significant and 
range from positive values, for the (-1, 0) and (10, 20) window, to negative values, for the (-2, 
2), (-10, 10) and (-40, 40) event windows. These results are consistent with the buyer power 
hypothesis which predicts a positive CAAR to the competitors and a negative CAAR to the 
suppliers of the acquisition industry. The buyer power hypothesis is consistent with both 
positive and negative market reaction for the customer companies of the acquisition industry. 
Table 3.6, Panel C shows the results from the analysis of abnormal returns for the subsample 
of distressed acquisitions where distress is measured by the EBITDA to Net Interest Expense 
Ratio. The CAARs are qualitatively similar to the CAARs obtained for the overall sample of 
acquisitions (Table 3.6, Panel A) in the sense that only the competitor portfolios earn a positive 
and statistically significant average return while suppliers and customers experience an 
insignificant market reaction (Table 3.6, Panel C). 
Following Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Shahrur (2005), the analysis of 
average abnormal returns to the customer, competitor and supplier portfolios is performed 
separately for the subsamples of acquisitions which result in positive and negative combined 
CAARs to the target and bidder (Table 3.6, Panels D through I ).27 The rationale behind 
dividing the sample of acquisitions into value-creating and value-destroying deals is that the 
buyer power, collusion and productive efficiency hypotheses envisage a positive combined 
wealth effect for the target and bidder firms. The examination of the two subsamples makes it 
                                                          
27 Combined (target and bidder) CAARs are measured over (-2, 2) event window.  
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possible to disentangle the wealth effects predicted by the different hypotheses and to also 
ensure that the results are not driven by the sub-sample of value-destroying M&A deals. 
Table 3.6, Panel D shows that the CAAR which accrues to the competitors of the 
subsample of value-creating acquisitions is significantly positive, and has an order of 
magnitude which is similar to the competitor CAAR reported for the overall sample (Table 3.6, 
Panel A). The results corresponding to the customer portfolios are inconclusive, with the 
CAAR ranging from negative to positive values for the different event windows. Panel D 
demonstrates that the CAAR which accrues to the supplier portfolios, including both Main and 
Dependent Suppliers, are qualitatively similar to the CAAR earned by customers. 
In order to gain a deeper insight into the validity of the collusion, buyer power and 
efficiency hypotheses, Table 3.6, Panels E and F, present the results for the subsamples of 
distressed acquisitions which are value-creating for the target and bidder (i.e. with positive 
combined (target and acquirer) wealth). The market reaction experienced by competitors is 
statistically positive, which is consistent with the findings for the overall competitor sample, 
however, the CAARs which accrue to the customer and supplier companies are either positive 
or negative and mostly insignificant. These results are inconsistent with the evidence obtained 
from the examination of the overall sample and fail to provide support for the buyer power 
hypothesis. The CAARs for the subsample of value destroying acquisitions are presented in 
Table 3.6, Panels G through I. The competitor companies from the overall sample of value-
destroying deals enjoy significantly positive CAAR amounting to 0.41% for the (-2, 2) event 
window. The latter finding differs from the results reported in Shahrur (2005) which show a 
negative CAAR for the competitor portfolios. In addition, it appears that the suppliers to the 
overall sample of value-destroying acquisitions experience a negative and statistically 
significant market reaction associated with the announcement of the M&A deals. The average 
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CAAR which accrues to the Dependent Suppliers is equal to -3% and -1% for the (-40, 40) and 
(10, 20) event windows respectively. 
The examination of the subsamples of value-destroying acquisitions of distressed 
targets (where distress is measured by EBIT to Net Interest Expense, Table 3.6, Panel H, and 
EBITDA to Net Interest Expense, Table 3.6, Panel I) reveals that suppliers suffer considerably 
as a result of the announcement of these M&A deals. Over the (-10, 10) event window, the 
negative market reaction amounts to -2% and -4% for the Main and Dependent Suppliers 
respectively. The results from the investigation of the wealth effect experienced by the 
customer and competitor companies are inconclusive, as the CAARs are insignificant and range 
from negative to positive values when considering the different event windows. 
The evidence presented above is inconclusive with regard to the validity of the 
collusion, buyer power and efficiency hypotheses. The statistically significant CAARs which 
accrue to the competitor and some of the supplier portfolios suggest that acquisitions can reveal 
new information about overall industry dynamics. Following Shahrur (2005), it is important to 
note that the results presented so far may be biased against the collusion and buyer power 
hypotheses, because informational effects are more likely to materialise and thus influence the 
value of companies across different regions (when the merging firms and their customers, 
competitors and suppliers operate in different geographic regions). In contrast, geographic 
distance may hinder the effects associated with changes in market or buyer power (the effects 
of the buyer power and collusion hypotheses may be less evident for samples dominated by 
firms which operate in different regions). To address this issue and in line with previous studies 
(see, for example, Coval and Moskowitz, 1999 and Shahrur, 2005), the analysis of abnormal 
returns is performed for a subsample of merging firms, customers, competitors and suppliers 
which are headquartered in the same state. US companies are not obliged to report information 
on the markets in which they carry out business activities and this fact makes it difficult to 
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accurately identify the degree to which US companies operate in a given region. Nevertheless, 
Shahrur (2005) investigates additional sources of information such as Moody’s industrial, 
Factiva, and transportation manuals. The author finds that the headquarter state, as reported by 
Compustat, is a good proxy for the market in which the company’s main operations take place. 
Table 3.6, Panels J through N present the results from the analysis of abnormal returns 
to customers, competitors and suppliers to the acquisition industry which operate in the same 
state as the states of the target and acquirer firms. Interestingly, the results are qualitatively 
different from those corresponding to the overall sample, and provide evidence in favour of the 
buyer power hypothesis. Specifically, Table 3.6, Panel J demonstrates that the suppliers suffer 
significantly as a result of the acquisition announcements, whereas the competitors enjoy a 
positive CAAR. The CAAR which accrues to the Main (Dependent) Suppliers amounts to -
0.7% (-1.42%) while the CAAR to the competitors is equal to 1.44% for the (-2, 2) window. 
The same pattern of CAARs to suppliers and rivals is evident when I analyse the subsample of 
acquisitions of distressed targets (EBIT to Net Interest Expense). In fact, although the direction 
of the market reaction for the supplier and rival firms is the same as that observed for the overall 
sample of state companies, the order of magnitude of the reaction is significantly greater for 
the subsample of distressed targets. Over the (-10, 10) event window, the Main (Dependent) 
Suppliers experience a wealth loss equal to -3.26% (-6.7%) while the competitor portfolios 
enjoy a 6.03% CAAR. This difference in magnitude is even more apparent when considering 
the (-40, 40) window, with the Main (Dependent) Supplier CAAR amounting to -8.8% (-
12.48%) while the competitor CAAR equals 17.68%. These results are consistent with the 
buyer power hypothesis for acquisitions of financially distressed targets. Thus, in anticipation 
of the fact that the distressed target is likely to file for Chapter 11, it appears that the suppliers 
to the acquisition industry are willing to provide the merging firms and their rivals with certain 
concessions which results in a negative market reaction for these suppliers.  
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To make sure that the latter results are not driven by the subsample of value-destroying 
acquisitions the CAARs to customer, competitors and suppliers are investigated separately for 
the subsamples of value-creating and value-destroying M&A deals. The results from the 
analysis are reported in Table 3.6, Panel M for the value-creating and Panel N for the value-
destroying subsamples of M&A deals. The analysis shows that suppliers which primarily 
operate in the acquirer’s states appear to suffer significantly from the announcement of both 
value-creating and value-destroying acquisitions. For example, the state Dependent Suppliers 
experience -5% (Table 3.6, Panel M) and -3.5% CAAR (Table 3.6, Panel N) over the (-10, 10) 
event window for the subsamples of value-creating and value-destroying M&A deals 
respectively. In addition, the competitors of the acquisition industry enjoy a positive CAAR as 
a result of the announcement of deals which are either perceived positively or negatively by 
investors. Over the (-1, 0) window, the CAAR to competitor portfolios amounts to 1.47% 
(Table 3.6, Panel M) and 0.82% (Table 3.6, Panel N) for the acquisitions with positive and 
negative announcement market reaction respectively. These results demonstrate that the 
observed valuation effects on suppliers and competitors are not driven by the sub-sample of 
value-eroding acquisitions. In addition, when considering the order of magnitude of the 
CAARs to the rival and supplier portfolios, the evidence shows that the returns which accrue 
to suppliers are significantly more negative, and the returns which accrue to rivals significantly 
more positive, for the subsample of M&A deals with positive market reaction. These results 
provide further support for the validity of the buyer power hypothesis, according to which both 
the merging firms and their rivals gain as a result of increased industry consolidation and this 
takes effect at the expense of their suppliers.28 
                                                          
28 This study does not report CAAR results for the sub-samples of value-creating and value-
destroying acquisitions of distressed targets when the suppliers, customers and rivals operate 
in the same state as the acquirer. This is due to the lack of sufficient number of observations to 
perform this type of analysis.  
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3.4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The findings documented in the previous section reveal that the average horizontal 
acquisition in the study sample is motivated by buyer power considerations and the wealth 
effects of this motive are stronger for the sub-sample of acquisitions of distressed targets. The 
aim of this section is to investigate the motives which drive the cross-section of M&A deals in 
the sample by analysing the relationship between the CAARs which accrue to the merging 
firms, rivals, customers and suppliers and the different industry structures in which these 
companies operate. First, this part of the chapter sets out the hypotheses for the expected signs 
of the relationships between the dependent variable (abnormal returns to the different industry 
players) and the independent variables, which capture the different industry characteristics. 
3.4.2.1 Regression Hypotheses 
Concentration of the Acquisition Industry: When companies operate in industries 
characterised with perfectly competitive markets, they generate zero economic gains in the 
long run. As a result, the benefits which accrue to the target and acquirer companies due to 
improved productive efficiency should be greater when the structure of the acquisition industry 
is less than perfectly competitive. The suppliers and customers of less-competitive acquisition 
industries are therefore expected to reap lower gains as a result of M&A deals which lead to 
more efficient production. In line with Shahrur (2005), this study measures the magnitude of 
industry competition by the concentration of that industry as indicated by the Herfindahl Index. 
A higher level of concentration indicates that the industry is less competitive, and vice versa. 
According to the productive efficiency hypothesis, the average abnormal returns which 
accrue to the merging companies will be positively related to the degree of concentration of 
the acquisition industry. In contrast, the CAARs to the customers and suppliers will be 
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negatively related to the level of concentration of the M&A industry. Since there is evidence 
that imports can increase competitiveness in industries with higher concentrations (see, for 
example, Domowitz et al., 1986, Katics and Peterson, 1994), this study accounts for the effect 
of foreign rivals on the acquisition industry. When the acquisition increases the level of 
industry concentration, thereby leading to higher probability of collusion, the merging 
companies and their competitors will benefit through their ability to generate higher monopoly 
rents. This capacity to make abnormal profits takes effect at the expense of the corporate 
customers and suppliers of the acquisition industry. Under the collusion hypothesis, and as 
suggested by Eckbo (1985), the consequences of acquisitions which lead to collusive behaviour 
will be more palpable when the acquisition causes a greater surge in industry concentration. 
Thus, according to the collusion hypothesis, there will be a positive relationship between the 
level of industry concentration as well as the size of the increase in industry concentration 
caused by the acquisition, and the CAARs to the merging firms and their competitors. These 
anticompetitive industry effects are expected to lead to lower CAARs to the corporate 
customers and suppliers of the acquisition industry. 
Customer Concentration: The buyer power model posits that the likelihood of 
collusive activity will be lower the larger the size of the corporate customers (Snyder, 1996). 
The collusive effects of acquisitions can therefore be alleviated by a highly concentrated buyer 
industry. It is expected that a more concentrated buyer industry will result in a higher CAAR 
to the buyers (corporate customers) and a lower CAAR to the merging companies. In contrast, 
when the acquisition increases the productive efficiency of the industry, and when the corporate 
customers are concentrated, the benefits will be shared between buyers and sellers, owing to 
reduced selling and advertising costs (Ravenscraft, 1983). This theory anticipates a positive 
association between the level of buyer industry concentration and the returns to the merging 
companies (the sellers) and their customers. 
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Supplier Concentration: According to the buyer power hypothesis, collusive 
behaviour and higher buyer power within the acquisition industry can only exist when the 
suppliers of that industry are sufficiently concentrated (Shahrur, 2005). Acquisitions which 
augment the buyer power of the merging companies will also boost the rents enjoyed by 
industry competitors by building competition among suppliers (Snyder, 1996). Thus, the buyer 
power model anticipates that the higher the supplier concentration, the higher the CAARs that 
will accrue to the merging firms and their competitors. 
3.4.2.2 Regression Results 
Combined (Target and Bidder) Returns 
Table 3.7 presents the regression analysis of the factors which affect the combined 
cumulative abnormal returns which accrue to the acquirer and target companies in horizontal 
M&A. The table reports the results from the two types of estimation procedures that have been 
used, namely, the weighted least square (Models 1 through 3) and the maximum likelihood 
(Models 4 through 6). Three different types of regression equations are constructed for each 
estimation procedure: a) a regression equation which is based on the baseline sample of 
acquisitions of healthy and distressed targets (Table 3.7, Models 1 and 4); b) a regression 
equation which is based on the baseline sample of acquisitions of healthy and distressed targets. 
This model, however, also accounts for the difference in the effect of the supplier industry 
characteristics on the combined CAAR when the target is financially distressed as opposed to 
the cases when the target is financially sound, as indicated by a ratio of EBITDA to Interest 
Expense that is smaller than 1 (Table 3.7, Models 2 and 5); c) a regression equation which is 
the same as that in b), but where financial distress is measured by the ratio of EBIT to Net 
Interest Expense (Table 3.7, Models 3 and 6). Specifically, to distinguish between the impact 
of supplier industry concentration on the combined CAARs which accrue to acquirers of 
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healthy and acquirers of distressed targets, the independent variables which capture the effect 
of industry concentration are interacted with a dummy variable which is equal to one when the 
target is financially distressed and zero otherwise. 
This study first considers the variables which are used to test the validity of the buyer 
power hypothesis. Inconsistent with this hypothesis, the coefficient corresponding to the 
variable which measures the degree of industry concentration of the suppliers of the acquisition 
industry, ‘Sup. Con.’, is negative and statistically significant (Table 3.7, All Models). The 
coefficient corresponding to the interaction variable between the measure of supplier 
concentration and the financially distressed target dummy, ‘Sup. Con. x Distr. Target’, is 
positive and significant (Table 3.7, Models 2 and 5), indicating that acquisitions of distressed 
targets can enable merging companies to exercise higher buyer power. The ‘Sup. Con.’ variable 
is interacted with the relative size of the target and bidder companies in order to further 
investigate the validity of the buyer power hypothesis. The coefficient corresponding to the 
‘Sup. Con. x Rel. Size’ variable is positive and statistically significant (Table 3.7, All Models). 
The latter finding suggests that when the supplier industry is less than perfectly competitive, 
and when the size of the post-acquisition entity is larger than the acquirer and target companies 
as stand-alone entities, the merging firms enjoy higher CAARs on average. It follows that 
acquisitions can increase the buyer power of the merging companies when the newly formed 
entity is sufficiently large. 
The measure of supplier concentration is also interacted with the change in the 
Herfidahl Index of the acquisition industry in order to account for the effect of the acquisition 
on the industry structure of the merging companies. The coefficient corresponding to this 
variable, ‘Sup. Con. x Change in Herf. Index’, is not statistically significant (except for Table 
3.7, Model 6), implying that M&A deals which are smaller when compared to the overall 
industry can augment the buying power of the target and bidder firms. To test whether this 
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latter effect on the combined CAARs is different when the target is financially distressed, the 
‘Sup. Con. x Change in Herf. Index’ variable is interacted with the distressed target dummy. 
The coefficient corresponding to this variable, ‘Sup. Con. x Change in Herf. Index x Distr. 
Target’, is positive and significant when distress is measured by the ratio of EBIT to Net 
Interest Expense (Table 3.7, Models 3 and 6). This result demonstrates that acquisitions of 
distressed targets can generate higher combined CAARs relative to their peers when the deal 
is sufficiently large compared to the industry. In other words, the acquirers of distressed targets 
have the ability to exert higher buyer power on their suppliers when the M&A deal is large 
enough to cause an industry-wide shift in the concentration of the acquisition industry. 
Next, this study considers the variables which test the validity of the productive 
efficiency and collusion hypotheses. The coefficient corresponding to the variable which 
captures the degree of concentration of the acquisition industry, ‘Herf. Index’, is positive and 
statistically significant (Table 3.7, All Models), which is in line with the predictions of both 
the collusion and productive efficiency models, and consistent with the findings in Shahrur 
(2005). In contrast, the coefficient corresponding to the variable ‘Change in Herf. Index’ is not 
statistically significant (Table 3.7, All Models) which contradicts the implications of the 
collusion hypothesis. 
To investigate the influence of the change in the industry concentration variable on the 
wealth that the acquisition announcements generate for the cases when the M&A industry is 
already characterised with high levels of concentration, the ‘Herf. Index’ variable is interacted 
with the ‘Change in Herf. Index’. The results of the regression analysis demonstrate that the 
‘Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index’ variable has a significantly negative impact on the value 
that is generated by the average horizontal M&A in the sample (Table 3.7, All Models). The 
latter finding provides evidence against the collusion hypothesis and is consistent with the 
results reported in Eckbo (1992) and Shahrur (2005). In addition, the coefficient corresponding 
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to the ‘Customer Concentration’ variable is not statistically significant in any of the models 
presented in Table 3.7, which is inconsistent with the implications of the productive efficiency 
hypothesis. 
Returns to Suppliers 
The analysis of the factors that impact returns to the Main Suppliers is presented in 
Table 3.8. The table shows five different types of regression equations: a) Table 3.8, Model 1 
which is estimated on the basis of the baseline sample of horizontal acquisitions; b) Table 3.8, 
Model 2 which is estimated on the basis of the subsample of horizontal acquisitions of 
distressed targets as indicated by the EBITDA to Net Interest Expense Ratio; c) Table 3.8, 
Model 3 which is estimated on the basis of the subsample of horizontal acquisitions of 
distressed targets as indicated by the EBIT to Net Interest Expense Ratio; d) Table 3.8, Model 
4 which is based on the baseline sample of acquisitions of healthy and distressed targets but 
also accounts for the difference in the effect of the supplier industry characteristics on the 
supplier CAAR when the target is financially distressed (as indicated by a ratio of EBITDA to 
Interest Expense that is smaller than 1); e) Table 3.8, Model 5 which is identical to the model 
in point d) but where financial distress is measured by the ratio of EBIT to Net Interest Expense. 
Table 3.8, Panel A presents the analysis of the factors which affect the CAARs to the suppliers 
of the acquisition industry for the sample of all suppliers (i.e. both suppliers which operate in 
the same state as the acquirer and suppliers which operate outside the state of the acquirer) 
while Table 3.8, Panel B shows the results based on the analysis of the sub-sample of suppliers 
which operate in the same state as the acquirer company - the ‘State Suppliers’. 
It is expected that the proportion of the supplier industry’s output that is sold to the 
acquisition industry should be related to the CAARs that accrue to the suppliers. Thus, I control 
for this effect by including the variable ‘Supplier Percentage Sold’ in the analysis. This variable 
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captures the significance of the supplier industry as a provider of inputs to the acquisition 
industry. This study therefore predicts a positive association between the CAARs that accrue 
to suppliers and the ‘Supplier Percentage Sold’. Following Shahrur (2005) and to further 
examine the validity of this hypothesis, I construct a dummy variable, ‘Supplier Negative 
CAAR Dummy’, which equals one when the CAARs to the suppliers are negative and zero 
otherwise. In addition, the ‘Supplier Negative CAAR Dummy’ is interacted with the ‘Supplier 
Percentage Sold’ in order to test whether the size of the CAARs experienced by suppliers is 
influenced by the proportion of supplier industry output that is used by the acquisition industry. 
The coefficient corresponding to the ‘Supplier Percentage Sold’ variable is positive and 
significant in all the models presented in Table 3.8 (except Model 3), which provides support 
for the a priori expectation that the wealth effect on suppliers is contingent upon the proportion 
of the total output of the supplier industry that is purchased by the acquisition industry (i.e. the 
importance of the merged entity as a buyer of the supplier industry's produce). The coefficient 
corresponding to the ‘Supplier Pct. Sold x Sup. Negative CAAR Dummy’ is either significant 
(Table 3.8, Models 1 and 3) or insignificant (Table 3.8, Models 2, 4, and 5) which suggests that 
there is no qualitative difference in the impact of ‘Supplier Percentage Sold’ on the CAARs to 
suppliers which depends on the sign of these CAAR. 
The results reported in Table 3.8 fail to provide evidence in favour of the collusion 
hypothesis. The coefficient corresponding to the ‘Herf. Index’ has a significantly positive 
impact on the supplier CAARs in all the models presented in Table 3.8 which is contrary to the 
prediction of the collusion hypothesis. Furthermore, the coefficients pertaining to the ‘Change 
in Herf. Index’ and ‘Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index’ are either significantly positive, 
significantly negative or insignificant and thus do not lend empirical support to the collusion 
model. 
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The regressions presented in Table 3.8 include a variable which measures the degree of 
supplier industry concentration, ‘Sup. Con.’, in order to investigate the validity of the buyer 
power hypothesis. While the sign of the coefficient on the ‘Sup. Con.’ variable is not consistent 
with the buyer power hypothesis (the coefficient is significantly positive in Table 3.8, Panel A, 
All Models and Table 3.8, Panel B, Models 4 and 5) the sign on the interaction between ‘Sup. 
Con.’ and ‘Change in Herf. Index’ is negative and statistically significant in all the models 
presented in Table 3.8 (Panel A for all suppliers and B for state suppliers). This finding implies 
that horizontal acquisitions can hurt the suppliers to the takeover industry by enhancing the 
buyer power of the merging companies when the M&A deal is large in comparison to its 
industry, and the supplier industry is sufficiently concentrated - evidence in support of the 
buyer power hypothesis. Since the ‘Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. Index’ variable is in the form 
of an interaction term, it is necessary to consider the value of its coefficient along with the 
value of the coefficient of ‘Sup. Con.’ in order to gauge the total marginal effect associated 
with the interaction term. All the models displayed in Table 3.8 (Panel A for all suppliers and 
Panel B for state suppliers) demonstrate that the value of the coefficient corresponding to the 
‘Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. Index’ variable is significantly higher than the value of the 
coefficient corresponding to the ‘Sup. Con.’ variable. The latter result further reinforces the 
idea that when the supplier industry is concentrated, and when the horizontal acquisition 
induces a shift in the concentration of the industry of the merging firms, the wealth which 
accrues to suppliers is reduced significantly. In fact, Table 3.8 also reveals that the buyer power 
effect appears to be stronger when the target is financially distressed since the coefficient 
corresponding to the interaction between the ‘Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. Index’ and the 
distressed target dummy is significantly negative (Table 3.8, Panel A for all suppliers and B 
for state suppliers, Models 4 and 5). This finding extends the evidence reported in Shahrur 
(2005) by showing that the degree of the detrimental impact on the CAAR to suppliers is 
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contingent upon the financial health of the target company and that it is higher when the target 
is distressed. 
Table 3.9 reports the results from the regression analysis of the CAARs to all Dependent 
Suppliers (Panel A) and the state Dependent Suppliers (Panel B). The signs and significance 
of the independent variables in all the models presented in Table 3.9 (Panels A and B) are not 
qualitatively different from the results pertaining to the sample of Main Suppliers. These results 
provide further support for the validity of the buyer power hypothesis and also demonstrate 
that the buyer power that can be exerted by the acquirers of targets which are faced with severe 
financial difficulties is significantly higher. 
Returns to Competitors 
The results from the analysis of the variables which affect the CAARs to the 
competitors of the acquisition industry are presented in Table 3.10. Panel A reports the findings 
corresponding to the overall sample of competitors and Panel B reports the findings 
corresponding to the state competitors. The signs and significance of the coefficients 
corresponding to the variables which test the validity of the collusion hypothesis, namely, the 
‘Herf. Index’, ‘Change in Herf. Index’, and ‘Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index’ are 
inconsistent with the predictions of this hypothesis as they are either positive or negative and 
either significant or insignificant with no discernible pattern. 
The ‘Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. Index’ variable is significantly positive in most of 
the models presented in Table 3.10, Panels A and B. This result provides evidence which 
supports the buyer power hypothesis according to which companies which belong to the 
acquisition industry can exert buyer power on their suppliers if the supplier industry is less than 
perfectly competitive and if there is a sufficient shift in the concentration of the acquisition 
industry. The sign and significance of the coefficients remain the same when the variable is 
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interacted with the distressed target dummy (Table 3.10, Panels A and B, Model 5). It follows 
that the buyer power effect on the CAARs to competitors is more pronounced in acquisitions 
of financially distressed targets. 
Returns to Customers 
Table 3.11 shows the analysis of the determinants of the CAARs that accrue to the 
corporate customers (the ‘Main Customers’) of the acquisition industry. Table 3.11, Model 1 
reports the findings based on the analysis of all customers while Table 3.11, Model 2 displays 
the findings based on the analysis of customers which perform their main business operations 
in the same state as the acquirer company, i.e. the ‘State Customers’. I include a variable, 
‘Customer Input Coefficient’, which measures the importance of the acquisition industry as a 
seller to the customer industry and thus captures the degree to which the customer companies 
rely on the output generated by the takeover industry. The magnitude of the CAARs to the 
corporate customers should be related to the size of the ‘Customer Input Coefficient’. 
Following Shahrur (2005), and to further explore this proposition, I incorporate a dummy 
variable which equals one when the CAARs to the customers are negative, ‘Customer Negative 
CAAR Dummy’, along with an interaction term which is equal to the product of the ‘Customer 
Input Coefficient’ and the negative CAAR dummy. The coefficient corresponding to the 
‘Customer Input Coefficient’ is significantly negative, while the coefficient of the interaction 
between the ‘Customer Input Coefficient’ and the negative CAAR dummy is significantly 
positive. This result implies that although higher dependency on the acquisition industry leads 
to lower CAARs for the customers in general, this negative impact is less pronounced when 
the customer CAAR is negative. 
The results pertaining to the analysis of state customers provide evidence in line with 
the collusion hypothesis. The coefficient of the ‘Change in Herf. Index’ is significantly 
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negative (Table 3.11, Model 2), revealing that the acquisition-induced shift in industry 
concentration reduces the wealth of the corporate customers of the takeover industry. In 
addition, the ‘Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index’ is also significantly negative, suggesting 
that the detrimental impact on the CAARs for customers from the increase in industry 
concentration persists when the pre-acquisition level of industry concentration is already high. 
The positive association between the ‘Customer Concentration’ and the CAARs to the 
customers (Table 3.11, Model 2) suggests that the detrimental wealth effect on the customer 
CAARs from the anticompetitive behaviour of the merging companies can be mitigated to 
some extent when the customer industry is sufficiently concentrated. Furthermore, the positive 
and significant coefficient on the ‘Herf. Index x Foreign Competition’ (Table 3.11, Model 2) 
provides evidence that the presence of foreign players in the takeover industry can boost 
competitiveness when the industry is concentrated, thereby benefiting corporate customers.
3.5 Conclusion 
This study investigates the relative importance of the buyer power, monopolistic 
collusion and productive efficiency motives as drivers of horizontal takeovers on the basis of 
a sample of 1,211 US M&A transactions completed between 1985 and 2012. This study posits 
that the significance of these motives for horizontal acquisitions changes when the target 
company is financially distressed since: a) the newly formed firm may be able to negotiate 
lower input prices/better contract terms with its suppliers, thus benefitting itself and its 
competitors at the expense of industry suppliers; b) the newly formed firm may become 
financially more stable thereby benefitting itself and its suppliers. To test the validity of the 
different theories about the wealth effects from horizontal acquisitions of distressed targets, I 
analyse the cumulative average abnormal returns from the announcements of horizontal 
acquisitions on the merging companies as well as their suppliers, customers and competitors. 
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Table 3.12 reviews the findings from the analysis of the CAARs to the different 
participants in the product-market chain. The analysis reveals that the ability to exercise 
increased buyer power is a major driver of horizontal acquisitions. This is evidenced by the 
negative CAAR that accrues to the suppliers of the takeover industry and the positive CAARs 
that accrue to the merging companies and their competitors. What is more, these effects appear 
to be more pronounced when the target company is financially distressed, with the merging 
companies and their competitors enjoying even higher CAARs at the expense of their suppliers. 
The latter finding demonstrates that the merging companies are able to negotiate even more 
favourable contract terms with their suppliers when the target company is financially 
distressed, and when compared to cases with a financially sound target. 
Regression analysis of the CAARs which accrue to participants in the product-market 
chain was performed in order to examine the influence of different levels of industry 
competitiveness on the relative importance of the four theories tested in this study. The results 
present evidence in support of the buyer power hypothesis when the target is financially 
distressed. Specifically, I show that the merging companies and their competitors enjoy 
significantly higher gains when the supplier industry is relatively more concentrated, and that 
this effect is more pronounced when the merged company is sufficiently large and when the 
acquisition was of a financially distressed target. In addition, the regression analysis of the 
wealth effect on suppliers reveals that the CAARs experienced by these firms are lower when 
the supplier industry is less than perfectly competitive, when the acquisition is sufficiently large 
relative to its industry, and when the acquired company was facing severe financial difficulties 
prior to the acquisition. Thus, this study provides empirical support for the theoretical model 
developed by Yang et al. (2014) and extends the analysis in Shahrur (2005) by demonstrating 
that the detrimental impact on supplier wealth is stronger when a target is financially distressed.  
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This paper carries vital implications for corporate managers and policymakers alike. 
The analysis presented in this study provides valuable information regarding the effects of 
regulatory policies which support reorganization following bankruptcy on companies’ ex ante 
operational decisions as well as share price valuation. Specifically, this paper reveals that 
companies which are domiciled in countries with more debtor oriented insolvency rules can 
develop a competitive advantage over their cross-border rivals. The results also demonstrate 
that when facing a distressed buyer, suppliers need to understand how M&A can change the 
profitability and competitiveness of the different players in the supply chain. From the rival 
company’s perspective, this study’s findings suggest that facing a financially distressed 
competitor could be beneficial. From the financially distressed company’s perspective, it is 
important to note that in practice information regarding the financial health of the company 
may not always be publically available. In the latter case, the management of the distressed 
company can decide to either reveal or downplay the financial situation of the business 
depending on the legal environment and product-market dynamics that the company operates 
in. 
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Table 3.1 Wealth Implications of the Productive Efficiency, Monopolistic Collusion and Buyer Power Hypotheses  
 
Buyer power Buyer power with financially 
distressed target 
Financial stabilization Productive efficiency 
Monopolistic 
collusion 
Merging 
companies 
Positive: decreased input costs 
due to increased bargaining 
power and/or higher 
competition among suppliers 
More positive relative to buyer 
power with healthy targets: 
debtor-oriented insolvency 
code enables the acquirer to re-
negotiate input prices 
Positive: improved financial 
health of the merged firm  
 
Positive: realization of 
economies of scale or 
reduction in overlapping 
facilities results in lower 
output production costs 
Positive: monopoly 
rents extracted from 
customers and 
suppliers 
Suppliers 
Negative: decreased input 
costs due to increased 
bargaining power and/or 
higher competition among 
suppliers 
More negative relative to buyer 
power with healthy targets: 
debtor-oriented insolvency 
code enables the acquirer to re-
negotiate input prices 
Positive: the financial health 
of the target is stabilized 
Positive: scale-increasing 
acquisitions 
Negative: scale-decreasing 
takeovers and/or more 
efficient use of each unit of 
input 
Negative: lower output 
levels in the takeover 
industry lead to 
restricted demand for 
the factors of 
production 
Customers 
Positive: gain from lower 
input prices for the takeover 
industry. Negative: 
monopsonistic takeover 
industry participants increase 
prices as a result of lower 
output levels 
Positive: gain from lower input 
prices for the takeover 
industry. Negative: 
monopsonistic takeover 
industry participants increase 
prices as a result of lower 
output levels 
No specific prediction 
Positive: lower production 
costs lead to lower customer 
prices 
Negative: scale-decreasing 
acquisitions 
Negative: higher 
output prices due to 
lower output levels 
Competitors 
Positive: decreased input costs 
due to increased bargaining 
power and/or higher 
competition among suppliers 
Positive/More positive relative 
to buyer power with healthy 
targets depending on the 
degree to which the re-
negotiated lower input 
prices/more favourable 
contract terms affect the 
acquisition industry as a whole 
No specific prediction 
Positive: new information 
related to company 
undervaluation or future 
horizontal M&A 
Negative: higher takeover 
industry competition due to 
the augmented productive 
efficiency of the acquirer 
Positive: monopoly 
rents extracted from 
customers and 
suppliers 
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Table 3.2 Sample Restrictions 
Restriction    
Total number 
of deals 
1. All completed M&A Deals from SDC Platinum where the acquirer and target 
companies are domiciled in the US and the acquirer company has a SEDOL or DataStream 
code available 
6,300 
2. Deals in 1 where the first three digits of the target and acquirer primary SIC codes are 
equal 
3,068 
3. Deals in 2 with all industry and company level information available and where the 
acquirer is exchange-listed company 
1,211 
4. Deals in 3 where the target company is exchange-listed 421 
 
Notes: This table presents the restrictions used when constructing the final sample of the study. Deals are 
completed between 1985 and 2012. As indicated, the final number of deals is 1,211. This sample is used for the 
analyses of the CARs to the suppliers, customers and competitors of the acquisition industry. The sample of 421 
deals is used for the analysis of the Combined CARs which accrue to the target and bidder companies as a result 
of the announcement of the horizontal acquisition. 
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Table 3.3 Variable Definitions  
Variable Name Definition 
CAARs 
Cumulative average abnormal returns to either the supplier, customer or 
competitor companies of the acquisition industry. Returns are cumulated over 
an event window of (-2, 2)  
Combined CAARs 
Combined cumulative average abnormal returns to the target and acquirer 
companies. Target and acquirer abnormal returns are weighted by the market 
value of the respective company as of ten days prior to deal announcement. 
Returns are cumulated over an event window of (-2, 2) 
Herf. Index 
The Herfindahl Index of the acquisition industry. Company market share is 
measured by the net sales of each company as a proportion of industry total net 
sales.  
Change in Herf. Index 
Acquisition-induced shift in industry concentration. Following the 
methodology in Shahrur (2005) this variable is estimated as the product of the 
acquirer and target market shares multiplied by two  
(i.e. 2 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡) Market share is 
measured with the use of net sales as of one year before the acquisition 
announcement.  
Herf. Index x Change in 
Herf. Index 
Interaction term which is equal to the product of the Herfindahl Index of the 
acquisition industry multiplied by the acquisition-induced shift in that 
industry’s concentration.  
Sup. Con.  
Measures the industry concentration of the suppliers to the acquisition industry. 
This variable is estimated with the use of the Herfindahl Index of each industry. 
Sup. Con. x Distr. Target 
Interaction term which is equal to the product of the supplier industry 
concentration and a dummy variable which measures target company financial 
distress (i.e. the dummy variable is equal to one when the target is in financial 
distress and zero otherwise). Financial distress is measured with the use of the 
ratio of EBITDA (Earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortization) 
to Net Interest Expense as well as the ratio of EBIT (Earnings before interest 
and tax) to Net Interest Expense.  
Rel. Size 
Measures the relative size of the acquirer and target companies. The variable 
is equal to the ratio of target to acquirer market value measured as of four weeks 
before the announcement of the M&A deal.  
Sup. Con. x Rel. Size 
Interaction term which is equal to the product of the supplier industry 
concentration and the relative size of the target and bidder firms.  
Sup. Con. x Rel. Size x 
Distr. Target 
Interaction term which is equal to the product of the ‘Sup. Con. x Rel. Size.’ 
variable and a dummy variable which measures target company financial 
distress.  
Sup. Con. x Change in Herf. 
Index 
Interaction term which is equal to the product of the supplier industry 
concentration and the acquisition-induced shift in the concentration of the 
acquisition industry.  
Sup. Con. x Change in Herf. 
Index x Distr. Target 
Interaction term which is equal to the product of the ‘Sup. Con. x Change in 
Herf. Index’ variable and a dummy variable which measures target company 
financial distress. 
Customer Concentration 
Customer industry concentration is measured as ∑ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  , where 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖  is 
measured as the proportion of the acquisition industry’s output bought by 
company i and where n is the total number of companies in the industry. Thus, 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖  is captured by the product of the Customer Input Coefficient of the 
industry and the sales of company i. 
Foreign Competition 
Measured as the acquisition industry’s imports as a proportion of the industry’s 
total supply following the methodology in Shahrur (2005). 
Herf. Index x Foreign 
Competition 
Interaction term which is equal to the product of the Herfindahl index of the 
acquisition industry and the variable ‘Foreign Competition’.  
Stock Financing 
Dummy variable which is equal to one when the deal is partly or entirely 
financed by stock and zero otherwise. 
Hostile Deal 
Dummy variable which is equal to one when the deal’s attitude is classified as 
hostile by the SDC Platinum Database 
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Distr. Target 
Dummy variable which is equal to one when the target company is financially 
distressed. A company is classified as financially distressed when its EBIT to 
Net Interest Expense or EBITDA to Net Interest Expense ratio is less than 1. 
Supplier Negative CAAR 
Dummy 
Dummy variable which is equal to one when the CAAR to the supplier 
portfolio is negative and zero otherwise 
Supplier Percentage Sold 
The proportion of the total output of the supplier industry that is purchased by 
the acquisition industry 
Supplier Pct. Sold x Sup. 
Negative CAAR Dummy 
Interaction term which equals to the product of the ‘Supplier Percentage Sold’ 
variable and the ‘Supplier Negative CAAR Dummy’ variable.  
Acquisition Percentage Sold 
The percentage of the output of the acquisition industry that is purchased by 
the customer industry 
Customer Input Coefficient 
The proportion of total output of the acquisition industry that is purchased by 
the customer industry divided by the total output of the customer industry 
Acquisition Input 
Coefficient 
The value of the supplier industry's produce that is purchased by the acquisition 
industry divided by the total output of the acquisition industry. 
Customer Negative CAAR 
Dummy 
Dummy variable which is equal to one when the CAR to the customer portfolio 
is negative and zero otherwise 
Customer Input Coefficient 
x Cust. Negative CAAR 
Dummy 
Interaction term which equals to the product of the ‘Customer Input 
Coefficient’ variable and the ‘Customer Negative CAAR Dummy’ variable. 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for the Measures Used to Define the Supplier and Customer Industries 
 
Notes: The sample includes 1, 211 horizontal acquisitions completed between 1985 and 2012. An acquisition is 
classified as horizontal when the acquirer and target companies have the same primary three-digit SIC code. The 
supplier and customer industries are defined with the use of the benchmark input-output accounts of the US 
economy following the methodology in Shahrur (2005). Please refer to Table 3.3 and the methodology section of 
this study for a detailed explanation of how each variable is constructed. 
 
Companies 
(Unique 
industries) 
Mean Median 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Main Customer      
Customer Input Coefficient 
5,692 
(129)  
12.22% 2.99% 2.13% 8.44% 
Acquisition Percentage Sold 
5,692 
(129) 
18.43% 8.50% 3.76% 16.95% 
Main Supplier      
Supplier Percentage Sold 
4,754 
(174) 
9.74% 7.01% 4.20% 11.94% 
Acquisition Input Coefficient 
4,754 
(174) 
20.60% 9.52% 4.42% 23.36% 
Dependent Supplier      
Supplier Percentage Sold 
6,503 
(176) 
9.02% 6.61% 1.83% 14.59% 
Acquisition Input Coefficient 
6,503 
(176) 
12.64% 11.28% 9.01% 13.98% 
CHAPTER 3: DISTRESSED HORIZONTAL M&A 
176 
 
Table 3.5 Distribution of M&A Deals by Industry and Year 
Industry Name SIC Code 1985-1989 1990-2000 2000-2008 2009-2012 Total % of Total 
Acquisition 
Activity 
1. Coal Mining 12 0 0 1 0 1 0.08% 0.24% 
2. Oil and Gas Extraction 13 0 23 56 2 81 6.69% 0.81% 
3. Building construction 15 0 1 2 0 3 0.25% 0.34% 
4. Heavy Construction, Except Building 16 0 3 0 1 4 0.33% 0.77% 
5. Special Trade Contractors 17 0 3 0 0 3 0.25% 0.85% 
6. Food & Kindred Products 20 1 4 3 2 10 0.83% 0.36% 
7. Textile mill products 22 0 3 0 0 3 0.25% 0.41% 
8. Lumber and wood products 24 0 4 0 0 4 0.33% 0.36% 
9. Furniture and fixtures 25 0 1 1 0 2 0.17% 0.34% 
10. Paper and allied products 26 1 4 0 1 6 0.50% 0.29% 
11. Printing and publishing 27 0 3 5 0 8 0.66% 0.46% 
12. Chemicals and allied products 28 2 11 1 0 14 1.16% 0.12% 
13. Petroleum refining 29 0 1 6 2 9 0.74% 0.61% 
14. Rubber and plastics 30 3 7 3 0 13 1.07% 0.79% 
15. Stone, clay, and glass 32 2 1 0 0 3 0.25% 0.27% 
16. Primary metal 33 1 1 4 0 6 0.50% 0.24% 
17. Fabricated metals 34 0 2 1 0 3 0.25% 0.13% 
18. Industrial machinery 35 10 51 12 10 83 6.85% 1.15% 
19. Electronical machinery 36 8 43 15 1 67 5.53% 0.79% 
20. Transportation equipment 37 1 4 0 0 5 0.41% 0.17% 
21. Instruments 38 3 83 26 13 125 10.32% 1.74% 
22. Misc. manufacturing 39 2 10 4 1 17 1.40% 1.20% 
23. Railroad transportation 40 1 1 2 1 5 0.41% 0.93% 
24. Motor freight transportation 42 0 0 4 1 5 0.41% 0.38% 
25. Water transportation 44 0 0 1 0 1 0.08% 0.10% 
27. Transportation by air 45 14 6 3 4 27 2.23% 2.35% 
28. Communications 48 1 32 7 0 40 3.30% 0.66% 
29. Electric, gas, and sanitary services 49 5 34 15 11 65 5.37% 0.81% 
30. Wholesale trade-durable goods 50 2 16 2 2 22 1.82% 0.70% 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
 
 
Notes: The sample includes 1, 211 horizontal acquisitions completed between 1985 and 2012. An acquisition is classified as horizontal when the acquirer and target companies 
have the same primary three-digit SIC code. This table shows the distribution of the M&A deals in the sample by industry and year. ‘Acquisition Activity’ is constructed as the 
number of companies that participated in horizontal acquisitions as a proportion of the total number of companies in the given industry over the sample period. 
Industry Name SIC Code 1985-1989 1990-2000 2000-2008 2009-2012 Total % of Total 
Acquisition 
Activity 
31. Wholesale trade-non-durable goods 51 3 7 0 3 13 1.07% 0.78% 
32. General merchandise stores 53 4 6 4 0 14 1.16% 6.11% 
33. Food stores 54 7 8 2 0 17 1.40% 2.71% 
34. Automotive dealers 55 0 1 0 0 1 0.08% 0.23% 
35. Apparel and accessory stores 56 0 1 0 1 2 0.17% 0.87% 
36. Home furniture 57 2 5 1 0 8 0.66% 3.08% 
37. Eating and drinking places 58 2 31 5 0 38 3.14% 2.35% 
38. Miscellaneous retail 59 1 7 4 0 12 0.99% 0.86% 
39. Hotels and rooming houses 70 0 17 4 1 22 1.82% 2.79% 
40. Business services 73 0 167 157 22 346 28.57% 2.53% 
41. Motion pictures 78 0 1 1 0 2 0.17% 0.29% 
42. Amusement 79 0 1 0 0 1 0.08% 0.07% 
43. Health services 80 2 63 14 2 81 6.69% 3.34% 
44. Social services 83 0 3 0 0 3 0.25% 1.49% 
45. Engineering and related serviced 87 1 8 6 1 16 1.32% 0.66% 
Total  79 678 372 82 1,211 100.00%  
% of Total  6.52% 55.99% 30.72% 6.77% 100.00%   
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Table 3.6 Average Announcement Abnormal Returns to Suppliers, Competitors and Customers 
 
Panel A: CAARs (%) to the Baseline Sample of Acquisitions 
 
Main Suppliers 
Dependent 
Suppliers 
Customers Competitors 
Average 
(Median) 
Number of 
Companies 
27 (18) 37 (10) 44 (28) 56 (31) 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0002 
(-0.1570) 
-0.0003 
(-0.1600) 
-0.0001 
(-0.0548) 
0.0045*** 
(3.6752) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0006 
(-0.4003) 
-0.0033 
(-1.1224) 
-0.0014 
(-0.6922) 
0.0072*** 
(3.7095) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0020 
(-0.6269) 
-0.0097 
(-1.6294) 
0.0011 
(0.2720) 
0.0083** 
(2.0991) 
(-40, 40) 
0.0012 
(0.1892) 
-0.0042 
(-0.3601) 
-0.0034 
(-0.4301) 
0.0202*** 
(2.5946) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0006 
(-0.2419) 
-0.0018 
(-0.4150) 
-0.0014 
(-0.4840) 
0.0008 
(0.2900) 
Panel B: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions of Distressed Targets (EBIT) 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0002 
(-0.0874) 
-0.0010 
(-0.2776) 
0.0010 
(0.2857) 
0.0042 
(1.6387) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0030 
(-0.7950) 
-0.0048 
(-0.8461) 
-0.0044 
(-0.8069) 
0.0081** 
(1.9962) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0211*** 
(-2.7585) 
-0.0304*** 
(-2.6246) 
-0.0045 
(-0.4015) 
0.0095 
(1.1400) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0334** 
(-2.2229) 
-0.0255 
(-1.1217) 
-0.0136 
(-0.6191) 
0.0385** 
(2.3639) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0093* 
(-1.6841) 
-0.0065 
(-0.7797) 
0.0006 
(0.0790) 
0.0012 
(0.2026) 
Panel C: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions of Distressed Targets (EBITDA) 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
0.0020 
(0.6304) 
0.0005 
(0.1001) 
0.0006 
(0.1577) 
0.0046 
(1.4641) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0017 
(-0.3409) 
-0.0054 
(-0.6878) 
-0.0037 
(-0.5914) 
0.0107** 
(2.1687) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0160 
(-1.5316) 
-0.0210 
(-1.3159) 
-0.0064 
(-0.4984) 
0.0142 
(1.4104) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0288 
(-1.3981) 
0.0166 
(0.5285) 
-0.0258 
(-1.0320) 
0.0546*** 
(2.7608) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0100 
(-1.3145) 
0.0036 
(0.3154) 
-0.0009 
(-0.0991) 
0.0015 
(0.2056) 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
Panel D: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions with Positive Combined Abnormal Returns 
 Main Suppliers 
Dependent 
Suppliers 
Customers Competitors 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0012 
(-0.9391) 
-7.8E-05 
(-3.0E-02) 
-0.0003 
(-0.1862) 
0.0045** 
(2.3826) 
(-2, 2) 
0.0003 
(0.1483) 
-0.0009 
(-0.2202) 
-0.0016 
(-0.5671) 
0.0101*** 
(3.3556) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0021 
(-0.4917) 
-0.0070 
(-0.8202) 
0.0050 
(0.8425) 
0.0116* 
(1.8801) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0102 
(-1.2427) 
0.0238 
(1.4207) 
0.0003 
(0.0254) 
0.0266** 
(2.2032) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0027 
(-0.9002) 
0.0077 
(1.2448) 
-0.0049 
(-1.1429) 
0.0006 
(0.1254) 
Panel E: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions of Distressed Targets (EBIT) Where the 
Combined CAAR is Positive 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0028 
(-0.7997) 
0.0032 
(0.5379) 
0.0010 
(0.2546) 
0.0031 
(0.7985) 
(-2, 2) 
0.0010 
(0.1776) 
0.0018 
(0.1890) 
-0.0002 
(-0.0311) 
0.0117* 
(1.9307) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0224 
(-1.9413) 
-0.0139 
(-0.7106) 
0.0097 
(0.7445) 
0.0154 
(1.2355) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0311 
(-1.3741) 
0.0474 
(1.2354) 
0.0031 
(0.1212) 
0.1022*** 
(4.1788) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0030 
(-0.3648) 
0.0085 
(0.6021) 
-0.0010 
(-0.1050) 
0.0108 
(1.1993) 
Panel F: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions of Distressed Targets (EBITDA) Where the 
Combined CAAR is Positive 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0021 
(-0.4028) 
0.0067 
(0.8708) 
-0.0005 
(-0.1141) 
0.0039 
(0.7536) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0029 
(-0.3467) 
0.0042 
(0.3454) 
-0.0016 
(-0.2091) 
0.0162* 
(1.9761) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0348* 
(-2.0507) 
-0.0008 
(-0.0316) 
0.0029 
(0.1922) 
0.0152 
(0.9031) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0436 
(-1.3069) 
0.0863* 
(1.7619) 
-0.0255 
(-0.8497) 
0.1108*** 
(3.3505) 
(10, 20) 
0.0093 
(0.7589) 
0.0218 
(1.2075) 
-0.0038 
(-0.3394) 
0.0127 
(1.0447) 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
Panel G: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions with Negative Combined Abnormal Returns 
 Main Suppliers 
Dependent 
Suppliers 
Customers Competitors 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
0.0010 
(0.6057) 
-0.0005 
(-0.1984) 
0.0003 
(0.1649) 
0.0045*** 
(2.9391) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0016 
(-0.6211) 
-0.0054 
(-1.3801) 
-0.0011 
(-0.4374) 
0.0041* 
(1.7272) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0019 
(-0.3563) 
-0.0121 
(-1.5126) 
-0.0035 
(-0.7026) 
0.0049 
(1.0017) 
(-40, 40) 
0.0136 
(1.2922) 
-0.0300* 
(-1.9051) 
-0.0079 
(-0.8051) 
0.0135 
(1.3956) 
(10, 20) 
0.0018 
(0.4676) 
-0.0105* 
(-1.8107) 
0.0027 
(0.7474) 
0.0011 
(0.3135) 
Panel H: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions of Distressed Targets (EBIT) Where the 
Combined CAAR is Negative 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
0.0020 
(0.6046) 
-0.0048 
(-1.1250) 
0.0009 
(0.1904) 
0.0052 
(1.5284) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0063 
(-1.1934) 
-0.0107 
(-1.5900) 
-0.0097 
(-1.2450) 
0.0047 
(0.8666) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0201* 
(-1.8442) 
-0.0452*** 
(-3.2882) 
-0.0223 
(-1.4009) 
0.0040 
(0.3568) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0354 
(-1.6570) 
-0.0906*** 
(-3.3566) 
-0.0345 
(-1.1044) 
-0.0205 
(-0.9397) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0147* 
(-1.8626) 
-0.0200** 
(-2.0078) 
0.0027 
(0.2330) 
-0.0077 
(-0.9543) 
Panel I: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions of Distressed Targets (EBITDA) Where the 
Combined CAAR is Negative 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
0.0048 
(1.1451) 
-0.0051 
(-0.9023) 
0.0019 
(0.3457) 
0.0051 
(1.4281) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0010 
(-0.1460) 
-0.0140 
(-1.5628) 
-0.0060 
(-0.6964) 
0.0056 
(0.9917) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0033 
(-0.2429) 
-0.0392** 
(-2.1407) 
-0.0164 
(-0.9338) 
0.0133 
(1.1442) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0187 
(-0.6954) 
-0.0462 
(-1.2858) 
-0.0262 
(-0.7586) 
0.0039 
(0.1713) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0230** 
(-2.3201) 
-0.0127 
(-0.9587) 
0.0022 
(0.1699) 
-0.0086 
(-1.0264) 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
Panel J: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions with Supplier, Customer and Competitor 
Companies Domiciled in the State of the Acquirer 
 Main Suppliers 
Dependent 
Suppliers 
Customers Competitors 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0040* 
(-1.8223) 
-0.0001 
(-0.0326) 
0.0022 
(0.5884) 
0.0119*** 
(3.6303) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0070** 
(-2.0387) 
-0.0142** 
(-2.2846) 
0.0012 
(0.1981) 
0.0144*** 
(2.7684) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0108 
(-1.5373) 
-0.0425*** 
(-3.3363) 
0.0030 
(0.2490) 
0.0113 
(1.0637) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0059 
(-0.4248) 
-0.0669*** 
(-2.6765) 
-0.0055 
(-0.2327) 
0.0101 
(0.4824) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0100* 
(-1.9644) 
-0.0017 
(-0.1869) 
0.0004 
(0.0448) 
-0.0099 
(-1.2890) 
Panel K: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions of Distressed Targets (EBIT) Where Supplier, 
Customer and Competitor Companies are Domiciled in the State of the Acquirer 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
0.0040 
(0.6869) 
0.0142 
(1.5187) 
-0.0031 
(-0.2611) 
0.0141 
(1.6601) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0077 
(-0.8478) 
-0.0119 
(-0.8042) 
-0.0089 
(-0.4717) 
0.0249* 
(1.8521) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0326* 
(-1.7435) 
-0.0670** 
(-2.2066) 
-0.0016 
(-0.0410) 
0.0603** 
(2.1908) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0880** 
(-2.3989) 
-0.1248* 
(-2.0923) 
0.0787 
(1.0319) 
0.1768*** 
(3.2703) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0210 
(-1.5528) 
-0.0166 
(-0.7559) 
-0.0109 
(-0.3890) 
-0.0105 
(-0.5253) 
Panel L: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions of Distressed Targets (EBITDA) Where 
Supplier, Customer and Competitor Companies are Domiciled in the State of the Acquirer 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
0.0021 
(0.2888) 
0.0177 
(1.1362) 
-0.0016 
(-0.1123) 
0.0124 
(1.1282) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0073 
(-0.6470) 
-0.0150 
(-0.6082) 
0.0004 
(0.0186) 
0.0263 
(1.5085) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0296 
(-1.2722) 
-0.0617 
(-1.2237) 
-0.0028 
(-0.0621) 
0.0560 
(1.5671) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0856* 
(-1.8723) 
-0.1241 
(-1.2530) 
0.0669 
(0.7426) 
0.1939** 
(2.7628) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0188 
(-1.1146) 
-0.0127 
(-0.3488) 
-0.0196 
(-0.5909) 
-0.0092 
(-0.3550) 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
 
Notes: This table displays the CARs (cumulative abnormal returns) to the Main Suppliers, Dependent Suppliers, 
Customers and Competitors of the acquisition industry. The sample includes 421 horizontal acquisitions 
completed between 1985 and 2012. An acquisition is classified as horizontal when the acquirer and target 
companies have the same primary three-digit SIC code. The supplier and customer industries are defined with the 
use of the benchmark input-output accounts of the US economy following the methodology in Shahrur (2005). 
Please refer to Table 3: Variable definitions and the methodology section of this study for a detailed explanation 
of how each variable is constructed. CAARs are measured on the basis of equally-weighted portfolios of the 
companies in the corresponding industry. Panel A shows CAARs to the baseline sample of acquisitions. Panels B 
and C show CAARs for the subsample of acquisitions of distressed targets (where distress is measured by the 
EBIT to Net Interest Expense and EBITDA to Net Interest Expense ratios respectively). Panel D (Panel G) shows 
the CAARs for the subsample of acquisitions with positive (negative) ‘Combined CAAR’. Panels E and F (Panels 
H and I) show the CAARs for the subsample of acquisitions with positive (negative) ‘Combined CAAR’ where 
the target is financially distressed as indicated by the EBIT to Net Interest Expense and EBITDA to Net Interest 
Expense ratios respectively. Panel J shows the CAARs for the subsample of acquisitions with supplier, customer 
and competitor companies domiciled in the state of the acquirer. Panels K and L show the CAARs for the 
subsamples of acquisitions with supplier, customer and competitor companies domiciled in the state of the 
acquirer and where the target is financially distressed as indicated by the EBIT to Net Interest Expense and 
EBITDA to Net Interest Expense ratios respectively. Panel M (Panel N) shows the CAARs to the subsample of 
acquisitions with supplier, customer and competitor companies domiciled in the state of the acquirer and where 
the ‘Combined CAAR’ is positive (negative). 
 Main Suppliers 
Dependent 
Suppliers 
Customers Competitors 
Panel M: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions with Positive Combined Abnormal Returns 
Where Supplier, Customer and Competitor Companies are Domiciled in the State of the Acquirer 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
-0.0097*** 
(-3.2865) 
0.0021 
(0.3434) 
0.0001 
(0.0319) 
0.0147*** 
(2.9463) 
(-2, 2) 
-0.0150*** 
(-3.2321) 
-0.0147 
(-1.4871) 
-0.0022 
(-0.3049) 
0.0222*** 
(2.8170) 
(-10, 10) 
-0.0259*** 
(-2.7158) 
-0.0500** 
(-2.4679) 
-0.0050 
(-0.3370) 
0.0196 
(1.2170) 
(-40, 40) 
-0.0391** 
(-2.0871) 
-0.0426 
(-1.0706) 
-0.0191 
(-0.6537) 
0.0306 
(0.9678) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0059 
(-0.8509) 
0.0090 
(0.6171) 
0.0058 
(0.5398) 
-0.0092 
(-0.7850) 
Panel N: CAAR (%) to the Subsample of Acquisitions with Negative Combined Abnormal Returns 
Where Supplier, Customer and Competitor Companies are Domiciled in the State of the Acquirer 
Window 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
Average 
(t-stat) 
(-1, 0) 
0.0015 
(0.4461) 
-0.0024 
(-0.5644) 
0.0056 
(0.8987) 
0.0082** 
(2.0985) 
(-2, 2) 
0.0006 
(0.1206) 
-0.0137** 
(-2.0335) 
0.0068 
(0.6902) 
0.0038 
(0.6192) 
(-10, 10) 
0.0035 
(0.3282) 
-0.0350** 
(-2.5346) 
0.0164 
(0.8109) 
8E-05 
(6E-03) 
(-40, 40) 
0.0257 
(1.2284) 
-0.0912*** 
(-3.3686) 
0.0172 
(0.4321) 
-0.0178 
(-0.7129) 
(10, 20) 
-0.0139* 
(-1.8103) 
-0.0125 
(-1.2514) 
-0.0087 
(-0.5916) 
-0.0110 
(-1.1945) 
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Table 3.7 Analysis of Combined Wealth Effect from the Acquisition on Target and Bidder Companies 
 Model 1 
WLS 
Model 2 
WLS 
Model 3 
WLS 
Model 4 
MLE 
Model 5 
MLE 
Model 6 
MLE 
Dependent 
Variable: Combined 
CAR (-2, 2) 
No 
Dummies 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBITDA) 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBIT) 
No 
Dummies 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBITDA) 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBIT) 
Buyer Power Hypothesis 
Sup. Con. -0.00014** -0.00015** -0.000142* -0.00014** -0.00015** -0.000142* 
 (-1.976) (-2.078) (-1.912) (-2.005) (-2.118) (-1.950) 
Sup. Con. x Distr. 
Target 
 
0.000259* 7.53e-05 
 
0.000259* 7.53e-05 
  (1.739) (0.744)  (1.773) (0.758) 
Sup. Con. x Rel. Size 0.000210* 0.000235* 0.000248** 0.000210* 0.000235* 0.000248** 
 (1.720) (1.819) (2.087) (1.745) (1.855) (2.128) 
Sup. Con. x Rel. Size 
x Distr. Target 
 
-0.000570 -0.000909 
 
-0.000570 -0.000909 
  (-1.544) (-1.225)  (-1.574) (-1.249) 
Sup. Con. x Change 
in Herf. Index 0.00187 0.00210 0.00260 0.00187 0.00210 0.00260* 
 (0.990) (1.157) (1.622) (1.004) (1.179) (1.654) 
Sup. Con. x Change 
in Herf. Index x 
Distr. Target 
 
0.180 0.114** 
 
0.180 0.114** 
  (0.825) (1.984)  (0.841) (2.023) 
Productive efficiency and Collusion Hypotheses 
Herf. Index 0.000148* 0.000134* 9.87e-05* 0.000148* 0.000134* 9.87e-05** 
 (1.756) (1.760) (1.932) (1.781) (1.794) (1.969) 
Change in Herf. 
Index 0.000509 0.000426 5.12e-05 0.000509 0.000426 5.12e-05 
 (0.531) (0.417) (0.0491) (0.538) (0.426) (0.0501) 
Herf. Index x Change 
in Herf. Index -0.00298* -0.00305* -0.0037*** -0.00298* -0.00305* -0.0037*** 
 (-1.814) (-1.906) (-2.671) (-1.840) (-1.943) (-2.723) 
Controls 
Customer 
Concentration 2.67e-05 1.57e-05 1.43e-05 2.67e-05 1.57e-05 1.43e-05 
 (0.448) (0.265) (0.248) (0.454) (0.270) (0.253) 
Foreign Competition 2.05e-05 3.36e-06 1.40e-05 2.05e-05 3.36e-06 1.40e-05 
 (0.563) (0.157) (0.436) (0.572) (0.160) (0.445) 
Herf. Index x Foreign 
Competition -0.000428 -0.000402 -0.000326 -0.000428 -0.000402 -0.000326 
 (-0.854) (-0.627) (-0.734) (-0.867) (-0.640) (-0.748) 
Rel. Size -2.77e-05 -2.84e-05 -2.66e-05 -2.77e-05 -2.84e-05 -2.66e-05 
 (-1.242) (-0.919) (-0.802) (-1.260) (-0.937) (-0.818) 
Stock Financing -1.19e-05 -9.73e-06 -1.21e-05 -1.19e-05 -9.73e-06 -1.21e-05 
 (-0.824) (-0.673) (-0.848) (-0.836) (-0.687) (-0.865) 
Hostile Deal 0.000393** 0.000394** 0.000392** 0.000393** 0.000394** 0.000392** 
 (2.326) (2.298) (2.294) (2.360) (2.343) (2.339) 
Distr. Target  -1.39e-05 -7.93e-06  -1.39e-05 -7.93e-06 
  (-0.700) (-0.298)  (-0.714) (-0.304) 
Intercept 8.41e-06 1.12e-05 1.62e-05 8.41e-06 1.12e-05 1.62e-05 
 (0.418) (0.506) (0.751) (0.424) (0.516) (0.765) 
Number of Deals 421 421 421 421 421 421 
Adjusted R2 / Chi2 0.092 0.098 0.109 1352 5181 7843 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
Notes: The dependent variable, ‘Combined CAAR’ is measured by cumulating the combined weighted abnormal 
returns to the target and acquirer companies over an event window of (-2, 2). Models 1 through 3 present the 
results from the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation procedure where the weights are measured as one 
divided by the standard deviation of the residuals. Models 4 through 6 present the results from the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) procedure. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by 
the symbols *, **, *** respectively. The t-statistics corresponding to each regression coefficient are presented in 
parentheses. The sample used for the purposes of the models in this table consists of 421 horizontal acquisitions 
where the acquirer and target companies are both exchange-listed. Please refer to Table 3.3 and the methodology 
section of this study for a detailed explanation of how each variable is constructed. 
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Table 3.8 Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Main Suppliers 
 
Dependent Variable: Supplier 
CAR 
 
Panel A: All Suppliers 
Model 1 
All Deals 
Model 2 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBITDA) 
Model 3 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBIT) 
Model 4 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBITDA) 
Model 5 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBIT) 
Buyer Power Hypothesis      
Sup. Con. 0.0506*** 0.0451*** 0.0669*** 0.0253*** 0.0281*** 
 (28.51) (7.874) (18.23) (13.12) (13.89) 
Sup. Con. x Distr. Target    0.0337*** 0.0386*** 
    (7.925) (10.48) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index -1.051*** -7.544** -1.061** -1.369*** -1.396*** 
 (-11.02) (-2.464) (-2.019) (-29.17) (-29.65) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index x Distr. Target 
   
-84.84*** -5.194*** 
    (-13.52) (-5.575) 
Collusion Hypothesis      
Herf. Index 0.0245*** 0.0185*** 0.0291*** 0.0221*** 0.0229*** 
 (29.68) (7.847) (17.13) (27.35) (28.33) 
Change in Herf. Index 0.0302* -0.723*** 0.0615 0.127*** 0.124*** 
 (1.676) (-3.627) (0.987) (17.63) (17.16) 
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. 
Index -0.166*** 3.795*** 0.435*** -0.269*** -0.261*** 
 (-5.495) (3.129) (2.716) (-17.30) (-16.79) 
Controls      
Supplier Negative CAAR 
Dummy -0.0691*** -0.0636*** -0.0656*** -0.0700*** -0.0692*** 
 (-215.2) (-67.38) (-96.61) (-217.2) (-216.0) 
Supplier Percentage Sold 0.00316*** 0.0176*** -0.000452 0.00651*** 0.00601*** 
 (4.490) (4.752) (-0.224) (9.327) (8.602) 
Supplier Pct. Sold x Sup. 
Negative CAAR Dummy 0.00312*** -0.00586 0.00669*** -0.000380 -0.000808 
 (3.218) (-1.434) (2.800) (-0.412) (-0.878) 
Foreign Competition -0.00965*** 0.0110*** 0.00910*** 0.00649*** -0.0124*** 
 (-16.54) (3.245) (5.372) (11.09) (-19.66) 
Herf. Index x Foreign 
Competition 0.105*** -0.172*** -0.140*** -0.0126*** 0.137*** 
 (23.56) (-4.034) (-6.885) (-20.07) (25.90) 
Distr. Target    0.140*** 0.00134*** 
    (26.81) (2.995) 
Intercept 0.0275*** 0.0322*** 0.0266*** 0.0281*** 0.0278*** 
 (79.41) (28.04) (35.46) (81.31) (78.51) 
Number of Deals 1,049 205 205 1,049 1,049 
Chi2 8303 7409 14578 8428 8374 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable, ‘Supplier CAAR’ is measured by cumulating the abnormal returns to an equally-
weighted portfolio of supplier companies for each industry over an event window of (-2, 2). All models are 
estimated using the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation procedure where the weights are measured as one 
divided by the standard deviation of the residuals. Panel A (Panel B) presents the results pertaining to all (state) 
supplier companies. ‘State Suppliers’ are defined as companies which are domiciled in the same state as the 
acquirer. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by the symbols *, **, *** respectively. 
The t-statistics corresponding to each regression coefficient are presented in parentheses. The sample used for the 
purposes of the models in this table consists of 1,211 horizontal acquisitions where the acquirer and target 
companies are both exchange-listed. Please refer to Table 3.3 and the methodology section of this study for a 
detailed explanation of how each variable is constructed.. 
Dependent Variable: Supplier 
CAR 
 
Panel B: State Suppliers 
 
Model 1 
All Deals 
Model 2 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBITDA) 
Model 3 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBIT) 
Model 4 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBITDA) 
Model 5 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBIT) 
Buyer Power Hypothesis      
Sup. Con. -0.140*** -0.0721*** -0.0419*** 0.0281*** 0.0551*** 
 (-67.96) (-7.940) (-6.507) (12.70) (24.50) 
Sup. Con. x Distr. Target    -0.334*** -0.430*** 
    (-62.91) (-106.6) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index -71.23*** -112.4*** -78.70*** -0.202*** -0.249*** 
 (-172.8) (-51.94) (-55.36) (-3.545) (-4.368) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index x Distr. Target 
   
-248.8*** -19.72*** 
    (-37.56) (-17.04) 
Collusion Hypothesis      
Herf. Index 0.0655*** 0.0285*** 0.122*** 0.0192*** 0.0289*** 
 (58.53) (7.922) (46.72) (16.37) (25.02) 
Change in Herf. Index 1.437*** -4.694*** 4.753*** 0.142*** 0.162*** 
 (87.11) (-10.85) (36.50) (12.74) (14.60) 
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. 
Index -2.191*** 49.80*** -5.314*** -0.255*** -0.304*** 
 (-53.52) (31.61) (-23.21) (-13.42) (-16.05) 
Controls      
Supplier Negative CAAR 
Dummy -0.0514*** -0.0702*** -0.0980*** -0.0277*** -0.0309*** 
 (-179.4) (-56.43) (-111.4) (-95.00) (-107.4) 
Supplier Percentage Sold 0.0207*** 0.00905** 0.0529*** 0.00534*** 0.00198*** 
 (37.24) (2.536) (19.75) (9.649) (3.559) 
Supplier Pct. Sold x Sup. 
Negative CAAR Dummy 0.0298*** 0.00290 0.0245*** 
-
0.00654*** 0.00204* 
 (22.30) (0.641) (5.753) (-5.551) (1.743) 
Foreign Competition 
0.00660*** 0.0259*** 0.0457*** 
-
0.00434*** -0.0085*** 
 (12.24) (20.92) (47.78) (-7.242) (-14.92) 
Herf. Index x Foreign 
Competition -0.0621*** -0.277*** -0.519*** 0.0473*** 0.0936*** 
 (-11.50) (-19.67) (-52.05) (7.734) (15.66) 
Distr. Target    0.0410*** 0.0432*** 
    (56.29) (67.64) 
Intercept 0.0158*** 0.0334*** 0.0130*** 0.00287*** 0.000118 
 (62.33) (22.74) (11.34) (11.03) (0.451) 
Number of Deals 770 160 160 770 770 
Chi2 2496 1140 1464 3011 2976 
CHAPTER 3: DISTRESSED HORIZONTAL M&A 
187 
 
Table 3.9 Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Dependent Suppliers 
 
Dependent Variable: Supplier 
CAR 
 
Panel A: All Dependent 
Suppliers 
Model 1 
All Deals 
Model 2 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBITDA) 
Model 3 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBIT) 
Model 4 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBITDA) 
Model 5 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBIT) 
Buyer Power Hypothesis      
Sup. Con. -0.0124*** 0.0058 0.0442*** -0.0062*** -0.0081*** 
 (-8.435) (1.19) (13.47) (-3.756) (-4.204) 
Sup. Con. x Distr. Target    -0.0101* 0.0645*** 
    (-1.718) (16.79) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index -0.706** 
-
13.9958*** 
-
15.2796*** -1.062** 0.223 
 (-2.282) (-5.18) (-8.96) (-2.298) (0.719) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index x Distr. Target 
   -
673.120*** -0.996*** 
    (-10.52) (-4.566) 
Collusion Hypothesis      
Herf. Index -0.0827*** 0.0270** -0.0566*** -0.0566*** 0.00661 
 (-30.85) (2.02) (-7.18) (-17.99) (1.590) 
Change in Herf. Index 0.0197** 4.7799*** 2.2994*** 0.0618 6.948*** 
 (2.004) (6.73) (9.70) (0.326) (17.49) 
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. 
Index 10.78*** 
-
35.5603*** 
-
15.5325*** 0.775 -34.94*** 
 (5.989) (-4.77) (-3.23) (0.958) (-10.54) 
Controls      
Supplier Negative CAAR 
Dummy -0.0648*** -0.0844*** -0.0860*** -0.0504*** -0.0781*** 
 (-113.2) (-46.76) (-59.92) (-79.34) (-101.6) 
Supplier Percentage Sold 
-0.0151*** -0.0171*** -0.0333*** 
-
0.00986*** -0.0242*** 
 (-10.52) (-3.17) (-16.00) (-7.471) (-17.07) 
Supplier Pct. Sold x Sup. 
Negative CAAR Dummy 0.0645*** 0.0038 0.0292*** 0.0431*** 0.138*** 
 (35.69) (0.51) (8.40) (22.83) (53.71) 
Foreign Competition -0.143*** -0.0110 -0.1705*** -0.0515*** -0.0538*** 
 (-40.42) (-0.72) (-17.66) (-18.57) (-14.18) 
Herf. Index x Foreign 
Competition 0.646*** -0.0192 0.6631*** 0.273*** 0.201*** 
 (35.45) (-0.24) (13.47) (15.48) (10.39) 
Distr. Target    0.00161 -0.0208*** 
    (0.817) (-16.97) 
Intercept 0.0446*** 0.0413*** 0.0493*** 0.0347*** 0.0325*** 
 (65.59) (15.15) (24.12) (46.63) (39.39) 
Number of Deals 1,049 205 205 1,049 1,049 
Chi2 2396 2315 2117 1827 2056 
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Table 3.9 (Continued) 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable, ‘Supplier CAAR’ is measured by cumulating the abnormal returns to an equally-
weighted portfolio of supplier companies for each industry over an event window of (-2, 2). All models are 
estimated using the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation procedure where the weights are measured as one 
divided by the standard deviation of the residuals. Panel A (Panel B) presents the results pertaining to all (state) 
supplier companies. ‘State Suppliers’ are defined as companies which are domiciled in the same state as the 
acquirer. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by the symbols *, **, *** respectively. 
The t-statistics corresponding to each regression coefficient are presented in parentheses. The sample used for the 
purposes of the models in this table consists of 1,211 horizontal acquisitions where the acquirer and target 
companies are both exchange-listed. Please refer to Table 3.3 and the methodology section of this study for a 
detailed explanation of how each variable is constructed.. 
 
Dependent Variable: Supplier 
CAR 
 
Panel B: State Dependent 
Suppliers 
Model 1 
All Deals 
Model 2 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBITDA) 
Model 3 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBIT) 
Model 4 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBITDA) 
Model 5 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBIT) 
Buyer Power Hypothesis      
Sup. Con. -0.155*** -0.0296 -0.0933*** -0.173*** -0.159*** 
 (-30.42) (-0.953) (-3.169) (-33.91) (-28.69) 
Sup. Con. x Distr. Target    0.236*** 0.232*** 
    (10.79) (11.83) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index -0.960*** -269.9*** -11.34* 0.663 0.253 
 (-5.485) (-2.859) (-1.892) (1.554) (1.169) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index x Distr. Target 
   
-14.85** -1.363*** 
    (-2.077) (-3.142) 
Collusion Hypothesis      
Herf. Index -0.0885*** -0.137*** -0.129*** 0.0423*** 0.0598*** 
 (-18.88) (-5.668) (-4.931) (8.757) (10.52) 
Change in Herf. Index 11.69*** 2.755 -4.108* 0.00239 5.813*** 
 (23.39) (0.206) (-1.649) (0.0170) (10.90) 
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. 
Index -29.08*** 40.16 12.05** -0.0905 -34.54*** 
 (-7.476) (0.632) (2.474) (-0.0768) (-8.386) 
Controls      
Supplier Negative CAAR 
Dummy -0.0143*** -0.112*** -0.108*** -0.0319*** -0.0391*** 
 (-12.38) (-26.22) (-30.66) (-27.95) (-28.17) 
Supplier Percentage Sold -0.00186 -0.0403*** -0.0355*** -0.00373 -0.0259*** 
 (-0.816) (-5.214) (-9.060) (-1.609) (-10.37) 
Supplier Pct. Sold x Sup. 
Negative CAAR Dummy -0.181*** 0.0659*** 0.0437*** 
-
0.00863*** 0.00296 
 (-42.72) (5.909) (7.128) (-2.633) (0.510) 
Foreign Competition 0.000176 0.0128 0.117** 0.0683*** 0.0961*** 
 (0.0320) (0.207) (2.132) (12.47) (16.42) 
Herf. Index x Foreign 
Competition -0.0404 -0.473 -1.018*** -0.532*** -0.615*** 
 (-1.337) (-1.480) (-3.578) (-13.36) (-18.23) 
Distr. Target    -0.0326*** -0.0280*** 
    (-11.07) (-9.449) 
Intercept 0.0419*** 0.0877*** 0.0923*** 0.0305*** 0.0340*** 
 (31.41) (12.64) (16.02) (21.40) (22.41) 
Number of Deals 770 160 160 770 770 
Chi2 1427 1427 1891 6380 6758 
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Table 3.10 Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Competitors 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Competitor CAR 
 
Panel A: All Competitors 
Model 1 
All Deals 
Model 2 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBITDA) 
Model 3 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBIT) 
Model 4 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBITDA) 
Model 5 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBIT) 
Buyer Power Hypothesis      
Sup. Con. 0.0285*** -0.0232 0.0434*** 0.0365*** 0.0238*** 
 (5.302) (-1.569) (5.021) (6.467) (4.067) 
Sup. Con. x Distr. Target    0.0457*** 0.0570*** 
    (2.848) (4.155) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index 47.29*** 8.671*** 2.212*** 182.0*** 0.828*** 
 (14.78) (2.671) (3.139) (11.92) (3.676) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index x Distr. Target 
   
-1.421 1.964*** 
    (-0.867) (2.656) 
Collusion Hypothesis      
Herf. Index 0.0800*** -0.000139 -0.0122 0.0720*** 0.0391*** 
 (14.69) (-0.00802) (-1.013) (14.71) (7.306) 
Change in Herf. Index -7.037*** -10.79*** -1.528*** -7.648*** -2.010*** 
 (-11.15) (-18.85) (-8.952) (-10.75) (-10.93) 
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. 
Index -2.127 9.654*** 1.647*** 17.13*** -0.850*** 
 (-0.506) (3.785) (2.942) (4.242) (-3.759) 
Controls      
Customer Concentration -0.0133*** -0.0171*** -0.0256*** -0.0169*** -0.0140*** 
 (-5.962) (-2.781) (-5.133) (-7.264) (-7.145) 
Foreign Competition 0.0139*** -0.00820 -0.00716 0.0145*** 0.00501** 
 (6.518) (-1.195) (-1.424) (7.134) (2.306) 
Herf. Index x Foreign 
Competition -0.202*** 0.130 0.0987 -0.195*** -0.0720*** 
 (-8.040) (1.589) (1.622) (-8.537) (-2.942) 
Distr. Target    -0.0119*** -0.0150*** 
    (-5.252) (-7.710) 
Intercept 
-0.0105*** 0.00322 
-
0.00868*** -0.0108*** -0.0055*** 
 (-12.23) (1.130) (-4.450) (-12.55) (-5.965) 
Number of Deals 1,049 205 205 1,049 1,049 
Chi2 847.6 701.7 194.1 934.2 427.1 
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Table 3.10 (Continued) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable, ‘Competitor CAAR’ is measured by cumulating the abnormal returns to an 
equally-weighted portfolio of competitor companies for each industry over an event window of (-2, 2). All models 
are estimated using the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation procedure where the weights are measured as 
one divided by the standard deviation of the residuals. Panel A (Panel B) presents the results pertaining to all 
(state) competitor companies. ‘State Competitors’ are defined as companies which are domiciled in the same state 
as the acquirer. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by the symbols *, **, *** 
respectively. The t-statistics corresponding to each regression coefficient are presented in parentheses. The sample 
used for the purposes of the models in this table consists of 1,211 horizontal acquisitions where the acquirer and 
target companies are both exchange-listed. Please refer to Table 3.3 and the methodology section of this study for 
a detailed explanation of how each variable is constructed.. 
Dependent Variable: 
Competitor CARs 
 
Panel B: State Competitors 
Model 1 
All Deals 
Model 2 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBITDA) 
Model 3 
Distressed 
Deals 
(EBIT) 
Model 4 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBITDA) 
Model 5 
All Deals - 
Distressed 
Dummies 
(EBIT) 
Buyer Power Hypothesis      
Sup. Con. -0.130*** -0.0910*** -0.0197 -0.133*** -0.292*** 
 (-41.83) (-3.305) (-0.895) (-42.20) (-50.96) 
Sup. Con. x Distr. Target    0.0408* 0.309*** 
 
 
   
(1.665) (11.84) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index 3.473*** 833.4*** 538.9*** 3.597*** 331.8*** 
 (4.714) (4.273) (4.809) (4.876) (6.303) 
Sup. Conc. x Change in Herf. 
Index x Distr. Target 
   
-24,786 321.6*** 
    (-0.959) (3.430) 
Collusion Hypothesis      
Herf. Index -0.0515*** -0.201*** -0.0283 -3.037*** -0.100*** 
 (-5.531) (-5.311) (-0.996) (-21.04) (-9.045) 
Change in Herf. Index -2.934*** -172.6*** -36.36** -0.0459*** -171.0*** 
 (-20.49) (-3.095) (-2.192) (-4.873) (-14.97) 
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. 
Index 0.0426 888.6*** 140.3 -0.0801 978.3*** 
 (0.123) (2.873) (1.551) (-0.229) (9.373) 
Controls      
Customer Industry Concentration -0.0643*** -0.118*** -0.0536*** -0.0617*** -0.0479*** 
 (-17.73) (-8.762) (-4.962) (-16.84) (-12.95) 
Foreign Competition 
-0.0198*** -0.00957 -0.00496 -0.0183*** 
-
0.00943*** 
 (-6.179) (-1.205) (-0.730) (-5.664) (-2.964) 
Herf. Index x Foreign 
Competition 0.195*** 0.0388 0.0711 0.184*** 0.0926*** 
 (5.882) (0.437) (0.903) (5.514) (2.822) 
Distr. Target    -0.0141*** -0.0579*** 
    (-3.470) (-22.84) 
Intercept 0.0391*** 0.0560*** 0.00277 0.0388*** 0.0674*** 
 (28.51) (7.647) (0.673) (28.10) (39.90) 
Number of Deals 770 160 160 770 770 
Chi2 9720 154.5 72.94 9766 3952 
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Table 3.11 Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Customers 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable, ‘Customer CAR’ is measured by cumulating the abnormal returns to an equally-
weighted portfolio of customer companies for each industry over an event window of (-2, 2). All models are 
estimated using the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimation procedure where the weights are measured as one 
divided by the standard deviation of the residuals. Model 1 (Model 2) presents the results pertaining to all (state) 
customer companies. ‘State Customers’ are defined as companies which are domiciled in the same state as the 
acquirer. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by the symbols *, **, *** respectively. 
The t-statistics corresponding to each regression coefficient are presented in parentheses. The sample used for the 
purposes of the models in this table consists of 1,211 horizontal acquisitions where the acquirer and target 
companies are both exchange-listed. Please refer to Table 3.3 and the methodology section of this study for a 
detailed explanation of how each variable is constructed. 
Dependent Variable: Customer CAR 
Model 1 
All Customers 
Model 2 
State Customers 
Collusion Hypothesis   
Herf. Index -0.0169*** 0.00177** 
 (-13.88) (2.129) 
Change in Herf. Index 0.0988*** -0.0242** 
 (5.278) (-1.997) 
Herf. Index x Change in Herf. Index -0.140*** -0.954*** 
 (-3.738) (-3.330) 
Controls   
Customer Negative CAR Dummy -0.0687*** -0.0388*** 
 (-180.2) (-57.72) 
Customer Input Coefficient -0.0375*** -0.0392*** 
 (-12.54) (-13.42) 
Customer Input Coefficient x Cust. Negative CAR Dummy 0.0446*** 0.0731*** 
 (11.99) (13.51) 
Customer Concentration -0.00299** 0.00737*** 
 (-2.368) (4.931) 
Foreign Competition 0.0177*** -0.359*** 
 (4.079) (-77.29) 
Herf. Index x Foreign Competition -0.0552** 1.189*** 
 (-2.243) (45.86) 
Intercept 0.0406*** 0.0234*** 
 (112.4) (54.61) 
Number of Deals 1,049 770 
Chi2 1354 3521 
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Table 3.12 Summary of Univariate Analysis 
 Theoretical Model Empirical Findings 
Panel A: All 
Companies 
Buyer 
Power 
Buyer 
Power 
with 
distressed 
target 
Financial 
stabilization 
Collusion 
Productive 
Efficiency 
All M&A 
M&A of 
distressed 
targets 
Value-
creating 
distressed 
M&A  
Value-
destroying 
distressed 
M&A  
Value-
creating 
M&A 
Value-
destroying 
M&A 
Merging 
companies 
+ 
+/Stronger 
than with 
healthy 
targets 
+ + + + + + - + - 
Suppliers - 
-/Stronger 
than with 
healthy 
targets 
+ - +/- Insignificant - Insignificant - Insignificant - 
Customers +/- +/- 
No specific 
prediction 
- +/- Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Competitors + 
+/ 
Stronger 
than with 
healthy 
targets 
No specific 
prediction 
+ +/- + + + Insignificant + + 
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Table 3.12 (Continued) 
 Theoretical Model Empirical Findings 
Panel B: 
State 
Companies 
Buyer 
Power 
Buyer 
Power 
with 
distressed 
target 
Financial 
stabilization 
Collusion 
Productive 
Efficiency 
All M&A 
M&A of 
distressed 
targets 
Value-
creating 
distressed 
M&A  
Value-
destroying 
distressed 
M&A  
Value-
creating 
M&A 
Value-
destroying 
M&A 
Merging 
companies 
+ 
+/Stronger 
than with 
healthy 
targets 
+ + + + 
+/ Stronger 
than with 
healthy 
targets 
N/A N/A + - 
Suppliers - 
-/Stronger 
than with 
healthy 
targets 
+ - +/- - 
-/Stronger 
than with 
healthy 
targets 
N/A N/A - - 
Customers +/- +/- 
No specific 
prediction 
- +/- Insignificant Insignificant N/A N/A Insignificant Insignificant 
Competitors + 
+/ Stronger 
than with 
healthy 
targets 
No specific 
prediction 
+ +/- + 
+/ Stronger 
than with 
healthy 
targets 
N/A N/A + + 
 
Notes: This table presents the signs of the CAARs (Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns) that accrue to the merging companies, as well as the suppliers, customers and 
competitors of the acquisition industry. The sample consists of 421 horizontal acquisitions completed between 1985 and 2012. The supplier and customer industries are defined 
with the use of the benchmark input-output accounts of the US economy following the methodology in Shahrur (2005). The abnormal returns are estimated using the market 
and risk model. The CAARs to the supplier, customer and competitor industries are calculated on the basis of equally-weighted portfolios of companies which belong to the 
corresponding industry. Value-creating (value-destroying) acquisitions are defined as acquisitions for which the Combined CAR corresponding to a value-weighted portfolio 
of the acquirer and target companies is positive (negative). Panel A (Panel B) presents the results pertaining to all (state) companies. State companies are defined as companies 
which are domiciled in the same state as the acquirer company. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
194 
 
Bibliography 
Agrawal, A. and R. Walkling (1994), ‘Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding  
Takeover Bids’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, pp. 985-1014. 
Aharony, J. and A. Dotan (1994), ‘Regular Dividend Announcements and Future Unexpected  
Earnings: An Empirical Analysis’, Financial Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 125-51. 
Allen, F., A. Bernardo and I. Welch (2000), ‘A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax  
Clienteles’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No. 6, pp. 2499-536. 
Allen, F. and R. Michaely (2003), ‘Payout Policy’, In Handbook of the Economics of Finance  
1A, ed. Constantinides, G., Harris, M., Stulz, R. 337-429. Amsterdam: North-Holland-
Elsevier. 
Alzahrani, M. and M. Lasfer (2012), ‘Investor Protection, Taxation, and Dividends’, Journal  
of Corporate Finance, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 745-62. 
Andrade, G., M. Mitchell and E. Stafford (2001), ‘New Evidence and Perspectives on  
Mergers’, Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 15, pp. 103-20. 
Anyanwu, J. (2012), ‘Why Does Foreign Direct Investment Go Where It Goes?: New 
Evidence from African Countries’, Annals of Economics and Finance, Vol.13, No.2, 
pp. 433-70. 
Appadu, N., A. Faelten, S. Moeller and V. Vitkova (2014), ‘Assessing Market Attractiveness  
for Mergers and Acquisitions: The M&A Attractiveness Index Score’, The European  
Journal of Finance, Routledge, pp 1-24.  
Asquith, P., R. Gertner and D. Scharfstein (1994), ‘Anatomy of Financial Distress: An 
Examination of Junk Bond Issuers’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, pp.  
625-58. 
Bae, K., R. Stultz and H. Tan (2008), ‘Do Local Analysts Know More? A Cross-country  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
195 
 
Study of the Performance of Local Analysts and Foreign Analysts’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol.88, pp. 581-606. 
Baker, M., R. Ruback and J. Wurgler (2005), ‘Behavioural Corporate Finance: A Survey’,  
The National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 10863. 
 Retrieved from: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10863 
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2004), ‘A Catering Theory of Dividends’, Journal of Finance,  
Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 1125-65. 
Barber, B. and J. Lyon (1997), ‘Detecting Long-run Abnormal Stock Returns: The Empirical  
Power and Specification of Test Statistics’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.43, 
pp. 341-72. 
Becker, B, Ivkovic, Z., Weisbenner, S. (2011) ‘Local Dividend Clienteles’, Journal of  
Finance, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp. 655-83. 
Benartzi, S., R. Michaely and R. Thaler (1997), ‘Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future  
or the Past?’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 1007-34. 
Bergström, C., T. Eisenberg, S. Sundgren and M. Wells (2005), ‘The Fate of Firms:  
Explaining Mergers and Bankruptcies’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 2, No. 
1, pp. 49-85. 
Berkovitch, E. and M. Narayanan (1993), ‘Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical  
Investigation’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, pp. 347-62. 
Berthelemy, J. and S. Demurger (2000), ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth:  
Theory and application to China’, Review of Development Economics, Vol.4, No.2,  
pp. 140-55. 
Bouwman, C., K. Fuller and A. Nain (2009), ‘Market Valuation and Acquisition Quality: 
 Empirical Evidence’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 633-79. 
Brennan, M., J. and H. Cao (1997), ‘International Portfolio Investment Flows’, Journal of  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
196 
 
Finance, Vol.52, pp. 1851-80. 
Bruner, R. (1988), ‘The Use of Excess Cash and Debt Capacity as a Motive for Merger’, 
 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.23, pp. 199-217. 
Bushee, B. (1998), ‘The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment  
Behaviour’, Accounting Review, Vol.73, pp. 305-33. 
Bushee, B. and C. Noe (2000), ‘Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional Investors, and  
Stock Return Volatility’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.38, pp. 171-202. 
Black, F (1976), ‘The Dividend Puzzle’, Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp.  
5-8. 
Blair, R. and J. Harrison (1993), ‘Monopsony: Antitrust Law and Economics’, Princeton  
University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Bloster, P. and J. Vahan (1991), ‘Dividend Policy and Valuation Effects of the Tax Reform  
Act of 1986’, National Tax Journal, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 511-18. 
Bollaert, H., S. Dereeper and A. Turki (2013), ‘Dividend Policy and Mergers and  
Acquisitions’, SSRN Manuscript. 
Retrieved from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628122 
Bradley, M., A. Desai and E. Kim (1988), ‘Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions  
and Their Division between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms’, Journal 
of  Financial Economics, Vol. 21, pp. 3-40. 
Brav, A., J. Graham, C. Harvey and A. Michaely (2008), ‘Managerial Response to the May  
2003 Dividend Tax Cut’, Financial Management, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 611-24. 
Brav, A., J. Graham, C. Harvey and A. Michaely (2005), ‘Payout Policy in the 21st Century’,  
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 483-527. 
Brealey, R., C. Myers and F. Allen (2006), Corporate Finance, 8th edition, McGraw–Hill  
Irwin. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
197 
 
Brook, Y., D. Charlton and R. Hendershott (1998), ‘Do Firms Use Dividends to Signal Large  
Future Cash Flow Increases?’, Financial Management, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 46-57. 
Brown, S. and J. Warner (1985), ‘Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies’,  
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 3-31. 
Bruner, R. (2002), ‘Does M&A Pay? A Survey for the Decision-maker’, Journal of Applied  
Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 48-60. 
Bulan, L. and N. Subramanian (2009), ‘Dividends and Dividend Policy’, Theory of  
Dividends, Ed. Kent, B., John Wiley and Son inc Haboken New Jesrsey. 
Carow K., R. Heron and T. Saxton (2004), ‘Do Early Birds Get the Returns? An Empirical  
Investigation of Early-mover Advantages in Acquisitions’, Strategic Management  
Journal, Vol.25, pp. 563-85. 
Casey, K., D. Anderson and R. Dickens (1999), ‘Examining the Impact of the 1986 Tax  
Reform Act on Corporate Dividend Policy: A New Methodology’, Financial Review,  
Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 33-46. 
Chen, X., J. Harford and K. Li (2007), ‘Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?’, Journal of  
Financial Economics, Vol.86, pp. 279-305. 
Chetty, R. and E. Saez (2005), ‘Dividend Taxes and Corporate Behaviour: Evidence from the  
2003 Dividend Tax Cut’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120, No. 3, pp. 791-
833. 
Clark, K. and E. Ofek (1994), ‘Mergers as a Means of Restructuring Distressed Firms: An  
Empirical Investigation’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 29, pp.  
541-65. 
Comment, R. and G. Schwert (1995), ‘Poison or placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and  
Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures’, Journal of Financial Economics,  
Vol. 39, pp. 3-43.  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
198 
 
Conn, R., A. Cosh, A., P. Guest and A. Hughes (2005), ‘The Impact on UK Acquirers of  
Domestic, Cross-border, Public, and Private Acquisitions’, Journal of Business  
Finance & Accounting, Vol.32, No.5, pp. 815-70. 
Copeland, T., F. Weston and K. Shastri (2005), ‘Financial Theory and Corporate Policy’, 4th  
edition, Pearson Education, International Edition. 
Cosh, A. and P. Guest (2001), ‘The Long-run Performance of Hostile Takeovers: UK  
Evidence’, ESRC Centre for Business Research Working Papers (ESRC Centre for  
Business Research). 
Retrieved from: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP215.pdf 
Coval, J. and T. Moskowitz (2001), ‘The Geography of Investment: Informed Trading and  
Asset Prices’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.109, pp. 811-41. 
Coval, J. and T. Moskowitz (1999), ‘Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in  
Domestic Portfolios’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, pp. 2045-73. 
Danbolt, J. and G. Maciver (2012), ‘Cross-border versus Domestic Acquisitions and the 
 Impact on Shareholder Wealth’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol.39,  
No.7, pp. 1028-67. 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo and D. Skinner (1996), ‘Reversal of Fortune: Dividend  
Signalling and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth’, Journal of  
Financial Economics, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 341-71. 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo and D. Skinner (1992), ‘Dividends and Losses’, Journal of  
Finance, Vol. 47, No. 5, pp. 1837-63. 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo and R. Stulz (2006), ‘Dividend Policy and the  
Earned/Contributed Capital Mix: A Test of the Life-Cycle Theory’, Journal of  
Financial Economics, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 227-54. 
Del Guercio, D. (1996), ‘The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-man Laws on Institutional  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
199 
 
Equity Investments’, Journal of Financial and Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 31-62. 
Denis, D. and I. Osobov (2008), ‘Why Do Firms Pay Dividends? International Evidence on  
the Determinants of Dividend Policy’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89, No.  
1, pp. 62-82. 
Desai, M. and L. Jin (2011), ‘Institutional Tax Clienteles and Payout Policy’, Journal of  
Financial Economics, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 68-84.  
Devos, E., P. Kadapakkam and S. Krishnamurthy (2008), ‘How Do Mergers Create Value? A  
Comparison of Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations 
for Synergies’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 1179-211. 
Dhaliwal, D., M. Erickson and R. Trezevant (1999), ‘A Test of the Theory of Tax Clienteles  
or Dividend Policies’, National Tax Journal, Vol. 52, pp. 179-94. 
Djankov, S., O. Hart, C. McLeish and A. Shleifer (2007), ‘Private Credit in 129 Countries’,  
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 84, pp. 299-329. 
Domowitz, I., G. Hubbard and B. Petersen (1986), ‘Business Cycles and the Relationship  
between Concentration and Price-costs Margins’, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.  
17, pp. 1-17. 
Dye, R. and S. Sridhar (2003), ‘Investment Implications of Information Acquisition and  
Leakage’, Management Science, Vol. 49, pp.767-83. 
Eckbo, E. (1983), ‘Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth’ Journal of  
Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 241-73. 
Eckbo, E. (1985), ‘Mergers and the Market Concentration Doctrine: Evidence from the  
Capital Market’, Journal of Business, Vol. 58, pp. 325-49. 
Eckbo, E. (1992), ‘Mergers and the Value of Antitrust Deterrence’, Journal of Finance, Vol.  
47, pp. 1005-29. 
Ejie, H. and W. Megginson (2008), ‘Dividend and Share Repurchases in the European  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
200 
 
Union’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 347-74. 
Faccio, M. and R. Sengupta (2006), ‘Corporate Response to Distress: Evidence from the  
Asian Financial Crisis’, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper Series No  
004A. 
Retrieved from: http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/11/03/127- 
154Sengupta.pdf 
Fama, E. and K. French (2001), ‘Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or  
Lower Propensity to Pay?’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 3-43. 
Fama, E. and K. French (2002), ‘Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions about  
Dividends and Debt’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 1-33. 
Fan, J. and L. Lang (2000), ‘The Measurement of Relatedness: An Application to Corporate  
Diversification’, Journal of Business, Vol. 73, pp. 629-60. 
Farrar, D. and L. Selwyn (1967), ‘Taxes, Corporate Financial Policy and Return to Investors’,  
National Tax Journal, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 444-54. 
Fee, C. and S. Thomas (2004), ‘Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from  
Customer, Supplier, and Rival Firms’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 74, pp. 
423-60. 
Ferreira, M., M. Massa and P. Matos (2009), ‘Shareholders at the Gate? Institutional  
Investors and Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions’, The Review of Financial  
Studies, Vol.23, pp. 601-44. 
Financial Reporting Council (2010), ‘UK Stewardship Code’. 
Retrieved from: https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7 
d540923533a6 
Franks, J., K. Nyborg and W. Torous (1996), ‘A Comparison of US, UK, and German  
Insolvency Codes’, Financial Management, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 86-101. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
201 
 
Frank, R. and D. Solomon (2002), ‘Cable Industry Mergers? Let’s Count the Ways’, The  
Wall Street Journal, January 22, C1. 
Fuller, K., J. Netter and M. Stegemoller (2002), ‘What do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell 
Us? Evidence from Firms that Make Many Acquisitions’, Journal of Finance, Vol.57, 
pp. 1763-94. 
Galbraith, J. (1952), ‘American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power’,  
Houghton-Mifflin, Boston. 
Gaughan, P. (2005) ‘Merger: What Can Go Wrong and How to Prevent It’, John Wiley &  
Sons Inc, United States. 
Gietzmann, M. (2006), ‘Disclosure of Timely and Forward-looking Statements and Strategic  
Management of Major Institutional Ownership’, Long Range Planning, Vol.39, No.4, 
pp. 409-27. 
Gonedes, N. (1978) ‘Corporate Signalling, External Accounting, and Capital Market  
Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends, Income, and Extraordinary Items’, Journal of  
Accounting Research, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 26-79. 
Graham, J., Kumar, A. (2006), ‘Dividend Preference of Retail Investors: Do Dividend  
Clienteles Exist?’ Journal of Finance, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 1305-36. 
Graham, J., L. Lemmon and G. Wolf (2002), ‘Does Corporate Diversification Destroy  
Diversification’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 695-720. 
Grinblatt, M. and M. Keloharju (2001), ‘How Distance, Language, and Culture Influence 
 Stockholdings and Trades’, Journal of Finance, Vol.56, pp. 1053-73. 
Grinstein, Y. and R. Michaely (2005), ‘Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy’, Journal of  
Finance, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 1389-426. 
Grullon, G., R. Michaely, S. Benartzi and R. Thaler (2005), ‘Dividend Changes Do Not  
Signal Changes in Future Profitability’, Journal of Business, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp.  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
202 
 
1659-82. 
Harzing, A. (2002), ‘Acquisitions versus Greenfield Investments: International Strategy and  
Management of Entry Modes’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 49, pp.  357- 
70. 
Hau, H. (2001), ‘Location Matters: an examination of trading profits’, Journal of Finance,  
Vol. 56, pp. 1959-83. 
Healy, P., K. Palepu and R. Ruback (1992), ‘Does Corporate Performance Improve  
after Mergers?’, Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 31, pp. 135-76. 
Hoberg, G. and R. Prabhala (2009), ‘Disappearing Dividends: The Importance of  
Idiosyncratic Risk and the Irrelevance of Catering’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol.  
22, pp. 79-116. 
Holl, P. and J., F. Pickering (1988), ‘The Determinants and Effects of Actual Abandoned and  
Contested Mergers’, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol.9, pp. 1-19. 
Holland, J. (2006), ‘Fund Management, Intellectual Capital, Intangibles and Private  
Disclosure’, Managerial Finance, Vol.32, pp. 277-316. 
Holmen, M., J. Knopf and P. Stefan (2008), ‘Inside Shareholders’ Effective Tax Rates and  
Dividends’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 32, No. 9, pp. 1860-69. 
Hotchkiss, E. and S. Lawrence (2007), ‘Empirical Evidence on the Existence of Dividend  
Clienteles’, SSRN Manuscript. 
Retrieved from: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1001429  
Hotchkiss, E. and R. Mooradian (1998), ‘Acquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in  
Chapter 11’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 240-62. 
Huang, Y. and R. Walkling (1987), ‘Target Abnormal Returns Associated with Acquisition  
Announcements – Payment, Acquisition Form, and Managerial Resistance’, Journal 
 of Financial Economics, Vol.19, pp. 329-49. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
203 
 
Huberman, G. (2001), ‘Familiarity Breeds Investment’, The Review of Financial Studies,  
Vol.14, pp. 659-80. 
Jain, R. (2007), ‘Institutional and Individual Investor Preferences for Dividends and Share  
Repurchases’, Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 59, No. 5, pp. 406-29. 
Jennings, R. and M. Mazzeo (1991), ‘Stock Price Movements around Acquisition 
 Announcements and Management’s Response’, Journal of Business, Vol.64, pp.139- 
63. 
Jensen, M. (1986), ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers’,  
American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 323-9. 
Jensen, M. (1991), ‘Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance’, Journal of Applied  
Corporate Finance, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 13-33. 
Jensen, M. (1993), ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal  
Control Systems’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 831-80. 
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency  
Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-60. 
Jensen, M. and R. Ruback (1983), ‘The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific  
Evidence’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 5-50. 
Jeon, J., J. Ligon and C. Sorankom (2010), ‘Dividend Policy and the Method of Payment in  
Mergers and Acquisitions’, Unpublished Manuscript. 
Retrieved from: http://www.apjfs.org/conference/2010/cafm2010/5-3.pdf 
Kale, J., O. Kini and J. Payne (2012), ‘On the Dividend Initiation Decisions of Newly Public  
Firms’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 47, pp. 365-96. 
Katics, M. and B. Petersen (1994), ‘The Effect of Rising Import Competition on Market  
Power: A Panel Data Study of US Manufacturing’, Journal of Industrial Economics,  
Vol. 42, pp. 277-86. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
204 
 
Kang, J. and M. Stulz (1997), ‘Why is There a Home Bias?’, Journal of Financial 
 Economics, Vol.46, pp. 3-28. 
Kouvelis, P. and W. Zhao (2012), ‘Financing the Newsvendor: Supplier vs. Bank, and the 
 Structure of Optimal Trade Credit Contracts’, Operations Research, Vol. 60, No.3, pp. 
 566-80. 
Lang, L. and R. Litzenberger (1989), ‘Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signalling vs.  
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp.  
137-54. 
Lang, L. and R. Stulz (1992), ‘Contagion and Competitive Intra-industry Effects of  
Bankruptcy Announcements’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 45-60. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1997), ‘Legal Determinants of  
External Finance’, Journal of Finance, Vol.52, pp. 1131-50. 
Lee, K., F. (2010), ‘Demographics, Dividend Clienteles and the Dividend Premium’,  
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 368-75. 
Lewellen, G., K. Stanley, R. Lease and G. Schlarbaum (1978), ‘Some Direct Evidence on the  
Dividend Clientele Phenomenon’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 33, No. 5, pp. 1385-99. 
Li, K. (2004), ‘Confidence in the Familiar: an international perspective’, Journal of Financial  
and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.39, pp. 47-68. 
Li, W. and E. Lie (2006), ‘Dividend Changes and Catering Incentives’, Journal of Financial  
Economics, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 293-308. 
Lie, E. (2000), ‘Excess Funds and Agency Problems: An Empirical Study of Incremental  
Disbursements’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 219-47. 
Lintner, J. (1956), ‘Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained  
Earnings, and Taxes’, American Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 97-113. 
Liu, X., C. Shu and P. Sinclair (2009), ‘Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
205 
 
Growth in Asian Economies’, Applied Economics, Vol.41, No.13, pp. 1603-12. 
Loughran, T. and A. Vijh (1997), ‘Do Long-term Shareholders Benefit from Corporate  
Acquisitions?’, Journal of Finance, Vol.52, pp. 1765-90. 
Ivkovic, Z. and S. Weisbenner (2005), ‘Local Does as Local Is: Information content of the  
Geography of Individual Investors’ Common Stock Investments’, Journal of Finance,  
Vol.60, pp. 267-306. 
Maksimovic, V. and G. Phillips (2001), ‘The Market for Corporate Assets: Who Engages in  
Mergers and Asset Sales and Are There Efficiency Gains?’, Journal of Finance, pp.  
2019-65. 
Malloy, C., J. (2005), ‘The Geography of Equity Analysis’, Journal of Finance, Vol.60, pp.  
719-55. 
Maquieira, C., W. Megginson and L. Nail (1998), ‘Wealth Creation Versus Wealth  
Redistributions in Pure Stock for Stock Mergers’, Journal of Financial Economics,  
Vol. 48, pp. 3-33. 
Martin, K. and J. McConnell (1991), ‘Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and  
Management Turnover’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, pp. 671-87. 
Martynova, M., S. Oosting and L. Renneboog (2006), ‘The Long-term Operating  
Performance of European Mergers and Acquisitions’, in Advances in Corporate  
Finance and Asset Pricing, L. Renneboog (ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Martynova, M. and L. Renneboog (2006), ‘Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe’, in Advances  
in Corporate Finance and Asset Pricing, L. Renneboog (ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Megginson, L., A. Morgan and L. Nail (2004), ‘The Determinants of Positive Long-term  
Performance in Strategic Mergers: Corporate focus and cash’, Journal of Banking and  
Finance, Vol.28, pp. 523-52. 
Mateev, M. (2009), ‘Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Southeastern  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
206 
 
Europe: New empirical tests’, Oxford Journal, Vol.8, No.1, pp. 133-49. 
Michaely, R., R. Thaler and K. Womack (1995), ‘Price Reactions to Dividend Initiations and  
Omissions: Overreaction and Drift?’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, pp. 573-608. 
Mikkelson, W. and M. Partch (1988), ‘Withdrawn Security Offerings’, Journal of Financial  
and Quantitative Analysis 23, 119-33. 
Miller, M. and F. Modigliani (1961), ‘Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares’,  
Journal of Business, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 411-33. 
Mitchell, M., L. and J., H. Mulherin (1996), ‘The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and  
Restructuring Activity’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 193-229. 
Mitchell, M. and E. Stafford (2000), ‘Managerial Decisions and Long-term Stock Price – 
 Performance’, Journal of Business, Vol.73, No.3, pp. 287-329. 
Moeller, S. and F. Schlingemann (2005), ‘Global Diversification and Acquirer Gains: A  
Comparison between Cross-border and Domestic Acquisitions’, Journal of Banking  
and Finance, Vol. 29, pp. 533-64. 
Mulherin, H., J. and A., L. Boone (2000), ‘Comparing Acquisitions and Divestitures’,  
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 6, pp. 117-39. 
Nieuwerburgh, S. and L. Veldkamp (2009), ‘Information Immobility and the Home Bias  
Puzzle’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 64, No.3, pp. 1187-215. 
Nissim, D. and A. Ziv (2001), ‘Dividend Changes and Future Profitability’, Journal of  
Finance, Vol. 56, No. 6, pp. 2111-33. 
Ogden, J., F. Jen and P. O’Connor (2003), ‘Advanced Corporate Finance: Policies and  
Strategies’, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Page, D., S. Jahera and W. Pugh (1996), ‘The Effect of Takeover Defences on the Firm  
Dividend Decision’, Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 49-58. 
Papaioannou, J. and C. Savarese (1994), ‘Corporate Dividend Policy Response to the Tax  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
207 
 
Reform Act of 1986’, Financial Management, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 56-63. 
Penman, S. (1983), ‘The Predictive Content of Earnings Forecasts and Dividends’, Journal of  
Finance, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 1181-99. 
Perez-Gonzales, F. (2003), ‘Large Shareholders and Dividends: Evidence from U.S. Tax  
Reforms’, SSRN Manuscript. 
Retrieved from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=337640 
Perotti, E., C. and K., E. Spier (1993) ‘Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The role of 
 Leverage in Contract Renegotiation’,  American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 5, 
 pp. 1131-41. 
Pettit, R. (1977), ‘Taxes, Transaction Costs and the Clientele Effect of Dividends’, Journal of  
Financial Economics, Vol. 5, pp. 419-36. 
Porter, M. (1993), ‘The Competitive Advantage of Nations’, Journal of Development  
Economics, Vol.40, No.2, pp. 399-404. 
Quazi, R. (2007), ‘Economic Freedom and Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia’, Journal  
of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol.12, No.3, pp. 329-44. 
Ravenscraft, D. (1983), ‘Structure-profit Relationship at the Line of Business and Industry  
Level’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 65, pp. 22-31. 
Rau, P. and T. Vermaelen (1998), ‘Glamour, Value and the Post-acquisition Performance of  
Acquiring Firms’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.49, pp. 223-53. 
Ravid, S., A., and S. Sundgren (1998), ‘The Comparative Efficiency of Small-firm  
Bankruptcies: A Study of the US and Finnish Bankruptcy Codes’, Financial  
Management, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 28-40. 
Rossi, S., and P., F. Volpin (2004), ‘Cross-country Determinants of Mergers and  
Acquisitions.' Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 74, pp. 277-304. 
Ryngaert, M. and R. Scholten (2010), ‘Have Changing Takeover Defence Rules and  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
208 
 
Strategies Entrenched Management and Damaged Shareholders? The Case of  
Defeated Takeover Bids’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 16 (1), 16-37.  
Saborowski, C. (2011), ‘Can Financial Development Cure the Dutch Disease?’, International  
Journal of Finance & Economics, Vol.16, No.3, pp. 218-36. 
Schlingemann, F., P., R. Stultz and S., B. Moeller (2005), ‘Wealth Destruction on a Massive  
Scale: A Study of Acquirer Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave’, Journal of  
Finance, Vol.60, pp. 757-82. 
Scholz, J., K. (1992), ‘A Direct Examination of the Dividend Clientele Hypothesis’, Journal  
of Public Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 261-85. 
Schwert, G. (2000), ‘Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder’, Journal of  
Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 2599-640. 
Sekkat, K. and M. Veganzones-Varoudakis (2004), ‘Trade and Foreign Exchange  
Liberalisation, Investment Climate and FDI in the MENA Countries’, Unpublished 
Manuscript (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International). 
Retrieved from: http://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2004/2004.30.pdf 
Servaes, H. (1991), ‘Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 46,  
pp. 409-419. 
Shahrur, H. (2005), ‘Industry Structure and Horizontal Takeovers: Analysis of Wealth Effects  
on Rivals, Suppliers, and Corporate Customers’, Journal of Financial Economics,  
Vol. 76, pp. 61-98. 
Snyder, C. (1996), ‘A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power’, Rand Journal of  
Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 747-69. 
Song, M. and R. Walkling (2000), ‘Abnormal Returns to Rivals of Acquisition Targets: A  
Test of the ‘‘Acquisition Probability Hypothesis’’’, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 55, pp. 143-71. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
209 
 
Stigler, G., J. (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72,  
pp. 44-61. 
Strickland, D. (1996), ‘Determinants of Institutional Ownership: Implications for Dividend  
Clienteles’, SSRN Manuscript. 
Retrieved from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=8204 
Tong, T., T. Alessandri, J. Reuer and A. Chintakananda (2008), ‘Sources of Valuable Growth  
Options: A multi-country analysis’, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol.39,  
pp. 387-405. 
Travlos, N. (1987), ‘Corporate Takeover Bids, Method of Payment and Bidding Firm’s Stock  
Returns’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, pp. 943-963. 
Uysal, V., S. Kedia and V. Panchapagesan (2008), ‘Geography and Acquirer Returns’,  
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol.17, pp. 256-75. 
Watts, R. (1973), ‘The Information Content of Dividends’, Journal of Business, Vol. 46, No.  
2, pp. 191-211.  
Weston, J., F., M., L. Mitchell and J., H. Mulherin ‘Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate  
Governance’, Prentice Hall 2004 (4th edition). 
Wilner, B., S. (2000) ‘The Exploitation of Relationships in Financial Distress: The Case of 
 Trade Credit’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 153-78. 
Winter, J. (2011), ‘Shareholder Engagement and Stewardship: The Realities and Illusions of  
Institutional Share Ownership’, SSRN Manuscript. 
Retrieved from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1867564 
Wong, S. (2010), ‘Index-based Investing Mars Stewardship’, Financial Times, 13 June. 
Yang, S., A. and J., R. Birge (2009) ‘How Inventory is (Should Be) Financed: Trade Credit in 
 Supply Chains with Demand Uncertainty and Costs of Financial Distress’, 
 Unpublished Manuscript. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
210 
 
 Retrieved from SSRN eLibrary doi:10.2139/ssrn.1734682. 
Yang, S., J. Birge and J. Parker (2014), ‘The Supply Chain Effects of Bankruptcy’, SSRN  
Manuscript.  
Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2080436. 
Yartey, C., A. (2008), ‘The Determinants of Stock Market Development in Emerging  
Economies: Is South Africa different?’, IMF Working Paper WP 08/32. 
Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp0832.pdf 
Zhang, G. (2010), ‘Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Is It Good News or Bad News for 
 Industry Competitors? ’, Financial Management, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 1719-42. 
Zingales, L. and R. Rajan (1995), ‘What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some 
 Evidence from International Data’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, pp. 1421-60. 
